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INTRODUCTION
The number of couples in the United States who are medically
deemed infertile is rising at an alarming rate.' These numbers are
expected to increase dramatically within the next two decades.2  In
response to this growing concern, medical researchers have attempted
to assist infertile couples by developing methods which give them a
chance at having a 100% genetically related child.' The first major
medical advance-in vitro fertilization ("IVF") -allowed doctors
more control over the human reproductive process.4 IVF has been
expanded to allow a gestational carrier, a woman who is not the
1. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
3. For an overview of the basic techniques used in assisted reproduction, see
infra Part I.E.
4. For a history of IVF, see infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
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genetic parent of the fetus, to carry a fetus to term for the intended
parents. I This allows couples to have genetically related children
even when the woman has no means of bearing a child herself.6
It is important to contrast gestational carrier situations with
traditional surrogacy; the procedures differ in a critical way. In
traditional surrogacy the intended father and the woman who carries
the fetus provide its genetic make-up.7 By contrast, in gestational
surrogacy, the woman who carries the fetus has provided none of the
genetic material.' In many cases, both of the intended parents provide
the genetic material for the fetus.9 It is clear, however, that with both
5. This article will use either the term "gestational carrier" or "gestator" to refer
to the woman who bears and gives birth to the child. The couple who provides the
genetic material for the child will be referred to either as "intended parents" or
"genetic mother/father." These terms are in keeping with the scientific and legal
literature in the area. See Unif. Parentage Act art. 8, prefatory cmt. (2000) (using the
term "gestational mother" because the woman "provides the gestational heritage of a
child to be raised by the intended parents"); Frances R. Batzer et al., Genetic
Offspring in Patients with Vaginal Agenesis: Specific Medical and Legal Issues, 167
Am. J. Gynecol. 1288, 1291 (1992) (recommending the term gestational carrier be
used "to avoid confusion and eliminate the negative connotation of other
terminologies"); Hilary Hanafin, Surrogacy and Gestational Carrier Participants, in
Infertility Counseling: A Comprehensive Handbook for Clinicians 376 (Linda
Hammer Burns & Sharon N. Covington eds., 1999). The term "surrogate" is deemed
disparaging by some medical professionals and authors. See Hanafin, supra, at 376:
Nicole Miller Healy, Beyond Surrogacy: Gestational Parenting Agreements Under
California Law, 1 UCLA Women's L.J. 89,90 n.5 (1991).
6. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
7. In traditional surrogacy, the child is conceived pursuant to an agreement
under which the surrogate will turn the child over to the male who provides the
inseminating sperm. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
8. See Jaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 695 (1996); see also infra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text. Cheryl Tiegs and James Taylor are two high-
profile individuals who, with their separate spouses, have had children by gestational
carriers. Julie K.L. Dam & Meg Grant, Bringing Up Babies, People, Nov. 27,2000, at
68 (stating that Tiegs and her husband were having twin boys); Ellen Glazer, Sharing
a Pregnancy Society: What is It Like for a Woman to Bear Another Woman's Child?,
Boston Globe, June 10, 2001, at Cl (indicating that Taylor and his wife were
expecting twins); Karen Springen et al., Should You Have Your Baby Now?,
Newsweek, Aug. 13, 2001, at 40, 44 (stating that Tiegs used her own eggs in the
process).
9. The intended parents do not always contribute the genetic material; in some
cases, it may be contributed by third-party donors. See, e.g., Jaycee B., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 696 (gestator carried fetus which was created from donor sperm and donor eggs);
Unif. Parentage Act art. 8, prefatory cmt. (2000) (stating that an "egg donor or a
sperm donor, or both, may be involved"). For additional information on the Jaycee
B. case, see Jerald V. Hale, From Baby M. to Jaycee B.: Fathers, Mothers, and
Children in the Brave New World, 24 J. Contemp. L. 335 (1998) (discussing the legal
consequences of assisted reproductive technology); Christine L Kerian, Surrogacy: A
Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a Coinmodification of Women's Bodies
and Children?, 12 Wis. Women's L.J. 113 (1997) (supporting the enforcement of
surrogacy contracts and urging government regulation); Gary Whiter, Surrogate
Contracts: Another Cry from the California Courts for Legislative Action, 19 J. Juv. L
437 (1998) (discussing the need for legislation that regulates surrogate contracts and
urging the legislature to provide specific definitions for "parents").
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traditional and gestational surrogacy the intended parents must rely
on the gestator to take care of the fetus and, ultimately, to deliver to
the intended parents a child who is as healthy as reasonably possible.
This Article posits that the requirement of a gestational carrier to
produce a reasonably healthy child, by necessity, negates the
gestational carrier's fundamental right to abort the fetus."0
While both types of surrogacy arrangements have faced
considerable opposition and engendered heated debate, gestational
surrogacy has received heightened attention because of the deep
conflicts of interest between the intended parents, the fetus and the
gestational carrier." Indeed, the infertile couple, who desperately
want a genetically related child, must endure tremendous emotional,
physical and financial burdens with only a slim chance that their hope
of a child will be realized.12 The gestational carrier, however, also
suffers considerable physical and emotional burdens given that
carrying the fetus is a great intrusion upon her bodily integrity, albeit
one voluntarily undertaken. The gestational carrier knows the
purpose for which she has agreed to become a gestator and
acknowledges the rights she temporarily surrenders for the benefit of
the intended parents and fetus.
The authors argue that while the Supreme Court has determined
the right to abort is a fundamental right of privacy, the right should
not be absolute.13 In situations where a gestational carrier is used, the
right to abort must be balanced against the rights of both the fetus and
the intended parents. The authors conclude that, based on the context
within which these arguments are made, the gestational carrier must
be required to carry the fetus to term unless her own life or health is
at stake. 4
The authors suggest that trust law might provide the legal
justification to limit the rights of a gestational carrier to abort the
fetus. 5 We argue that the gestational carrier is the trustee of the
fetus, whom the intended parents have entrusted to her. As a result,
the gestational carrier has a fiduciary obligation to carry the unborn
fetus to term.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four primary sections.
Part I discusses the medical aspects of infertility treatments, detailing
the history of in vitro fertilization, how the female reproductive
10. For a discussion on the right to abortion, see infra Part II. For the argument
that the right of the gestational carrier to abort should be limited, see infra Part III.
11. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text (regarding costs) and Parts I.E-F
(regarding the IVF procedure).
13. See infra notes 366-71 and accompanying text.
14. See Unif. Parentage Act § 801(f) (2000) ("A gestational agreement may not
limit the right of the gestational mother to make decisions to safeguard her health or
that of the embryos or fetus.").
15. See infra Part III.
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system works and the present methods used in IVF. Part II reviews
the right to obtain an abortion in the United States under current case
law. Part III applies trust law to gestational carrier arrangements and
finds that there is a fiduciary duty owed to both the intended parents
and the fetus. Finally, Part IV discusses the various arguments against
restricting abortion and why those arguments do not apply to limiting
the right to abort in the gestational carrier situation.
I. MEDICAL HISTORY AND INFORMATION ABOUT ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION
A. A Short History of Assisted Reproduction
The first successful in vitro procedure, or "test-tube" baby, was
born on July 25, 1978.16 Louise Brown was born to John and Lesley
Brown, who had been trying to have a child for twelve years.'7 The
procedure was performed in England by obstetrician Patrick Steptoe
and reproductive physiologist Robert Edwards."8 Oddly, no formal
16. Robert Edwards & Patrick Steptoe, A Matter of Life 176-81 (1980); see also
Walter Sullivan, "Test-Tube" Baby Born in the U.S., Joining Successes Around the
World, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1981, at Cl (reporting birth of the first test-tube baby
born in an American hospital). The first attempt at IVF in the United States was in
1973 in New York with John and Doris Del Zio. See Otto Friedrich, "A Legal, Moral,
Social Nightmare:" Society Seeks to Define the Problems of the Birth Revolution,
Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at 55. The procedure utilized was extremely crude as compared
with today's methods. Mrs. Del Zio had one egg removed by laparoscopy; it was
placed in a container and taken across New York City in a taxi to Columbia-
Presbyterian Medical Center. See id. The egg was fertilized with Mr. Del Zio's sperm
and placed in an incubator. Id. Before transfer, Dr. Raymond Vande Wiele, removed
the test-tube holding the egg and sperm from the incubator since he was upset that
the procedure was being performed. See id. His act succeeded in killing the embryo.
See id. The Del Zios sued the hospital and received $50,000 in damages. See id.; Del
Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74-3588. 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14. 1978). For additional comments on the Del Zio case, see Alexander Morgan
Capron, Alternative Birth Technologies: Legal Challenges. 20 U.C. Davis L Rev. 679,
691 (1987); Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 Conn.
L. Rev. 305. 313-14 (1993): Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and
Legal Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 2 DePaul J. Health Care L 703, 747-48 (1999);
Lynne M. Thomas, Comment. Abandoned Frozen Embryos And Teras Law Of
Abandoned Personal Property: Should There Be A Connection?, 29 St. Mary's LJ.
255,276-78 (1997).
17. See Anne Taylor Fleming, New Frontiers in Conception, N.Y. Times, July 20,
1980, § 6, at 14. For the parents' story, see Leslie Brown & John Brown, Our Miracle
Called Louise: A Parent's Story (1979).
18. John D. Biggers, In Vitro Fertilization and Eibryo Transfer ii Human Beings,
304 New Eng. J. Med. 336. 337 (1981): see also Claudia Wallis, The New Origins of
Life: How the Science of Conception Brings Hope to Childless Couples, Time, Sept.
10, 1984, at 46 (describing the history of in vitro fertilization and modern
advancements). The first successful IVF procedure in the United States was in 1981
with Roger and Judy Carr, who delivered a five pound, twelve ounce girl they named
Elizabeth Jordan Carr. Sullivan, supra note 16. The physicians were the wife and
husband team of Drs. Georgeanna and Howard Jones. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, A
2001]
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paper was ever published regarding this historic endeavor. 19 While
much was made over the birth of Louise Brown, the success rate for
Drs. Steptoe and Edwards was only two live births among the first
seventy-nine patients." The low success rate was due to the
procedures they used to perform IVF.
In the first attempts at IVF, doctors made no effort to regulate the
women's hormones or stimulate the ovaries to produce more than the
normal number of eggs per cycle.21 Attempts to cause the ovaries to
produce more than the normal one egg per cycle ("superovulation")
were not made during the early attempts at IVF because, during early
trials, superovulated eggs failed to implant. Doctors felt this failure to
implant was due to the drugs used, which affected the womb.2 With
the woman under general anesthetic, a laparoscope was used to
recover any eggs present, but since the timing for egg release by the
ovaries was uncertain, the attempt was often unsuccessful. 3 In
contrast to present protocols followed after egg retrieval, the early
IVF attempts tried to fertilize the eggs with the sperm as soon as
possible after the eggs were recovered.24
Revolution in Making Babies, Time, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56, 62; see also John A.
Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 Hastings L.J. 911,
911 (1996) (discussing assisted reproductive techniques available to infertile couples).
19. Fleming, supra note 17. Steptoe and Edwards did publish several non-
technical papers on their achievement. See Edwards & Steptoe, supra note 16, at 176-
81; P.C. Steptoe & R.G. Edwards, Birth After the Reimplantation of a Human
Embryo, 2 Lancet 366 (1978).
20. See Biggers, supra note 18, at 338 (reporting a three percent success rate for
Steptoe and Edwards in their first attempts); Fleming, supra note 17. The second
child, a boy, was born to another couple and was named Alastair Montgomery. See
Fleming, supra note 17; Test-Tube Babies: Doing What Comes Naturally-Ahnost,
Economist, Feb. 3, 1979, at 88 [hereinafter Test-Tube Babies].
21. See Edwards & Steptoe, supra note 16, at 145; see also Fleming, supra note 17;
Test-Tube Babies, supra note 20, at 88 ("The team has ceased to use hormones to help
nature along, the point being to interfere as little as possible with the natural
processes of ovulation, conception, and birth."). Natural Cycle Ovulation Retrieval in
In Vitro Fertilization ("NORIF") is performed presently by some doctors. See Gail
Dutton, A Matter of Trust: The Guide to Gestational Surrogacy 37-38 (1997). The
advantages are that NORIF costs less and there are no side effects present as
compared to the drugs used in standard assisted reproductive techniques. See id.; see
also S. Bassil et al., Outcome of In-Vitro Fertilization Through Natural Cycles in Poor
Responders, 14 Hum. Reprod. 1262, 1262, 1264 (1999) (asserting that IVF with no
stimulation drugs may be the best option for women who lack oocytes or have
resistant ovary syndrome).
22. See Richard G. Matson, Collaborative Baby-Making: Surrogacy and Related
Bio-Medical Considerations, 24 Willamette L. Rev. 1100, 1109 (1988); Fleming, supra
note 17.
23. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 948 (1986); Wallis, supra
note 18, at 49. In the early procedures, Steptoe and Edwards had a total of forty-four
eggs recovered from sixty-eight patients. See Fleming, supra note 17.
24. See Wallis, supra note 18, at 48; see also David R. Meldrum et al., Evohtion of
a Highly Successfid In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer Program, 48 Fertility &
Sterility 86 (1987) (discussing the treatment protocol of an assisted reproduction
[Vol. 70
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B. Infertility: The Basics
A gestational carrier is medically implicated for infertile couples
where the woman is incapable of bearing children.-5  A couple is
defined as "infertile" if they cannot conceive a child within one year
of having frequent, unprotected intercourse. 6 In contrast to those
who are unable to conceive within one year, ninety percent of couples,
both of childbearing age, who engage in intercourse without using
birth control for one year will conceive.2"
program in the early 1980s).
25. See Susan Lewis Cooper & Ellen Sarasohn Glazer, Choosing Assisted
Reproduction: Social, Emotional & Ethical Considerations 290 (1998); John A.
Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies 9
(1994); Stephen L. Corson et al., Gestational Carrier Pregnancy, 69 Fertility &
Sterility 670, 670 (1998); Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society,
Surrogate Gestational Mothers: Women Who Gestate a Genetically Unrelated Embryo,
46 Fertility and Sterility (Supp. 1) 58S, 61S (1986): David R. Meldrum, In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, in Gynecology and Obstetrics 10 (John J. Sciarra
ed., 1999) [hereinafter Meldrum, In Vitro Fertilization]. In the first gestational carrier
program, patients were accepted only if they had ovaries and either no or a severely
abnormal uterus, over five recurrent abortions, or some other medical problem with
conceiving (for example, DES exposure, severe heart disease, diabetes mellitus). See
Wulf H. Utian et al., Preliminary Experience With In Vitro Fertilization-Surrogate
Gestational Pregnancy, 52 Fertility and Sterility 633, 634 (1989) [hereinafter Utian et
al., Preliminary Experience]. A gestational carrier is also recommended for
individuals who have had a hysterectomy, or those with Rokitansky syndrome (a
condition where the vagina and uterus do not develop normally). See, e.g., Shohre
Beski et al., Gestational Surrogacy: A Feasible Option for Patients with Rokitansky
Syndrome, 15 Hum. Reprod. 2326 (2000); Godwin 1. Meniru & Ian L Craft,
Experience with Gestational Surrogacy as a Treatment for Sterility Resulting from
Hysterectomy, 12 Hum. Reprod. 51, 54 (1997).
26. See Joyce C. Abma et al., Fertility, Family Planning, and Women's Health:
New Data From the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth (National Center for
Health Statistics, Vital and Health Stat., No. 19) 1997, at 7; Leon Speroff et al.,
Clinical Gynecologic Endocrinology and Infertility 1013, 1013 (6th ed. 1999); Karen
D. Bradshaw, Evaluation and Management of the Infertile Couple, in Gynecology and
Obstetrics, supra note 25, at 2; Anjani Chandra & William D. Mosher, Tile
Demography of Infertility and the Use of Medical Care for Infertilit. in 5 Infertility
and Reproductive Medicine Clinics of North America: Study Designs and Statistics
for Infertility Research 283, 285 (1994).
27. See Bradshaw, supra note 26, at 2; Christopher Tietze et al., Time Required for
Conception in 1,727 Planned Pregnancies, 1 Fertility & Sterility 338, 338 (1950);
Sharon Begley, The Baby Myth, Newsweek, Sept. 4, 1995, at 38. Even though non-
infertile couples have a ninety percent chance of conception within one year. this does
not mean getting pregnant is easy. See Michael R. Soules, The In Vitro Fertilization
Pregnancy Rate: Let's be Honest With One Another, 43 Fertility & Sterility 511, 511
(1985). Even under optimum conditions, fertile couples fail to conceive seventy-five
percent of the time. See id.; Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 18. at 56 ("Even under the best
of circumstances ... [conception] fails 3 times out of 4"). The probability of
becoming pregnant within one menstrual cycle is called "fecundability." Speroff et al.,
supra note 26, at 1013. The ability to achieve a live birth is called -fecundity." Id; see
also Chandra & Mosher, supra note 26, at 284 ("[F]ecundity refers to a woman's
ability to conceive and carry a baby to term and a man's ability to impregnate.").
There are three basic types of pregnancy: 1) a chemical pregnancy, which is a rise in
the human chorionic gonadotropin ("hCG") levels but clinically is an unrecognized
20011
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The number of American couples who are diagnosed as infertile is
stated to have reached "epidemic" levels.28 The latest surveys
estimate that 7.1% of married couples and 10.2% of women of
childbearing age are infertile. 9 Several reasons have been postulated
for this increase." The number of infertile women and couples in the
United States is expected to climb dramatically over the next twenty-
five years."
Infertile couples can be separated into two groups, those with
primary infertility and those with secondary infertility. Primary
infertility is the term used for couples who are unable to become
pregnant and who have not previously conceived.32 Secondary
spontaneous abortion; 2) recognized spontaneous abortion, normally between six to
twenty weeks' gestation; and 3) viable pregnancies. Soules, supra, at 511.
28. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 18, at 56; Wallis, supra note 18, at 50 (stating that
the number of infertile couples has tripled from 1964 to 1984). While the total
number of infertile couples in the United States has increased, the percentage of
infertile women and couples remained stable at approximately eight percent from
1965 to 1988. See Chandra & Mosher, supra note 26, at 283,286; see also Elizabeth H.
Stephen & Anjani Chandra, Updated Projections of Infertility in the United States:
1995-2025, 70 Fertility & Sterility 30, 30 (1998) (stating that infertility rates were
stable throughout the 1980s). The dramatic rise in the number of infertile couples is
attributed to the baby-boomer generation getting older. See Chandra & Mosher,
supra note 26, at 288-89; Stephen & Chandra, supra, at 30. While there is some
debate as to whether infertility is increasing in statistically significant numbers, there
is no doubt that the number of couples seeking treatment for infertility is rising
rapidly. See infra note 35.
29. Abma et al., supra note 26, at 7; Stephen & Chandra, supra note 28, at 32.
There has been an approximate two percent increase in the overall percentage of
infertile women from 1982 to 1995. See Stephen & Chandra, supra note 28, at 32. The
increase has occurred primarily after 1988. See Abma et al., supra note 26, at 7; see
also Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 1014 (noting the increase in the overall
percentage of infertile women from 1988 to 1995).
30. Some of the different reasons given for the increasing number of couples
facing infertility are that women are postponing child birth due to the Pill, the
women's movement, and a greater focus on their careers; liberalized sexual behavior
has increased the incidence of pelvic inflammatory disease; some women in their late
thirties and forties have malformed reproductive systems due to DES
(diethylstibestrol); greater participation by women in athletics has decreased these
women's body fat to levels too low to produce the required hormones; and women
have increased stress. See Capron, supra note 16, at 683; Elmer-Dewitt, supra note
18, at 56; The Saddest Epidemic, Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at 50; Springen et al., supra note
8, at 42 (reporting that the rate of first births to women in their thirties and forties has
quadrupled since 1970).
31. See Stephen & Chandra, supra note 28, at 34. In 1982, 4.5 million women
reported being infertile. Id. at 32. This increased to 4.9 million in 1988, and 1995 saw
a sharp rise to 6.2 million. Id. It is predicted that the number of infertile women will
increase to between 5 and 6.3 million in 2000, and to between 5.4 and 7.7 million by
2025. Id. at 32, 34; see also Michael D. Lemonick, The New Revolution In Making
Babies, Time, Dec. 1, 1997, at 40, 42 (stating that there has been a sharp rise in
infertility over the last thirty years); Wallis, supra note 18, at 46 (noting that infertility
among married women increased 177% from 1965 to 1982).
32. Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, Infertility
Medical and Social Choices, app. J at 386 (1988); Bradshaw, supra note 26, at 1; see
also Chandra & Mosher, supra note 26, at 285 (indicating that "primary" or
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infertility exists when a couple cannot presently conceive, but either
already has one child or can document a prior conception either
through a blood test or ultrasound.33 Secondary infertility accounts
for a significant portion of the total number of infertile couples in the
United States. 4
Many infertile couples are currently seeking treatment for their
infertility.35 While many couples experiencing infertility require only
minor treatment in order to conceive, others are forced to undergo
very expensive procedures to bear a child.' The standard "high tech"
treatment is IVF.7 The present cost of one cycle of standard IVF
"secondary" refers to the "absence or presence of a prior pregnancy").
33. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 32, at 51; Bradshaw. supra note
26, at 1.
34. See Alicia C. Shepard, One is Not Enough: The Tribulations of Secondary
Infertility, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1994, at G5. Most commonly, secondary infertility is
caused by blocked fallopian tubes due to delivery, infection, abortion or
endometriosis. Id. There are 1.4 million American couples who suffer from secondary
infertility. Id.
35. In 1995, approximately fifteen percent of women of reproductive age reported
seeking help for infertility. See Abma et al., supra note 26, at 7: Speroff et al., supra
note 26, at 1014.
Not all countries are as accepting of assisted reproduction techniques as the
United States. In Japan the use of donor sperm and eggs is called -extramarital
fertilization" and is a medical taboo. See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, Japan Takes
Dim View of Fertility Treatments: Doctor Who Went Public Loses License, Wash.
Post, July 5, 1998, at A13. One doctor who completed such a procedure was expelled
from Japan's leading obstetric society, with some calling for the revocation of his
license to practice medicine. Id. For this reason, Japanese couples requiring the use
of donor eggs or sperm are giving patronage to assisted reproduction clinics in the
United States. See id.; see also Suvendrini Kakuchi, Japan: Storm Over Surrogate
Motherhood, Inter Press Service, Sept. 15, 1992, LEXIS, News Library, Wires File
(reporting on the use of United States assisted reproduction facilities by Japanese
couples).
For a list of international views and laws on assisted reproduction, see Office
of Technology Assessment, supra note 32, app. E at 329-63; Dutton, supra note 21, at
77-83; see also Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Redefining Parenthood, 29 Cal. W. Int'l L.J.
313 (1999) (discussing Israeli law on surrogacy); Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M:
International Perspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary
Biological Mother, 5 Annals Health L. 193, 215-21 (1996) (reviewing laws of other
countries and noting that many industrialized nations have banned commercial
gestational carriers); see generally Angie Godwin McEwen, So You're Having
Another Wonman's Baby: Economics and Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy. 32
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 271 (1999) (reviewing the surrogacy laws of several countries).
36. See Laurence Zuckerman, Couple Now Has No Savings, More Debt and Little
Hope of Having a Baby, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1996, § 1, at 39. Some of the -low tech"
methods to aid conception are the use of boxer shorts for the male in order to assist
sperm production, the use of drugs to stabilize ovulation, and the use of ovulation
predictor kits, such as Clear Blue Easy or Ovu Quick. See Begley, supra note 27, at 40.
37. See infra Parts I.E-H (describing, in depth, the IVF procedure). IVF literally
translated means "fertilization in a glass." Webster's New World Dictionary of the
American Language 742 (2nd ed. 1984) [hereinafter Webster's New World
Dictionary]. IVF with no donor gametes and non-frozen embryos accounts for
seventy-three percent of all the assisted reproductive cycles completed in the United
States. Center for Disease Control, 1998 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success
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treatments typically ranges from $8000 to $11,000.38 This estimate is
only for standard IVF with the costs for more exotic procedures such
as Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection ("ICSI"), Gamete Intra-
Fallopian Transfer ("GIFT") and Zygote Intra-Fallopian Transfer
("ZIFT") being much higher.39
Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports 11 (2000) [hereinafter Center
for Disease Control]. The other methods (GIFT, ZIFT, Interuterine Insemination
("IUI"), use of donor gametes and frozen embryos) make up the remainder. Id.
38. See James Holman, Medical Necessity: Whose Call Is It?, Wash. Post, July 12,
1998. at C3. The cost of IVF treatments has steadily increased over time. In 1984 the
cost per cycle was between $3000 and $5000. Wallis, supra note 18, at 50. The cost in
1991 was approximately $6000, and in 1996 the median cost was $7800. Elmer-
Dewitt, supra note 18, at 62; Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope's Limit,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1996, § 1, at 1; Zuckerman, supra note 36; see also Bradley J. Van
Voorhis et al., Cost-Effective Treatment of the Infertile Couple, 70 Fertility & Sterility
995, 998 (1998) (finding that in 1992 the average cost per IVF cycle in the United
States was $8071, and the average cost of IVF before having a live birth was $44,200).
These costs are unlikely to decrease since many of the expenses are fixed costs, like
lab equipment. See Soules, supra note 27, at 513. On the cost of infertility services,
see generally Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 32, at Ch. 8 (listing the
various costs for different assisted reproductive treatments).
A "cycle" is the period of treatment for infertility, from the drug therapy to
the transfer of the embryos, and typically covers six weeks. Curt Suplee, Fertility
Clinics' Success Rate is About I in 5, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1997, at Al. The $8000 to
$10,000 in costs does not take into account the tremendous amount of time and
emotional energy it takes to undergo infertility treatments. See, e.g., Robert J.
Edelmann, Emotional Aspects of In Vitro Fertilization Procedures: Review, 8 J.
Reprod. Infant Psychol. 161 (1990) (discussing the psychological characteristics of
couples selected for IVF, and the impact and counseling needs of IVF couples);
Carolyn M. Mazure et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies II. Psychologic
Implications for Women and Their Partners, 1 J. Women's Health 275, 277-78 (1992)
(listing the various reasons why assisted reproduction is very stressful on couples);
Springen et al., supra note 8, at 44 (indicating that the process is "financially,
physically and emotionally draining"). The constant doctor visits, blood tests,
ultrasounds, shots and emotional trials can ruin a couple's careers. Surveys of
individuals undergoing IVF treatments found that twenty-five percent had to quit
their jobs or reduce work hours to undergo infertility treatments. See Sue
Shellenbarger, Infertile Employees Seek Firms' Support, Wall St. J., May 12, 1992, at
B1. Another sixteen percent found less demanding jobs to accommodate their
treatment schedules. See Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening
Gap Between the Science of Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws Which
Govern that Technology, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 825, 831 (1999) (speculating that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 could be used to allow women more leeway
from employers to use various reproductive technologies). For Supreme Court dicta
indicating that infertility might be covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998), on remand, 163 F.3d 87 (1st
Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court wrote, "[r]eproduction falls well within the phrase
'major life activity.' Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central
to the life process itself." Id. But see Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that an employer was not required to provide insurance
coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
39. See infra notes 129-50 and accompanying text. The costs also exclude any
expenses for donor gametes. See Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg
Donor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1999, at A10. In March 1999, an advertisement ran in the
newspapers of Stanford University, MIT and Cal Tech offering $50,000 for a 5' 10",
athletic woman who scored at least 1400 on the SAT and suffered no major family
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While the cost to undergo treatment is high, there are no
guarantees the treatments will be successful. National averages show
that thirty-two percent of women under age thirty-five undergoing
IVF can expect a live birth, and the percentage is significantly lower
for women thirty-five years and older.' In many cases, a live birth is
achieved only after three or four treatment cycles.4
While the probability for live birth is low with IVF, in many cases
the procedure is a couple's only chance at having a genetically related
child. This may account for the estimated $1 billion dollars per year
that is spent by infertile couples in the pursuit of pregnancy. 2 Of the
medical problems. Id More than 200 women responded in just one week. Id.; see also
Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors' Eggs: A Case Study of Why Congress Must Modify
the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 919 (1999) (suggesting a woman's
eggs should be treated as a capital asset); Michael D. Lemonick, Hot Genes for Sale?
A Website Offers Eggs-But Maybe Just for Browsing, Time, Nov. 8, 1999. at 56
(discussing a website which auctions the eggs of "beautiful models"). Once a couple
elects to use donor eggs they must decide whether to use those from someone they
know or from an anonymous donor. See P. Baetens et al., Counseling Couples and
Donors for Oocyte Donation: The Decision to Use Either Known or Anonymous
Oocytes, 15 Hum. Reprod. 476 (2000) (discussing factors couples use to determine
whether to use the oocytes of someone they know or an anonymous donor).
However, it has been noted that egg donation is not an easy way to make money.
M.L. Lyke, You Wouldn't Want to Make it a Career, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug.
31, 1999, at D4 ("As jobs go, egg donation is no slacker's holiday. It's a seven-day-a-
week, 24-hour-a-day, physically demanding stint, with irregular hours and unknown
risks.").
40. See Center for Disease Control, supra note 37, at 47. The reason for a lower
success rate in older women is the decrease in fecundity as a woman grows older.
Chandra & Mosher, supra note 26, at 288. But see Jane Menken et al., Age and
Infertility, 233 Science 1389, 1389, 1393 (1986) (asserting that there is a weak
connection between fecundity and age). Over eighty percent of women treated for
infertility are under forty years old. See Begley, supra note 27, at 38.
In late 1998, a New York fertility clinic successfully transferred the DNA of
one human egg to that of another human egg. Rick Weiss, Fertility Erperiments Mi
Genes of 2 Women, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1998, at Al. The egg was then fertilized and
the resulting embryo placed in a womb. Id. The reason behind this procedure was to
overcome the lower fertilization rates for women over the age of thirty-five, which is
thought to be caused by poor egg quality. See id.
41. See Machelle M. Seibel et al., In Vitro Fertilization: How Much is Enough?,
321 New Eng. J. Med. 1052, 1053 (1989) (stating "eighty-four percent of the births
occurred after two IVF cycles"). This is an unfortunate consequence since most
couples can only afford two IVF cycles. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note
32, at 10; see Holman, supra note 38. In 1992. the average cost of IVF treatments per
live birth was $44,200. Van Voorhis, supra note 38, at 998; see also David R. Meldrum
et al., Success Rate with Repeated Cycles of ln Vitro Fertilization-Emnbryo Transfer, 69
Fertility & Sterility 1005, 1008 (1998) (stating that analysis of all cycles done in one
year in SART programs in the United States showed only a "modest decline of
success" for each cycle attempted) [hereinafter Meldrum, Success Rate].
42. Machelle M. Seibel & Susan L. Crockin, Family Building Through Egg and
Sperm Donation 24 (1996) (stating that $1 billion was spent to overcome infertility in
1987); Bradshaw, supra note 26, at 1; see also Office of Technology Assessment, supra
note 32, at 10 (stating that in 1987 seven percent of the money spent on infertility was
on assisted reproductive techniques). The $1 billion spent by infertile couples is a
500% increase from the $200 million that was spent on infertility treatments in 1983.
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$1 billion dollars spent, eighty-five percent of the costs are borne by
the patients themselves, since infertility treatments are generally not
covered by health insurance plans.43 Several states require all health
plans to offer IVF coverage, but most states which have statutes
providing for infertility insurance have significant exceptions.44
See Robertson, supra note 23, at 946.
43. See Gabriel, supra note 38. How do couples afford the treatment? "The first
step usually involves exhausting their savings. The next step is signing up for a host of
credit cards and charging up to their credit limit. If they can, they usually then
borrow from relatives or friends." Esther B. Fein, Calling Infertility a Disease,
Couples Battle with Insurers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1998, § 1, at 1.
A 1997 survey found that one-half of large employers covered some form of
infertility services. Holman, supra note 38. When adding small employers, the
coverage rate dropped to twenty-five percent. Id.; see also Office of Technology
Assessment, supra note 32, at 148-57 (providing overview of state laws on insuring
treatment for infertility); Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, app. 1-J at 32 (reprinting
letter in The Lancet concerning the additional cost per insured to insure for
infertility).
Employers are also not required to provide insurance coverage under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318,
326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In Saks, the District Court held that the plaintiff, while having
standing to pursue ADA claims, could not use the statute to recover expenses for
infertility care. Id. at 326-28. The plaintiff's ADA claim failed since her employer did
not offer less pregnancy-related coverage to infertile as compared to fertile people.
Moreover, the defendant's insurance plan was not covered by ADA since it was a
self-insured plan. Id.
A small comfort for couples who pay the cost of treatments themselves is that,
generally, infertility treatments may be tax deductible. See 26 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1986);
Mark Reid & Daphne Main, Tax Issues Surrounding Assisted Reproduction Expenses,
78 Taxes 26, 27 (2000) (stating that the IRS should allow a deduction for infertility
treatments since the costs of preventing pregnancy are deductible). However, the
payments are only deductible for those amounts greater than 7.5% of a couple's
adjusted gross income. 26 U.S.C. § 213(a). The cost of medical treatments, prescribed
drugs and transportation to seek treatment may also be treated as medical expenses.
Id. at § 213(b), (d)(1)(A), (B), (d)(3). But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 57-07-244900A (July 24,
1957) (disallowing the deduction for expenses associated with artificial insemination).
The cost of hiring a gestational surrogate or payments for donor egg or sperm may
not be tax deductible. See Reid & Main, supra, at 29 (finding "no justification for
claiming a deduction" for payments to gestational carriers). But see James Edward
Maule, Federal Tax Consequences of Surrogate Motherhood, 60 Taxes 656, 663 (1982)
(allowing for a medical deduction for the cost of traditional surrogacy since the costs
are "designed to mitigate the effects of a disease or bodily malfunction" of the
woman).
44. The following states have statutes regarding health coverage for infertility.
Broad Mandatory Coverage:
Massachusetts: Any blanket or general policy (except supplemental coverage of
Medicare or governmental programs) that provides hospital expense or surgical
expense insurance which includes pregnancy-related benefits must provide coverage
for medically necessary expenses for diagnosis and treatment of infertility. Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 47H (West 1997). Massachusetts further provides for the same
mandatory coverage under subscription certificates and contracts under hospital
service plans with certain restrictions and qualifications. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
176A, § 8K; ch. 176B, § 4J; ch. 176G, § 4 (West 1997).
Rhode Island: Rhode Island law requires most insurers (including Health
Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs") to cover the cost of medically necessary
expenses associated with the diagnosis and treatment of infertility if the policies
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include coverage for pregnancy services. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23, 27-20-
20, 27-41-33 (1998). The patient's co-payment cannot exceed twenty percent. Id. To
receive this coverage for infertility treatments, the individual must be an -otherwise
healthy married individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception during a
period of one year." Id.; see also Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer
Protection, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 2092, 2095 n.19 (1996) [hereinafter Note, In Vitro
Fertilization] (discussing availability of IVF treatment and insurance coverage).
Restricted Mandatory Coverage:
Illinois: Subject to certain limitations, Illinois requires insurance policies that insure
more than twenty-five people and provide pregnancy related benefits to cover the
costs of diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including IVF. 215 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/356m(a) (West 2000). The statute has no dollar limitation, but only allows up to
four completed oocyte retrievals, unless a live birth occurs, in which case two more
completed oocyte retrievals are covered. 5/356m(b)(1)(B). This statute applies to
HMOs, but infertility procedures are specifically excluded from coverage for qualified
plan members under the Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan Act. 215 II1. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 125/5-3, 105/8 (West 2000). The statute mandates coverage for IVF, ZIFT.
and GIFT, but only if less expensive treatments have been unsuccessful. Lisa N. Kerr,
Can Money Buy Happiness? An Examination of the Coverage of Infertility Services
Under HMO Contracts, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 599, 613 (1999) (urging federal
legislation that would require all HMOs to provide coverage for assisted reproduction
to address the wide variance in this area from state to state).
Maryland: Maryland does not allow health insurance policies (including HMOs) that
provide pregnancy-related benefits to exclude benefits for outpatient expenses arising
from IVF. Md. Code Ann., [Ins.] § 15-810(b) (1997); Md. Code Ann., [Health-Gen.
I] § 19-706(00) (2000). The allowed benefit includes up to three IVF attempts per live
birth, not to exceed a maximum lifetime benefit of $100,000. Md. Code Ann., [Ins.] §
15-810(d). However, HMOs are only required to provide coverage for IVF to the
same extent as the benefits provided for other pregnancy-related services. Id. at § 15-
810(b)(2).
Hawaii: Hawaii requires that all health insurance policies (individual and group)
providing pregnancy-related benefits cover all outpatient expenses for at least one
IVF procedure. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 431:10A-116.5, 432:1-604 (Michie 1993).
This coverage is contingent upon the insured's meeting several conditions. Id.
Mandatory coverage excludes HMOs:
Arkansas: All disability insurance companies doing business in the state must cover
the cost of IVF. Ark. Code Ann. 88 23-85-137, 23-86-118(a) (Michie 1999). HMOs
are not specifically directed to include or exclude these services from their coverage.
§ 23-76-104(a).
Infertility Coverage Included as Basic Health Care Services (includes HMOs):
Montana: As part of basic health care services, Montana state law requires HMOs to
cover infertility. Mont. Code Ann. § 33-31-102(2)(h)(v) (1999). As for health insurers
other than HMOs that qualify as association plans, the law specifically excludes
infertility coverage from the required scope of health benefits insurers must provide. §
33-22-1521(3)(b)(xii).
Ohio: Ohio requires health insuring corporations (the definition of which includes
HMOs) to cover basic health care services. which includes infertility. Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 1751.01(A)(7) (Anderson 2001). There is no requirement for other health
insurers to provide treatment for infertility. § 1751.01 (N).
West Virginia: West Virginia includes infertility services in the definition of basic
health care services required to be provided by HMOs. W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 33-
25A-2(1), 33-25A-4(2)(b) (Michie 2000).
Montana, Ohio, and West Virginia consider infertility treatments to be
preventative care, leaving the laws open to the interpretation that IVF should not be
covered as it does not "prevent" infertility; but rather, it just remedies the problem
caused by infertility. Note, In Vitro Fertilization, supra, at 2095 n.19.
Mandate to offer:
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However, even in the states that do require coverage, the laws do not
cover those employers that are self-insured. 5 Although the cost of
IV-F is high for individual couples, the cost to add infertility
treatments to employee health plans is small. Estimates suggest
adding standard infertility treatments to employee health coverage
would cost about three dollars per employee, per year. 6
California: Every health care service plan except for HMOs must offer coverage for
the treatment of infertility. Cal. [Health & Safety] Code § 1374.55(a) (West 2000).
IVF is not required as part of the treatment for infertility. Id.
Connecticut: Connecticut insurance law requires health insurers to offer coverage for
infertility diagnosis and treatment, including IVF. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38a-536
(West 2000).
Texas: Texas requires insurers that cover pregnancy services to also offer coverage for
infertility diagnosis and treatment. Tex. [Ins.] Code Ann. § 3.51-6(3)(A) (Vernon
2001). However, an insurer, HMO or self-insuring employer associated with a bona-
fide religion that believes in-vitro fertilization to be immoral will be exempt from this
section's mandate to offer coverage for in-vitro fertilization. § 3.51-6(3)(A)(f).
No mandatory coverage:
New York: Under New York law, health insurance policies cannot exclude coverage
for the diagnosis and treatment of correctable medical conditions otherwise covered
by the policy solely because the medical condition results in infertility. N.Y. [Ins.] Law
§ 3216(h)(13) (McKinney 2001). The statute says nothing about coverage for IVF
treatments. See American Society of Reproductive Medicine, State Infertility
Insurance Laws, at http://www.asrm.com/Patients/insur.html (last visited March 7,
2001). However, recent case law indicates that if an insurer provides some type of
infertility benefit, New York law mandates IVF coverage as well. Note, InVitro
Fertilization, supra, at 2095 n.19 (citing Empire Blue Cross Is Fined $1.1 Million,
Setting Record, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1996, at 24).
There is no inter-state uniformity in insurance law regarding IVF, but of those
states not listed above, eight others have considered enacting legislation on IVF.
Supra, Note, In Vitro Fertilization, at 2095 n.18 (indicating that Florida, Louisiana,
Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin have
considered proposals relating to IVF); see also Fein, supra note 43 (discussing various
state requirements); Shellenbarger, supra note 38; Zuckerman, supra note 36. The
number of states which require mandatory insurance coverage of infertility is unlikely
to change in the near future. Norbert Gleicher, M.D., Strategies to Improve Insurance
Coverage for Infertility Services, 70 Fertility & Sterility 1006, 1006 (1998).
45. Fein, supra note 43. Many insurance companies and self-insured companies
say that they will not cover infertility because they do not consider it a "disease" and
believe having children is elective. See Holman, supra note 38. One doctor's response
to this was, "if having children is elective, why cover maternity benefits?" Id.
46. See Dale W. Stovall et al., The Cost of Infertility Evaluation and Therapy:
Findings of a Self-Insured University Healthcare Plan, 72 Fertility & Sterility 778, 779
(1999) (finding the cost of infertility insurance for a university-based, self-insured
health plan to be $2.79 per member per year, or twenty-three cents per member, per
month); Fein, supra note 43. Employers may be concerned that if they added IVF
coverage, many more employees would take advantage of this benefit. For example,
in France where IVF is commonly covered by health insurance, the use of IVF
treatments per-capita is five times greater than in the United States. See Gabriel,
supra note 38; see also Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 32, at 54 (giving
a list of questions couples should ask themselves when they consider discontinuing
treatment); Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at app. 1-J at 32 (stating that most




The lack of insurance coverage and the lack of government funding
for research means that infertility clinics are largely unregulated. 7
Health economists suggest that the lack of government funding
creates higher costs, since insurance companies are not present to curb
prices.0 Therefore, there is no pressure on doctors or clinics to cut
fees and eliminate unnecessary procedures.49 However, this lack of
oversight and the possibility of high profit margins have in part led to
the vast expansion of infertility clinics in the United States. ' In the
last decade, the number of infertility clinics has increased by a power
of ten, from 30 to more than 300.51
With the increase in the number of clinics, a tremendous increase in
the number of babies born through IVF procedures has occurred.
Only 100 babies were born as a result of assisted reproduction
methods in the United States from the first successful IVF procedure
in 1981 until 1984.52 From 1984 to 1996, however, there were
approximately 40,000 babies conceived, resulting in 33,000 live
births.53
47. There is no federal oversight since the clinics are not covered by federal
regulations governing human-subjects research. See National Inst. Of Health.
Development Of NIH Guidelines Governing Research Involving Human In Vitro
Fertilization and the Preimplantation Embryo 1 (1995); Capron, supra note 16, at 689
n.24 (citing the Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-158. 99 Stat.
820 (1985), as a reason for lack of federal oversight); Robertson, supra note 18, at 919
(noting that any doctor can perform infertility services without special certification or
education); Rick Weiss, Fertility Innovation or Exploitation? Regulatory Void Allows
for Trial-and-Error Without Patient Disclosure Rules, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1998, at Al
[hereinafter Weiss, Fertility Innovation or Exploitation]. One professor of obstetrics
and gynecology put it this way: "[A] woman gets more regulatory oversight when she
gets a tattoo than when she gets IVF." Weiss, Fertility Innovation or Erploitation,
supra. This lack of federal funding has also created an industry which is on -an
aggressively entrepreneurial track." Rick Weiss, Babies in Limbo: Laws Outpaced by
Fertility Advances, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Weiss, Babies in
Limbo] (discussing the use of a deceased woman's eggs in a gestational surrogate
arrangement). For information on possible Congressional action to support
reproductive research see Office of Technology Assessment. supra note 32, at 29-31
(providing various options and levels of commitment to support fertility research); see
also Havins & Dalessio, supra note 38, at 843-44 (noting that the Center for Disease
Control was given the responsibility of establishing a model for states to adopt for the
certification of IVF laboratories, but that no program has been established due to lack
of proper funding); Warren A. Kaplan, Fetal Research Statutes, Procreative Rights,
and the "New Biology": Living in the Interstices of tre Law, 21 Suffolk U. L Rev. 723
(1987) (noting the need for federal legislation to regulate the fertility industry).
48. See Gabriel, supra note 38.
49. See id.
50. One clinic's profit margin was 37.5% for each cycle. Id.
51. See id; see also Center for Disease Control, 1996 Assisted Reproductive
Technology Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports 1 (1996)
(noting that there were 300 clinics in 1996). In 1998, there was a further increase to
360 clinics. Center for Disease Control, supra note 37, at 4.
52. Friedrich, supra note 16, at 54.
53. See Gabriel, supra note 38; Lemonick, supra note 31, at 42.
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Given the large number of couples who require assistance to
conceive children and the high profit margin, there is a great deal of
competition among clinics for patients. This can lead clinics to
provide misleading statistics to the public in order to attract more
patientsi 4 The most important statistic for a clinic is the number of
live deliveries per number of treatment cycles started.15 Some clinics
report the number of pregnancies per cycle, but this can be misleading
since fourteen percent of the pregnancies resulting from assisted
reproduction end in miscarriage or are just chemical pregnancies. 6
To aid people in their decisions regarding the choice of an infertility
clinic, Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) sponsored the Fertility Clinic
Success Rate and Certification Act in 1992.1' The bill required the
Center for Disease Control to survey participating clinics and publicly
report the findings. 8 The bill was passed in 1992, but it did not take
effect until 1994 and was not implemented until after 1996 due to
inadequate funding. 9 The survey is now available and contains
information on 360 clinics providing assisted reproductive services
across the United States. 60
54. See Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at app. 1-B at 19; Soules, supra note 27,
at 512.
55. See Soules, supra note 27, at 511, Gabriel, supra note 38.
56. See Abma et al., supra note 26, at 7; see also Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42,
app. 1-B at 19-20 (discussing the manipulation of IVF success rates); Soules, supra
note 27, at 512; Gabriel, supra note 38 (reporting an eighteen percent difference
between reported pregnancies and live births). A chemical pregnancy is one where
the only evidence of pregnancy is a rise in certain hormones associated with
pregnancy (specifically beta-hCG), but there is no fetus. See Meldrum, In Vitro
Fertilization, supra note 25, at 10.
57. 106 Stat. 3146, Pub. Law 102-493, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1, 263a-7
(1992). The legislative history says the bill was enacted to "provide for reporting of
pregnancy success rates of assisted reproductive technology programs and the
certification of embryo laboratories." Id.; see also Office of Technology Assessment,
supra note 32, at 18-20 (discussing the various options and consequences, pro and
con, of informing the public); Havins & Dalessio, supra note 38, at 843-44 (providing
short overview of the history of the bill); Robertson, supra note 18, at 919 (giving the
inflated claims of some IVF programs and the Federal Trade Commission's citations
for false advertising as the reason for the bill); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, U.S. Publishes
First Guide to Treatment of Infertility, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1997, at A22 (stating that
the purpose of the Center for Disease Control report on fertility clinics was to give
consumers a "starting place" and not to be used to compare one clinic against the
other).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-l(a)(1), (2) (1992).
59. Id. at § 263a-l(a); Suplee, supra note 38.
60. See Center for Disease Control, supra note 37, at 4. While the information
contained in the survey is self-reporting, the Center for Disease Control does a




C. Traditional Surrogacy v. Gestational Surrogac)
Traditional surrogacy" involves a situation where the child is
conceived pursuant to an agreement under which the surrogate
mother will turn the child over to the male who provides the
inseminating sperm. The surrogate mother provides both the female
gametes and the gestational component for the child. " This type of
surrogacy has been utilized since Biblical times and is usually
completed without advanced reproductive techniques.' Contract
surrogacy is traditional surrogacy, but the woman contractually agrees
to be inseminated and bear a child for another couple. This type of
surrogacy is thought to be the creation of a Michigan attorney, Noel
Keane, in 1976.6 Contract surrogacy entered the national scene with
61. "Surrogate" means "a substitute figure." Webster's New World Dictionary,
supra note 37, at 1433. "Traditional surrogacy" refers to situations where: (1) the
surrogate mother is related to the child she will bear in that her egg was inseminated
with the sperm of the sponsoring male: (2) she is having the child for an already
established couple: (3) the child was conceived under an agreement the surrogate
would turn the child over; and (4) insemination was done artificially. See Ethics
Committee of the Am. Fertility Soc'y. supra note 25, at 58s. Artificial insemination
may be done in a hospital setting or informally at home. See Utian et al., Preliminary
Experience, supra note 25, at 634 (discussing the distinction between "traditional
surrogacy" and "IVF surrogacy"). But see Capron, supra note 16, at 679 n.1 (saying
that the term "surrogate mother" is incorrect and should be used for the wife of the
biological father). The first recorded artificial insemination took place in 1799. See
Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 32. at 36.
62. Ethics Committee of the Am. Fertility Soc'y, Surrogate Gestational Mothers:
Women Who Gestate a Genetically Unrelated Embryo, 53 Fertility and Sterility (Supp.
2) 64S, 64S (1990).
63. See Genesis 16:1-4 (King James).
Now Sarai Abram's wife bore him no children: and she had an handmaid, an
Egyptian. whose name was Hagar. And Sarai said unto Abram, Behold
now, the Lord hath restrained me from bearing: I pray thee, go in unto my
maid; it may be that I may obtain children by her. And Abram hearkened to
the voice of Sarai. And Sarai Abram's wife took Hagar her maid the
Egyptian, after Abram had dwelt ten years in the land of Canaan, and gave
her to her husband Abram to be his wife. And he went in unto Hagar, and
she conceived.
Id.; see also Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for
Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 127, 133-34 (1986) (pointing out that Hagar was later cast
out of Abraham's household at his wife's insistence); Genesis 30:1-4 (King James)
(describing how Jacob's wife, Rachel, told Jacob to bear children by her servant):
Andrea Mechanick Braverman & Stephen L. Corson, Characteristics of Participants
in a Gestational Carrier Program, 9 J. Ass. Reprod. Genet. 353, 353 (1992).
64. George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, 16 Law Med. & Health
Care 27,27 (1988); Richard Lacayo, Whose Child is This? Baby . and tile Agonizing
Dilemma of Surrogate Motherhood, Time, Jan. 19, 1987, at 56, 57. Surrogate mothers
decide to contract to have a child for another couple for various reasons. These
reasons include: the enjoyment of being pregnant, a desire to share maternal joy with
others, a need for money and the desire to atone for past abortions. Philip J. Parker,
Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 117, 118
(1983) (providing survey results from 125 applicants to be surrogate mothers);
Claudia Wallis, A Surrogate's Story, Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at 53; see also Noel P.
Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. I11. U. L.J. 147 (discussing
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the "Baby M" case, in which the surrogate mother, Mary Beth
Whitehead, decided during pregnancy to keep the child she was
carrying.65 While contract surrogacy has allowed couples to have
children, it does not provide them with a 100% genetically related
child.6
Gestational surrogacy is assisted reproduction using a gestational
carrier and differs from traditional surrogacy in that the gestating
woman is not the genetic parent of the fetus she carries.67 Because of
the various legal challenges to contract surrogacy).
65. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see also Carol Lawson, Couples'
Own Embryos Used in Birth Surrogacy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1990, § 1, at 1
(contrasting traditional surrogacy and the Baby M case with gestational surrogacy).
The contracting couple, William and Elizabeth Stem, contracted with Mary Beth
Whitehead to be inseminated with Mr. Stem's sperm, gestate the fetus, and return it
to the Sterns after delivery. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235. The Sterns paid Mrs.
Whitehead $10,000 plus medical expenses during pregnancy. Id. at 1235. The Sterns
said they decided on a surrogacy arrangement since Mrs. Stern had mild multiple
sclerosis and she might not be able to carry a child without some physical harm. Id.
There was some question, however, whether the real reason for the surrogacy
arrangement was that Mrs. Stem did not want to interrupt her medical career as a
pediatrician. Lacayo, supra note 64, at 58. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted
custody to the Stems while Whitehead received visitation rights. In re Baby M, 537
A.2d at 1258, 1263. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see Bonnie Steinbock,
Surrogate Motherhood as Prenatal Adoption, in Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and
Privacy 123-28 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990); see also Thomas Wm. Mayo, Medical
Decision Making During a Surrogate Pregnancy, 25 Hous. L. Rev. 599, 607-09 (1988)
(discussing the Baby M case and analyzing the legal implications of surrogacy); Peter
H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Baby M Case, 76 Geo. L.J. 1793 (1988) (discussing
the Baby M case and arguing that surrogacy contracts should be upheld).
66. Not all traditional surrogacy agreements are successful. One of the more
infamous cases involved a surrogacy contract between Alexander Malahoff and Judy
Stiver. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1992). Under the terms of the
contract, Mrs. Stiver agreed to be inseminated with Mr. Malahoff's sperm and carry
the child. Id. Due to a cytomegalovirus ("CMV") infection the child was born
microcephalic (having a small head) and mentally retarded. See id. Mr. Malahoff
refused to accept the child, claiming it was not his and demanding a blood test to
determine paternity. See Friedrich, supra note 16, at 55. The results of the blood test
were given on national television on the Phil Donahue Show. See id.; see also William
Rasberry, Layaway Baby, Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 1983, at A17 (citing the Phil Donahue
Show: "The Case of the Layaway Baby" (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1983)).
The blood test showed that Mr. Malahoff was not the father. See Friedrich, supra note
16, at 55. During the show, the Stivers decided they would care for the child. Aric
Press & Frank Maier, A Surrogate Mother's Story, Newsweek, Feb. 14, 1983, at 76. It
was later revealed that Mr. Stiver had intercourse with his wife several days before
the insemination. See Stiver, 975 F.2d at 266. The Stivers later sued the hospital, the
doctors, the attorney who drafted the agreement, and Mr. Malahoff for negligence
because they believed Mr. Malahoff was the source of the CMV infection. See id. at
264; see also Capron, supra note 16, at 690-91 (describing the difficulties arising
between the Stivers and the Malahoffs when the baby was born with a birth defect);
John J. Mandler, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform
Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 Geo. L.J. 1283, 1285-86 (1985); Friedrich, supra note
16, at 55.
67. Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 13; see Ethics Committee of the Am.
Fertility Soc'y, supra note 25, at 58S. For a description of the current medical
procedures used for gestational carrier births, see infra Part G.
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the lack of a genetic relationship, this type of surrogacy arrangement
is also known as "host surrogacy." 6s In 1997, of the approximately
6,000 live births by surrogate mothers, around 500 were by gestational
surrogates.69 The ability to have a genetically related child without the
hassles and pain of childbirth has led some to voice concerns about
the exploitation of women who bear these children for other women,
who do not want their careers to be interrupted by gestating their own
child.7"
D. How the Female Reproductive System Works
The entire process of assisted reproduction can be seen as trying to
retrieve as many eggs as possible from the woman and to fertilize
them with the man's sperm.7' To accomplish this, doctors monitor and
control the woman's physiological processes that mature the eggs.
An overview of the normal female reproductive cycle will help to
understand the enormity of the task and degree of difficulty that
assisted reproduction must surmount for an infertile couple to bear a
child.
The basic building blocks of sexual reproduction are gametes, which
are present in both males and females. In the male they are called
spermatozoa (or sperm), and in the female they are called ova (or
eggs), and both carry one-half of the resulting child's genetic
material.73 When the sperm and egg combine, the union is a single cell
68. Dutton, supra note 21, at 11.
69. Hanafin, supra note 5, at 376.
70. The Huntington Reproductive Center in Pasadena, California only uses
gestational surrogacy when medically necessary. See Lawson, supra note 65. "The
hospital board is concerned that if you are thirty-nine years old, successful and very
busy, you might want to rent someone's womb as a convenience." hi. On the
possibility that surrogacy exploits poor women, see Martha Field, Reproductive
Technologies and Surrogacy: Legal Issues, 25 Creighton L Rev. 1589, 1590 (1992)
[hereinafter Field, Reproductive Technologies]; John Dwight Ingram. Surrogate
Gestator: A New and Honorable Profession, 76 Marq. L. Rev. 675, 683-84 (1993)
(arguing that surrogacy does not exploit women); Robertson, supra note 23, at 1012
n.244 (suggesting that there might be "social infertility" in the future if women choose
to use a gestational carrier for career or lifestyle reasons); Sherrie Lynne Russell-
Brown, Parental Rights and Gestational Surrogacy: An Argument Against the Genetic
Standard, 23 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 525,542-45 (1991-92).
71. For an overview of the IVF process see Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 3-
5 (providing an overview of the entire IVF procedure); William A. Sieck, In Vitro
Fertilization and the Right to Procreate: The Right to No, 147 U. Pa. L Rev. 435, 437-
41 (1998) (same).
72. Long-term studies on the increased incidence of cancer due to the use of
fertility drugs have shown no overall increase in cancer rates for most patients. See
Alison Venn et al., Risk of Cancer After Use of Fertility Drugs With In-Vitro
Fertilisation, 354 Lancet 1586, 1586 (1999), available at http'J/www.thelancet.com
(presenting a study of ten Australian IVF clinics). However, women with
unexplained infertility are at increased risk of uterine and ovarian cancer. See id.
73. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 38, at 832: see also Webster's New World
Dictionary, supra note 37, at 573 (defining "gamete" as a reproductive cell which can
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called a "zygote."'74 After this zygote has divided several times it is
called a "blastocyst."75 "Embryo" is the term used for the union of
sperm and egg up to the ninth week following conception.76 In
medical terms, an embryo is formed from the zygote only when the
"primitive streak" appears,77 which is around ten to fourteen days
after fertilization.78
Several hormones control the female system for maturing and
releasing eggs.79  A woman's eggs are carried in her ovaries and
mature, normally one at a time, under the influence of hormones.8"
To start the process of egg maturation, the hypothalamus, located in
the brain, produces gonadotropin-releasing hormone.8' This hormone
in turn triggers the pituitary gland (the "master" gland) to produce
join with another and develop into a new individual).
74. Havins & Dalessio, supra note 38, at 832; Webster's New World Dictionary.
supra note 37, at 1656 (defining zygote as a "fertilized egg before cleavage"). This
event starts the gestational clock and gives the gestational age. See Clifford Grobstein,
The Early Development of Human Embryos, 10 J. Med. & Phil. 213, 215 (1985).
Gestational age differs by about two weeks from the menstrual age of the embryo
which begins at the beginning of the last menstrual period. See id.
75. Webster's New World Dictionary, supra note 37, at 149 (defining a blastocyst
as a group of cells around which forms a sphere); see also Daniel Navot & Paul A.
Bergh, Implantation, in Gynecology and Obstetrics, supra note 25, at 1-2 (discussing
the embryo before implantation into uterus).
76. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 32, at 384; see also Biggers,
supra note 18, at 336-37 (explaining early embryonic development). For a list of all
the changes to the embryo over the nine weeks, see Grobstein, supra note 74, at 216-
17 tbl.I.
77. The "primitive streak," also called the "primitive neural streak," indicates
when the embryo is determined to be a "distinct developing individual." National
Institutes of Health, Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel 47 (Sept. 1994).
This occurs because, soon after the primitive streak appears, the development of the
nervous system begins, with the primitive streak forming the spinal column. See id. It
is after the primitive streak appears that the National Institutes of Health concluded
that there should be no experimentation allowed on the developing fetus. Id. at 51.
78. See Havins & Dalessio, supra note 38, at 833; Robertson, supra note 23, at 974.
79. A hormone is a chemical substance which is formed in one place in the body
and carried by the blood stream to another place in the body. Stedman's Medical
Dictionary 807 (26th ed. 1995). There are many different types of hormones, all of
which have various effects on the human body. See id. at 807-08.
80. See Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 108-09. About seven months before a
female is born, the eggs start to form within her ovaries. See id. at 112. A female will
be born with the maximum number of eggs she will ever have after she exits the
womb. about two million. See Biggers, supra note 18, at 337. By the time puberty is
reached, this number will be reduced to 400,000. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 18, at
59. This number slowly declines after puberty until menopause. See Speroff et al.,
supra note 26, at 116. The actual number of eggs which mature is about 400. See id.;
Biggers, supra note 18, at 337; Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 18, at 59. At the start of each
cycle, approximately twenty eggs start the maturation process, but normally only one
will reach full maturity. See Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 3.
81. See New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, Assisted Reproductive
Technologies: Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy 7 (1998) [hereinafter
New York State Task Force]. The term "Gonadotropin" refers to the nourishing of
the ovaries (gonad: ovaries; trophic: to nourish). Dutton, supra note 21, at 14.
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both follicle-stimulating hormone ("FSH") and lutenizing hormone
("LH").8 2
FSH causes the growth and development of undeveloped eggs in
the ovaries. 3 While in the ovary, the egg is surrounded by a layer of
cells that produces both estrogen and progesterone. I After the egg is
released, this layer of cells is called the corpus hiteum, and continues
to produce both hormones.
Estrogen affects the reproductive cycle in two ways. First, as
estrogen increases, the level of LH produced by the pituitary gland
also increases.' Second, estrogen, along with progesterone, fosters
the creation of the uterine lining (the endometrium) in preparation of
the egg and sperm union, the embryo.'
The rise in LH is what causes the matured egg to release from the
follicle.s Once the egg is released, the empty follicle (the corpus
luteum) produces even greater amounts of estrogen and progesterone,
further developing the endometrium.1
Once the egg is released, it is picked up by the fallopian tubes and
transported to the uterus.9 " It is in the fallopian tubes where the union
of egg and sperm commonly occurs." If the egg is fertilized and
reaches the uterus, the resulting blastocyst will embed in the
endometrium.92 Once in the endometrium, some of the blastocyst will
become the placenta, while other portions become the embryo. The
placenta provides the connection between the mother and the
embryo.93 The placenta also produces human chorionic gonadotropin
("hCG"). 94 The hCG helps to maintain the corpus hiteum so that it
82. New York State Task Force. supra note 81. at 7: Dutton, supra note 21, at 14.
FSH and LH are both gonadotropins. Id.
83. Speroff et al.. supra note 26, at 117: Gregory F. Erickson. Follicle Growth and
Development, in Gynecology and Obstetrics, supra note 25, at 4-6.
84. Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 119.
85. Id. Before the egg is released this layer of cells makes up the preovulatory
follicle. Id. at 118-19.
86. David Jensen, The Principles of Physiology 974 (2d ed. 1980).
87. Dutton, supra note 21, at 14; see also Speroff et al.. supra note 26, at 123-53
(providing in-depth information about uterine development and function).
88. Erickson, supra note 83. at 13-14.
89. New York State Task Force. supra note 81, at 7: Jensen, supra note 86, at 974.
90. Speroff et al., supra note 26. at 252-56: Robert H. Glass, Egg Transport and
Fertilization, in Gynecology and Obstetrics, supra note 25, at 1.
91. New York State Task Force. supra note 81, at 7, 8; Seibel & Crockin, supra
note 42, at 5: Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 254-56; Glass, supra note 90, at 2. 3.
92. Speroff et al.. supra note 26. at 262-64. The fertilization process takes several
hours to complete. See generally Navot & Bergh, supra note 75 (discussing
implantation of the embryo into the uterus). The endometrium is the layer of tissue
which lines the uterus and is sloughed off during a woman's menstrual period. See
Stedman's Medical Dictionary. supra note 79. at 570.
93. Speroff et al., supra note 26. at 265.
94. New York State Task Force. supra note 81. at 8.
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will continue its production of estrogen and progesterone, both of
which help to sustain the early embryo and halt the onset of mensesY5
E. How Infertility Treatments Are Performed
Once a couple is diagnosed as infertile, a standard evaluation is
performed to determine the reason for the infertility.96 A common
reason for infertility is blocked or abnormal fallopian tubes.9 In fact,
one infertility specialist described what he does as "old-fashioned
plumbing problems being treated with extraordinary new
techniques."98
The overall procedure used in IVF may seem dry and tedious when
reduced to a verbal description, but for the infertile couple it is
infused with intense emotion: hope, disappointment, joy and even
physical pain. The overview included here is as plain as possible, so
that the impassive reader may gain a window of understanding into
the "normal" cycle for attempting pregnancy through IVF.
A typical assisted reproductive cycle is as follows: On the
fourteenth day of the woman's menstrual cycle99 she begins taking a
gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonist ("GnRH-a").' GnRH-a
95. See id.; Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 132 (stating that without estrogen and
progesterone the uterine lining degrades).
96. Standard evaluation for infertility is semen analysis for the man; endometrial
biopsy, hysterosalpingography (placing dye in the woman's fallopian tubes to check
for blockage), and laparoscopy (inserting a scope into the abdominal cavity under
general anesthesia for a visual survey) for the woman; and to test for serum antisperm
antibodies for the couple. David S. Guzick et al., Efficacy of Superovulation and
Intrauterine Insemination in the Treatment of Infertility, 340 New Eng. J. Med. 177, 177
(1999); see also Bradshaw, supra note 26 (outlining infertility evaluation and
treatment).
For insight into the causes of infertility, see generally Office of Technology
Assessment, supra note 32, at 61-82 (listing the primary reasons for infertility as
infection by sexually transmitted disease, hormonal imbalance, endometriosis (cells
which are normally present in the uterine lining present outside the uterus),
varicocele (varicose vein of the testis), and other external factors (contraception,
abortion, environment, drugs, genetic factors, cancer, etc.)).
97. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 18, at 60; Wallis, supra note 18, at 46.
98. Cynthia Gorney, The Egg Man, Bazaar, Dec. 1998, at 265.
99. The menstrual cycle is counted from the first day a woman's period starts.
Marilyn J. Chohaney, Tune in to Menstrual Evolution, Cap. Times, Oct. 19, 1995, at
2F; The Cutting Edge, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 1999, at Z5.
100. See Dutton, supra note 21, at 14; Machelle M. Seibel, Ovulation Induction with
Gonadotropins, in Gynecology and Obstetrics, supra note 25, at 4-5. Examples of
GnRH-a are leuprolide acetate (common name Lupron), nafarelin acetate (common
name Synarel), and goserelin acetate (common name Zoladex). New York State Task
Force, supra note 81, at 49 n.76; Dutton, supra note 21, at 14. These drugs are given
either by tablet or subcutaneous injection. Dutton, supra note 21, at 14-15.
Subcutaneous injections are preferred to inter-muscular injections since they use
shorter, thinner needles causing less pain and can be more easily self-administered.
See Serono Labs Reports, Introduction of Fertinex Improves Quality of Patient Care by
Reducing Stress, Improving Convenience of Infertility Therapy, PR Newswire, Nov. 4,
1996, available at LEXIS, News Library, USNEWS File.
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causes the pituitary gland to switch off and stop producing FSH and
LH (the egg producing, maturing hormones), thereby allowing the
physician to control the maturation and timing of the follicles.""
GnRH-a causes the cessation of production by desensitizing the
pituitary gland after several days of use.' " One side effect of GnRH-a
is a lowering of estrogen levels, which causes some women to
experience menopausal symptoms (hot flashes, cold sweats, etc.)tA3
Typically, after two weeks on GnRH-a and during the woman's
period, a blood test will be performed to verify that the pituitary gland
has been shut down. t" When this occurs, the egg production phase of
the assisted reproductive cycle can begin.
The woman will now take less GnRH-a and begin taking drugs to
stimulate her ovaries. 05 In a woman's normal cycle, FSH is produced
by the pituitary to signal the ovaries to begin maturing follicles to
produce eggs.10u In an assisted reproductive cycle, human menopausal
gonadotropin ("HMG") is used to achieve this same goal."'
HMG is manufactured from two different sources." The first
reliable source of HMG was processed from human urine. "  There
Recently a new type of drug, a GnRH antagonist, has been used to prevent
the production of LH. See Mehmet A. Akman et al., Addition of GnRH Antagonist in
Cycles of Poor Responders Undergoing IVF, 15 Hum. Reprod. 2145,2145 (2000). The
advantage of using an antagonist is that it works immediately to prevent the LH surge
that triggers the eggs to release. See id. This allows them to be added to the patient's
treatment much later in the cycle after the eggs have developed. See id. This is
thought to be especially beneficial for those women who do not respond well to the
stimulation drugs. See id. However, there is some data to suggest that antagonists
could lead to lower implantation rates. Eleuterio R. Hernandez, Embryo Implantation
and GnRH Antagonists, Embryo Implantation: The Rubicon for GnRH Antagonists,
15 Hum. Reprod. 1211, 1211 (2000).
101. See New York State Task Force, supra note 81, at 49; Seibel & Crockin, supra
note 42, at 4.
102. Paul Devroey, GnRH Antagonists, 73 Fertility & Sterility 15, 15 (2000).
103. Dutton, supra note 21, at 14; Speroff et al.. supra note 26. at 1120.
104. See Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 104-05.
105. See id. Early attempts at IVF did not use any ovulatory drugs to increase the
number of follicles. See supra Part L.A (discussing early IVF protocols). In the early
1980's Clomid and Pergonal were used to increase the number of eggs per cycle. See
Wallis, supra note 18, at 48.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
107. Dutton, supra note 21, at 15; Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 4; Speroff et
al., supra note 26, at 1104. Before HMG, Clomiphene Citrate (drug name Clomid or
Serophene) was used to stimulate the pituitary to secrete more FSH and increase egg
production. See New York State Task Force, supra note 81, at 44. See generally Mary
G. Hammond, Induction of Ovulation with Cloyniphene Citrate, in Gynecology and
Obstetrics, supra note 25 (reviewing treatment protocols and results using
Clomiphene Citrate). HMG is more widely used because, when using clomiphene
citrate, doctors cannot control the timing of the LH surge which causes the follicles to
release the eggs. See Hammond, supra, at 1, 2.
108. Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 1110.
109. Seibel, supra note 100, at 1. At first, gonadotropins were obtained from
pregnant mares, but this proved unsatisfactory for human use. Id. Next, FSH and LH
were obtained from human pituitary glands containing both hormones. Id. However,
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are two disadvantages of urinary HMG."0 One is the availability of
urine from which to extract HMG."' The other is that many of the
drugs made with urinary HMG are typically given with inter-muscular
injections, a much more painful method than subcutaneous injections,
and cannot (without even more pain) be self-administered." 2  The
other source of HMG is genetically engineered FSH." 3 This process
was granted approval by the federal Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") in 1997.114 With the advent of recombinant technologies,
HMG, and therefore assisted reproduction, is available to more
couples. 15
due to the small number of human pituitary glands which contained the hormones,
the source was too unreliable. See id. Menotropin (common name Pergonal) was one
of the first widely used sources of HMG. See id. This comes from the urine of post-
menopausal women. See New York State Task Force, supra note 81, at 46. Since
post-menopausal women can no longer create eggs, and therefore do not have a
corpus luteum (the old egg sac), they are unable to produce estrogen. See Speroff et
al., supra note 26, at 226-38 (describing the hormonal phases of ovulation). This lack
of estrogen means the pituitary does not stop making FSH and LH, resulting in higher
constant concentrations of both in the urine of post-menopausal women. See id.
110. There are several drugs presently on the market which are made from urinary
HMG. Drugs like Pergonal and Humegon are a mixture of FSH and LH. New York
State Task Force, supra note 81, at 46. Others, like Metrodin and Fertinex, contain
only FSH (urofollitropin). Id. Metrodin was removed from the market since Fertinex
contained a more purified form of FSH and could be taken via subcutaneous
injection. New York State Task Force, supra note 81, at 46 n.56; Seibel, supra note
100, at 2. Metrodin was the fertility drug used by Bobbi McCaughey, the woman who
gave birth to the United States' first set of septuplets, and only the second set in the
world. See Pam Belluck, Progress Made by Seven Babies Encourages Their Doctors.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1997, at A32; Michael D. Lemonick, "It's A Miracle," Time,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 35.
111. Treating the estimated number of infertile women with urinary gonadotropins
would require 100 million liters of urine to be processed. Seibel, supra note 100, at 1.
112. New York State Task Force, supra note 81, at 46 n.58; Dutton, supra note 21,
at 16.
113. See Seibel, supra note 100, at 1. The two types of recombinant FSH currently
on the market are Gonal-F (follitropin alpha) and Follistim (follitropin beta). Salim
Daya & Joanne Gunby, Recombinant Versus Urinary Follicle Stimulating Hormone
for Ovarian Stimulation in Assisted Reproduction, 14 Hum. Reprod. 2207, 2207
(1999). To create this recombinant drug, the gene which creates FSH was isolated
and combined into the genome of Chinese hamster ovaries. See Seibel, supra note
100, at 1. This makes the hamster ovaries produce FSH which is harvested, purified,
processed and sold to the consumer. See id. at 2. Recombinant FSH has been linked
to many benefits over urinary FSH. See Daya & Gunby, supra, at 2211 (reviewing
studies comparing recombinant FSH to urinary FSH and concluding that the use of
recombinant FSH led to more clinical pregnancies); F. Raga et al., Recombinant
Follicle Stimulating Hormone Stimulation in Poor Responders with Normal Basal
Concentrations of Follicle Stimulating Hormone and Oestradiol" Improved
Reproductive Outcome, 14 Hum. Reprod. 1431, 1431, 1433 (1999) (stating that the use
of recombinant FSH led to more and better quality eggs retrieved, better embryos
obtained, and shorter treatment periods with lower dosages than those cycles in which
urinary FSH was used).
114. New York State Task Force, supra note 81, at 46.
115. The price of either urinary or recombinant HMGs is still one of the most
costly aspects of an assisted reproductive cycle. The drugs are sold by "ampule" and,
A TRUSTANALYSIS
During the administration of the HMG, the woman is required to
undergo several blood tests and ultrasound examinations, sometimes
daily.116 These tests provide information on the number and quality of
the eggs and indicate the optimum time to retrieve the matured
eggs.117 During early clinical trials in assisted reproduction, ultrasound
was not available.' This meant that patients were monitored by
observing cervical mucus changes and pelvic examinations."9 This
resulted in many cases of hyperstimulation of the ovaries.1'- However,
with the technology available today, doctors are able to determine the
number and size of follicles and can more accurately judge when to
retrieve the follicles.
Approximately thirty-six hours before retrieval of the eggs the
woman is given a shot of hCG.12 1 The hCG is similar to the LH that is
normally released by the pituitary gland to trigger the release of the
eggs from the follicles."
Retrieval is normally an outpatient procedure completed under
general anesthetic."z  The physician uses a needle that is placed
through the vaginal wall to aspirate the eggs from the follicles that
surround the ovaries.124 The doctor guides the needle with the help of
if purchased in the United States, typically cost around sixty dollars per ampule. See
Freedom Drug, http://wv.freedomdrug.comprices.html (as of July 27, 2001,
advertising Gonal-F for $54.40 per ampule). Purchased from either France or Great
Britain the cost per ampule decreases to around forty-five dollars. See Pharma-Med,
Ltd., http://www.pmed.com/ (as of April 26, 2000, advertising Gonal-F for $45.95 per
ampule.). Since the HMG injections last for ten to twelve days and a woman can take
from four to six ampules per day, the cost for the HMG drugs alone ranges from
approximately $1800 to approximately $4320. See id.; Dutton, supra note 21, at 17;
Meldrum, In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 25, at 5; Glazer, supra note 8 (providing
that the cost for one month of fertility medications for one woman was $3300). These
costs are typically not covered by insurance. See supra notes 43 to 45 and
accompanying text.
116. See Dutton, supra note 21, at 16; Vicken Sahakian & Mary G. Hammond, The
Role of Ultrasound in Infertility, in Gynecology and Obstetrics, supra note 25, 2-3.
There is some danger of "hyperstimulation" where the ovaries increase dangerously
in size. See Geoffrey Cowley & Karen Springen, Multiplying the Risks: More Group
Births Mean More Preemies and, Often, More Problems, Newsweek. Dec. 1. 1997, at
66. During the drug treatments, the ovaries can swell to ten times their normal size,
which would make them roughly the size of a grapefruit. Id.
117. See Dutton, supra note 21, at 17; Sahakian & Hammond, supra note 116, at 3.
118. Siebel, supra note 100, at 1.
119. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
120. See Seibel, supra note 100, at 1.
121. New York State Task Force, supra note 81. at 48; Dutton, supra note 21, at 17.
122 See New York State Task Force, supra note 81, at 48.
123. Dutton, supra note 21, at 18-19; Meldrum, In Vitro Fertlization, supra note 25,
at 6; Susan W. Trout et al., Conscious Sedation for In Vitro Fertilization, 69 Fertility &
Sterility 799, 800 (1998). In order to reduce costs of assisted reproduction, some
women choose to use just a local anesthetic. Edward C. Ditkoff et al., Anesthesia
Practices in the U.S. Common to In Vitro Fertilization (1VF) Centers, 14 J. Assisted
Reprod. Genet. 145, 146-47 (1997).
124. Dutton, supra note 21, at 18-19; Speroff et al., supra note 26. at 1137; Sahakin
& Hammond, supra note 116, at 3-6. Some retrievals are done by laparoscope, but
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ultrasound that gives an accurate, if albeit fuzzy, picture of the ovaries
and follicles."z  The entire procedure, from start to finish, takes
approximately thirty minutes.
After the eggs are retrieved, the husband is asked to give a sperm
sample. 126  The sperm are prepared by removing a portion of the
sperm, in a process called capacitation, and then placing them into
another liquid. 127 After several hours, the sperm and egg are mixed
together and placed in an incubator. They will stay there undisturbed
for ten to twelve hours. 28
An alternative to passive fertilization is ICSI.129 In this process, a
single sperm is injected into the egg.Y0 This process is used or
recommended for those couples in which the male has a low sperm
count, has the cystic fibrosis gene, or there is a lack of fertilization for
an unexplained reason.13 '
If the egg and sperm unite, the result is a zygote. 3 2 The resulting
embryo is left to incubate and divide for several days before being
the procedure is done infrequently since the recovery period is longer. See Seibel &
Crockin, supra note 42, at 4; Sahakian & Hammond, supra note 116, at 2.
125. See Dutton, supra note 21, at 18-19; Sahakin & Hammond, supra note 116, at
3-6.
126. This can be done beforehand, but fresh samples of sperm are linked with a
higher success rate than frozen sperm. See Meldrum, In Vitro Fertlization, supra note
25, at 6.
127. Dutton, supra note 21, at 18; Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 5; Meldrum,
In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 25, at 6. The most motile sperm are separated by the
"swim-up" technique, where the sperm are layered with another substance and the
ones which "swim-up" are used. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 32, at
127. This leaves the abnormal or nonmotile sperm remaining. Id.
128. See Meldrum, supra note 25, at 6-7; see also Office of Technology Assessment,
supra note 32, at 123 (stating that the egg and sperm are left undisturbed for eighteen
hours). To prevent mix-ups of patient gametes all containers are clearly labeled and
color-coded for a specific patient. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760,761 (1994).
129. Scott E. Smith & Michael J. Tucker, Micromanipulation for Assisted
Reproduction, in Gynecology and Obstetrics, supra note 25, at 3. ICSI, pronounced
"Icksee," adds approximately $1,500 to the overall cost of the cycle. See Geoffrey
Cowley, The Future of Birth: Reproductive Medicine is Still Evolving, Newsweek,
Sept. 4, 1995, at 42-43 [hereinafter Cowley, The Future of Birth]. Other methods of
assisted fertilization are zona drilling (puncturing the shell of the egg, called the zona
pellucida, to facilitate fertilization) and subzonal insemination ("SUZI") (several
sperm are placed under the zona pellucida). Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 12.
130. Smith & Tucker, supra note 129, at 3-4; Begley, supra note 27, at 41. One
study showed no increase in major congenital abnormalities with ICSI, but did show
minor developmental delay at one year. See Jennifer R. Bowen et al., Medical and
Developmental Outcome at One Year for Children Conceived by Intracytoplasinic
Sperm Injection, 351 Lancet 1529 (1998).
131. See Smith & Tucker, supra note 129, at 3; P.A. Veld et al., Genetic Counseling
Before Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, 350 Lancet 490, 490 (1997) (suggesting
genetic counseling before use of ICSI since male infertility can be associated with
male genetic abnormalities).
132. The terms used for the egg-sperm union vary with the amount of time and
placement. A zygote is the union of egg and sperm before the resulting cell divides.
Stedman's Medical Dictionary, supra note 79, at 1976. When the egg and sperm unite
the resulting mass of cells is called an embryo until the ninth week. See id. at 559. A
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transferred to the womb.'33 After three days, many of the embryos
will not attach to the uterine wall." Because of this, some doctors
transfer multiple embryos, which in turn can lead to multiple births." 5
However, Australian embryologist David Gardner developed a
medium, similar to the environment found in the human womb, which
allows the cells to grow in vitro for five days, until they reach the
blastocyst stage.136 This technique doubles the implantation rate, and
infertility specialists hope that by using this method the incidence of
higher-order multiple births will be reduced.'37
blastocyst is an embryo at the preimplantation stage. See Speroff et al., supra note 26,
at 261; see also Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 32, at 383.
133. See Meldrum, In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 25, at 10.
134. See David K. Gardner et al., Culture and Transfer of Human BlastocYsts
Increases Implantation Rates and Reduces the Need for Multiple Embryo Transfers. 69
Fertility & Sterility 84, 84 (1998). Low doses of aspirin (less than 80 mg) are thought
to help implantation of the embryo into the uterine wall. See Mara Rubinstein et al.,
Low-Dose Aspirin Treatment Improves Ovarian Responsiveness, Uterine and Ovarian
Blood Flow Velocity, Implantation, and Pregnancy Rates in Patients Undergoing In
Vitro Fertilization: A Prospective, Randomized, Double-blind Placebo-controlled
Assay, 71 Fertility & Sterility 825,827 (1999): Cowley, The Future of Birth, supra note
129, at 42-43.
135. See Dutton, supra note 21, at 20-23. Some infertility specialists believe that
the chance of a live birth from four embryos transferred is no greater than if only one
embryo is transferred. Id. at 21. But see David Finkel, "What Kind of Choice Is
That?": Science's War on Infertility Can Deliver Painful Decisions, Wash. Post, Mar.
21, 1999, at Al (stating that for a woman under the age of thirty-five, if one embryo is
transferred there is a 9% chance of a live birth, two embryos transferred 20%, and
with four embryos transferred the chance of live birth is 37%). In the United
Kingdom there is a restriction on the number of embryos that may be transferred to
reduce the number of incidences of multiple births. Judy Peres, Setting Limits on
High-Tech Babymaking, Chi. Trib., July 26, 1998, at Perspective 1. The American
Society for Reproductive Medicine recommends that a maximum of three to five
embryos be transferred at one time to lower the incidences of multiple births. Id.
136. Gardner et al., supra note 134, at 85. There are two primary advantages of
blastocyst transfer. See id. at 87. First, the female reproductive tract is more
synchronized with the blastocysts. Id. Second, the lab has longer to assess the viability
of the embryo. Id.; see Lemonick, supra note 31, at 44.
137. See Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 1139: Gardner et al., supra note 134, at 84-
85; see also Amin A. Milki et al., Two-Blastocyst Transfer Has Similar Pregnancy
Rates and a Decreased Multiple Gestation Rate Compared with Three-BlastocYst
Transfer, 72 Fertility & Sterility 225, 226-27 (1999) (stating that two-blastocyst
transfers had the same success rate as three-blastocyst transfers, wvith a lower
incidence of triplets); Basak Balaban et al., Blastocyst Quality Affects the Success of
Blastocyst-Stage Embryo Transfer, 74 Fertility & Sterility 282. 285-87 (2000) (finding
that the quality of the blastocyst positively correlates with implantation rates): Barry
Behr, Blastocyst Culture and Transfer, 14 Hum. Reprod. 5. 5-6 (1999) (suggesting that
blastocyst transfer always be used to identify the most viable embryos to transfer);
Jan Gerris & Eric Van Royen, Avoiding Multiple Pregnancies in ART, A Plea for
Single Embryo Transfer, 15 Hum. Reprod. 1884 (2000) (giving reasons for single
embryo transfer and possible tests to indicate which embryos would have the best
chance at implantation); P. Wolner-Hanssen & H. Rydhstroem, Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis of In Vitro Fertilization: Estimated Costs per Successful Pregnancy After
Transfer of One or Two Embryos, 13 Hum. Reprod. 88, 92 (1998) (suggesting that a
lower overall cost to society would be present if single embryos were transferred
versus multiple embryo transfers due to the higher costs involved in multiple births).
2001]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The techniques just described represent methods used in traditional
IVF. To complete a traditional IVF cycle the embryos are placed into
the womb or can be frozen for later use. 138 The transfer procedure is
simple: first the woman's womb is readied with progesterone, then
the embryos are placed inside it by one of several different methods . 39
Typically, the transfer is completed with no anesthetic, and takes only
about five minutes. 40  The transfer is aided by the use of an
138. Dutton, supra note 21, at 23. The freezing of embryos was first done in the
Netherlands in 1983. See P. Mazur, Freezing of Living Cells: Mechanisms and
Implications, 247 Am. J. Physiology C125 (1984). To freeze the embryos, they are
slowly taken down to minus 80 degrees Celsius and stored for later thawing and
transfer. See Don P. Wolf, Gamete and Embryo Cryopreservation, in Gynecology and
Obstetrics, spura note 25, at 4. For articles which discuss the various issues frozen
embryos create see Nicole L. Cucci, Constitutional Implications of In Vitro
Fertilization Procedures, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 417, 431-44 (1998) (reviewing case law,
state legislation and international law on the treatment and disposition of frozen
embryos); Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative
Rights Prevail in Disputes Over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 27 Conn. L. Rev.
1377 (1995) (discussing the legal disposition of frozen embryos); Donna A. Katz, My
Egg, Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for Deciding Which Party Receives
Custody of Frozen Preembryos, 5 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 623 (1998) (explaining
custody issues arising from frozen embryos); Alise R. Panitch, The Davis Dilemma:
How to Prevent Battles over Frozen Preembryos, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 543 (1991)
(focusing on disputes between spouses who disagree about the disposition of their
preembryos); John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 407 (1990) (examining issues raised by a couple's prior
agreement with respect to disposition); John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes over
Frozen Embryos, 19 Hastings Ctr. Rep. Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 7 (examining alternative
resolutions to disputes over the disposition of the embryos); Marcia Joy Wurmbrand,
Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1079 (1986)
(suggesting that all embryos should either be used or frozen, but none destroyed).
Approximately seventy-eight percent of couples starting an assisted
reproductive cycle transfer embryos. See New York State Task Force, supra note 81,
at 52. Embryos are frozen instead of eggs, since eggs do not freeze well. The first
successful pregnancy from frozen eggs was reported in October 1997 at Reproductive
Biology Associates ("RBA") in Atlanta, Georgia. See Weiss, Fertility Innovation or
Exploitation?, supra note 47. Until 1997, RBA reported only two live births in
twenty-three attempts using frozen eggs. See id. In addition to low success rates, there
is a published report that freezing damages the egg's DNA. Springen et al., supra note
8, at 43 (reporting that the reason freezing eggs is not currently an option is that "eggs
tend to crystallize in sub-zero temps, disrupting their chromosomal integrity"); Weiss,
Fertility Innovation or Exploitation?, supra note 47. Research is presently being done
on freezing a woman's ovarian tissue which contains thousands of immature follicles
to be used later by that same woman. See Springen et al., supra note 8, at 43.
139. In May 1984, 1209 pregnancies were reported from 9641 IVF treatments, for a
thirteen percent viable pregnancy rate. Soules, supra note 27, at 511-12. The rate of
embryos transferred ranged from ten percent viable pregnancies per single embryo
transfer, to nineteen percent per three embryos transferred. See id. at 512. A minority
of programs achieve this rate, while some programs never have a pregnancy. See id.
In 1995, the live birth rate via IVF increased substantially. Out of 27,000 procedures
performed in 1995, the live-birth rate was 18.6%. Begley, supra note 27, at 41.
140. Dutton, supra note 21, at 22 (stating that embryo transfer takes about five
minutes to complete); Meldrum, In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 25, at 8-9.
"Embryo transfer (ET) is one of the most critical procedures to successful assisted
reproduction." Rhonda M. Hearns-Stokes et al., Pregnancy Rates after Embryo
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ultrasound device that helps the physician place the embryos into the
womb. 4'
The process in ZIFT142 is similar to the traditional IVF process in
every way except where the zygote is placed in the woman's body and
the amount of time the zygote is allowed to incubate."' After one day
of incubation, the single-celled zygote is placed inside the fallopian
tube.'" This procedure is done under general anesthetic and with a
laparoscope.145 The zygote then travels to the uterus naturally and
implants itself into the uterine wall. The rationale for using this
technique is that the implantation rate is thought to be higher than
traditional IVF, since there is less trauma for the embryos on
transfer"' 6
In the process of GIFT,, 147 fertilization takes place inside the
woman.148 A catheter is loaded with the couple's eggs and sperm
Transfer Depend on Provider at Embryo Transfer, 74 Fertility & Sterility 80, 80
(2000).
There is a debate in the medical literature as to the need for bed rest following
embryo transfer. See Raoul Orvieto et al., Bed Rest Following Embryo Transfer-
Necessary?, 70 Fertility & Sterility 982 (1998) (suggesting that bed rest after embryo
transfer may have no effect on pregnancy rates due to the decrease in stress levels
associated with a return to a daily routine); Khaldoun Sharif et al., Is Bed Rest
Following Embryo Transfer Necessary?. 69 Fertility & Sterility 478, 480 (1998)
(finding higher pregnancy rates in patients who were not told to have bed rest after
transfer).
141. See B. Coroleu et al., Embryo Transfer Under Ultrasound Guidance Improves
Pregnancy Rates After In-Vitro Fertilization, 15 Hum. Reprod. 616, 617-19 (2000)
(reporting that use of ultrasound to place catheter 1.5 cm from fundus of uterine
cavity was found to be an "essential factor" to improving IVF results). As Dr. Patrick
Steptoe, the first to have a live birth, said: "The skill of the person doing the
replacement is very important .... The womb doesn't like things being put into it."
Wallis, supra note 18, at 49; see Hearns-Stokes et al., supra note 140, at 85 (finding a
correlation in pregnancy rates to various doctors who performed embryo transfers,
although the same techniques and equipment were used by all, and each provider
used the same ratio of high-grade embryos). "The biggest snag comes when the
embryo is inserted in the uterus, an operation that can be very disruptive to the
womb. As a result, such embryos often fail to take root, or implant." Philip Elmer-
Dewitt, A Revolution In Making Babies: New Techniques Help Childless Couples-
Even After Menopause, Time, Nov. 5, 1990, at 76,76.
142- Zygote Intra-Fallopian Transfer ("ZIFT").
143. ZIFT was pioneered by Dr. Ricardo Asch. Elmer-Dewvitt, supra note 18, at 61.
Pronuclear Stage Tubal Transfer ("PROST"), Tubal Embryo Transfer ("TET"), and
ZIFT are all variations of GIFT and all require IVF to be performed initially. Seibel
& Crockin, supra note 42, at 7. All require fertilization to be performed before any
transfer to the woman. Id.
144. Edmond Confino, Tubal Transfer Techniques for Assisted Reproduction, in
Gynecology and Obstetrics, supra note 25, at 1.
145. Id. at 2.
146. See Begley, supra note 27, at 41. Out of 1500 procedures performed in 1995
there was a twenty-four percent live birth rate. Id.
147. Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer ("GIFT"). Both GIFT and ZIFT were
pioneered by Dr. Ricardo Asch, who at the time was at the University of Texas at San
Antonio. See Ricardo H. Asch et al., Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer (GIFT): A New
Treatment for Infertility, 30 Int. J. Fertility 41, 41 (1985); Confino, supra note 144, at 1;
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(separated by an air bubble) and the gametes are placed into the
fallopian tube.'49 Hopefully, fertilization will take place, and the
embryo(s) will travel to and implant inside the uterine wall. 50
F. Chances of Conceiving with IVF
The good news is that fifty to sixty percent of couples who currently
seek infertility treatments will conceive a child if they are motivated
and follow prescribed treatment procedures. 5' The bad news is that
Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 18, at 61. Dr. Asch later was named director of the Center
for Reproductive Health at the University of California, Irvine. See Geoffrey Cowley
et al., Ethics and Embryos, Newsweek, June 12, 1995, at 66, 66. The U.C. Irvine
program closed in 1995 after allegations were made public that the program used
women's eggs, without consent, in the assisted reproductive procedures of other
infertile patients. Id.; Susan Kelleher et al., Asch Charged with Insurance Fraud,
Orange County Reg., Nov. 15, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Kelleher, Insurance Fraud].
These allegations led to more than 107 lawsuits, and at least fifteen children were
born from the misappropriated eggs. Susan Kelleher & Kim Christensen, Stone Says
Partners Knew of Egg Thefts, Orange County Reg., Mar. 18, 1998, at Al. In 1995, Dr.
Asch fled the United States, just before he was indicted by a federal grand jury on
mail fraud charges for fraudulent bills to insurers and conspiracy to defraud patients
of their genetic material. Susan Kelleher, Regents to Sue Fertility Surgeons for
Settlements Paid Out in UCI Scandal, Orange County Reg., July 17, 1999, at B7
(hereinafter Kelleher, Regents to Sue); Kelleher & Christensen, supra; Kelleher,
Insurance Fraud, supra. In 1999, the University of California Regents said it would
sue Dr. Asch and his partners for the $16.7 million that was paid to patients to settle
lawsuits over the egg swapping. Kelleher, Regents to Sue, supra, at B7; see also Havins
& Dalessio, supra note 38, at 862-65 (providing background on lawsuits against Dr.
Asch and his partners); Krim, supra note 35, at 194-95 (discussing lawsuits against
U.C. Irvine in aftermath of Asch scandal); Rebecca S. Snyder, Reproductive
Technology and Stolen Ova: Who is the Mother?, 16 Law & Inequality 289, 294, 334
(1998) (suggesting that family law should be used to resolve custodial issues of
children born from misappropriated gametes). For additional newspaper articles on
the lawsuits, see Susan Kelleher, 16-year Wait for Former UCI Fertility Clinic Patient
Ends in Birth of 'Miracle', Orange County Reg., Feb. 4, 1997, at B1; John McDonald,
Fertility Clinic Doctor Out on Bail, Orange County Reg., Dec. 24, 1997, at Al.
148. While insemination is in vivo, the procedure is still classified under IVF
because of its artificial nature. Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 5-7. Gamete
Uterine Transfer ("GUT") is like GIFT except that the transferred sperm and egg are
placed in the uterus instead of the fallopian tubes. Id. at 7. The primary advantage is
that transfer can be performed by ultrasound and can be performed on a woman who
does not have fallopian tubes. Id.
149. Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 7-11; see Confino, supra note 144, at 3; J.
Evans et al., A Possible Effect of Different Light Sources on Pregnancy Rates
Following Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer, 14 Hum. Reprod. 80, 80-82 (1999)
(finding that light sources which emitted lower amounts of ultra-violet light increased
pregnancy rates when used in GIFT procedures).
150. Out of 4200 procedures performed in 1995, the live birth rate was twenty-eight
percent. Begley, supra note 27, at 41.
151. Bradshaw, supra note 26, at 2; Barbara Stewart, Tough Choices: In Vitro vs.
Adoption, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1995, § 13, at 1. More than ninety percent of the babies
born with IVF techniques come within four IVF cycles, with eighty percent occurring
after two IVF cycles. Seibel & Crockin, supra note 42, at 17 app. 1-E at 24; Seibel ct
al., supra note 41, at 1053. Couples who are unsuccessful after four to six attempts are
not encouraged to pursue any further treatment. See Seibel et al., supra note 41, at
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for any single assisted reproduction cycle the chance the couple will
produce a healthy baby is only around twenty percent.12 The chance
of a live birth per cycle does vary dramatically with the age of the
woman undergoing the procedure.' 3  Approximately 29% of the
cycles performed on women under the age of thirty-five resulted in
live births, as compared to only 8.7% of those performed on women
thirty-nine and older.'- Medical professionals believe that egg quality
decreases with age and this accounts for the dramatic decrease in
fertilization and live births per cycle for older women.' 5"
G. Using a Gestational Carrier
Assisted reproduction by a gestational carrier applies the
techniques of IVF as described above, split between two women. Dr.
Wulf Utian achieved the first successful pregnancy by a gestational
carrier in 1985.156 The genetic mother was a thirty-seven year old
woman who had undergone a hysterectomy." The gestational carrier
was a twenty-two year old friend of the couple who previously had
two children. 1 8 The pregnancy led to the birth of a baby girl in the
next year.1 59
A growing number of clinics in the United States permit the use of a
gestational carrier.1"° The clinics that permit this procedure typically
have strict screening criteria for both the intended parents and the
gestational carrier."' Typically all parties involved must submit to full
1053. But see MeIdrum, Success Rate, supra note 41, at 1008 (review ing all cycles
done by fifty-four clinics in the United States and finding only a -modest decline in
success" for each cycle attempted).
152. New York State Task Force, supra note 81, at 52: see Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology & The American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States and Canada: 1994 Results
Generated from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine/Society for Assisted
Reproductive Technology Registry, 66 Fertility & Sterility 697, 698 (1996)- Gabriel,
supra note 38, at 1; Stolberg, supra note 57.
153. Abma et al., supra note 26, at 35.
154. Id.
155. Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 1016-17. But see Menken et al.. supra note 40,
at 1393 (stating that there is no connection between fecundity and age).
156. Wulf H. Utian et al., Successfid Pregnancy After In Vitro Fertilization and
Embryo Transfer From an Infertile Woman to a Surrogate, 313 New Eng. J. Med.
1351,1351-52 (1985) [hereinafter Utian et al., Successful Pregnancy].
157. Id. at 1351.
158. Id at 1352.
159. Utian et al., Preliminary Experience. supra note 25, at 633.
160. Corson et al., supra note 25, at 670. The National Summary of fertility clinics
shows that sixty-one percent of the fertility clinics in the United States offer a
gestational carrier option. See Center for Disease Control, supra note 37, at 47. This
is up from just thirty-seven percent two years earlier. Center for Disease Control,
1996 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and
Fertility Clinic Reports 35 (1996). One informal estimate provides that up to 10(10
babies are born to gestational carriers per year. Glazer, supra note 8.
161. Braverman & Corson, supra note 63, at 353-54 (detailing the psychological
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medical and psychological evaluations, meet certain age requirements,
and be represented by legal counsel. 62 Of course, for the intended
parents, an unwritten but very real requirement is the financial ability
to complete the procedure.
Apart from the cost of the assisted reproductive procedure, 63 a
gestational carrier is typically paid for her services. The payment can
range from $10,000 to $50,000 for a successful pregnancy.' 64 If the
pregnancy is not successful, the gestational carrier typically does not
receive the entire payment, sometimes as little as ten percent of the
agreed amount.1 65
screening of gestational carriers and intended parents in one clinic); Corson et al.,
supra note 25, at 670-71 (detailing the various requirements for admission into the
hospital's program); Hanafin, supra note 5, at 379; Richard P. Marrs et al., The Use of
Surrogate Gestational Carriers for Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 168 Am. J.
Obstetrics & Gynecology 1858, 1859 (1993). Screening of the gestational carrier is
required since there is a risk of the gestational carrier being less concerned for the
child than a pregnant woman who will rear the child. Mary E. English et al., Semantics
and Science: The Distinction Between Gestational Carrier and Traditional Surrogacy
Options, 3 Commentary 155, 156 (1991) (stating that gestational surrogates are less
emotionally attached to the fetus than to their own children); Ethics Committee of
the American Fertility Society, supra note 25, at 60S. In one clinic, the pool of
gestational carriers came from three sources: 1) a relative or friend of the patient, 2) a
response to an advertisement placed by the intended parents, or 3) a person who
contacted the program independently. Braverman & Corson, supra note 63, at 354.
162. Batzer et al., supra note 5, at 1289; Braverman & Corson, supra note 63, at 354
(detailing the psychological testing done in one clinic); Corson et al., supra note 25, at
670-71; Hanafin, supra note 5, at 378-82 ("Personality assessment is the most
important aspect of the assessment process."); Marrs et al., supra note 161, at 1859;
Judy Parkinson et al., Perinatal Outcome After In-vitro Fertilization-Surrogacy, 14
Hum. Reprod. 671, 671-72 (1998) (requiring prospective gestational carriers to have
delivered a child without complications, and no mental illness or postpartum
depression). It is suggested that programs explore many different areas of a
prospective gestational carrier life: her references; criminal background; history of
psychological care; history of chemical dependency; and any psychological disorders
associated with prior pregnancy, such as anxiety or postpartum depression. Hanafin,
supra note 5, at 380; see also Unif. Parentage Act § 803 (amended 2000) (requiring a
court hearing to validate any gestational carrier agreement and requiring that "all
parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement and understand its terms").
163. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
164. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (describing how the
couple contracted to pay the gestational carrier $10,000 and purchased a $200,000
insurance policy on her life); McEwen, supra note 35, at 276 (stating that $10,000 was
the typical payment to a gestational carrier); Glazer, supra note 8, (stating that
payments to gestational carriers range from $13,000 to $17,000); cf Marrs et al., supra
note 161, at 1861 (stating that the entire procedure costs couples around $40,000). By
agreement, payments are not made for the child, but rather "the couple is paying the
woman to provide temporary care for their own genetic child." Ethics Committee of
the American Fertility Society, supra note 25, at 60S. There are instances where the
gestational carrier does not charge a fee, such as when she is related to one of the
genetic parents. See, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 761 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994)
(gestational carrier was sister of genetic mother).
165. See McEwen, supra note 35, at 276-77. The two main forms of surrogacy are
"traditional" and "gestational." Traditional surrogacy consists of artificially
inseminating the surrogate with the husband's sperm. Gestational surrogacy is
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The perceived need and desire for money is the main reason why
women decide to be gestational carriers." While many feminist
different in that an already fertilized egg is implanted into a host female that is
genetically unrelated. The Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA") consolidates the two
types of surrogacy mentioned above into the single descriptive term for the woman.
"'gestational mother." The current version of the UPA allows gestational agreements
and allows the intended parents to compensate the gestational mother. However, the
UPA also requires that the agreement be scrutinized by a court before it becomes
effective. Statutorily, several states have followed suit and passed legislation
regarding gestational surrogacy. Several states have enacted portions of the UPA.
None allow the parents to compensate the surrogate mother for performing the
surrogate contract, but do generally allow for reasonable payment of medical and
living expenses related to the pregnancy. Florida. Nevada, New Hampshire, Virginia
and Kentucky allow gestational contracts, but only if there is no compensation paid to
the gestational mother. Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio. Reproductive
Surrogacy at the Millenniun Proposed Model Legislation Regulating "'on-
Traditional" Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 McGeorge L Rev. 673, 6 86-87, app.
at 694-95 (2000) (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 742.13. 742.15-742.16 (West 1985 & Supp.
1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 126.045 (Michie Supp. 1999); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
168-B:1 to 168-B:22 (1994 & Supp. 1999); Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (Michie
1995 & Supp. 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.590(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1997)) (noting
that only New Hampshire, Virginia and Florida distinguish between traditional and
gestational surrogacy). Generally, however, medical expenses and reasonable living
expenses are not included as "compensation" and are therefore allowed. li. Each
state has a slightly different definition of what compensation is forbidden, but Florida
provides a common example. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.15. Florida allows the couple
that has commissioned the surrogacy contract "to pay only reasonable living, legal,
medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses... that are directly related to
prenatal, intrapartal, and postpartal periods." Id. Of the six states that have statutes
providing for criminal penalties for entering into surrogacy agreements (District of
Columbia, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Utah and Washington). only two of those
focus the penalties on surrogacy in exchange for consideration (Kentucky and
Washington). See Havins & Dalessio, supra, at 687, app. at 699-700 (citing D.C. Code
Ann. § 16-402 (1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.990(2) (Michie 1995): Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 722.857 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 123
(McKinney 1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-204 (1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
26.26.250 (West 1997)).
Eight states void surrogacy agreements altogether. Id. at 67, app. at 697-98
(citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-218(A) (West 1991); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 31-20-1-1 to
31-20-1-2 (Michie 1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2713 (West 1991): Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 722.855 (West 1993): Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,200 (1995); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 122 (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-05 (1997); Tenn. Code Ann. §
36-1-102(46)(C) (1996). Surrogacy agreements in these states are not illegal, but are
simply not enforced as against public policy. See Ariz Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-218(A)
(West 1991); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 31-20-1-1 to 31-20-1-2 (Michie 1997); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 9:2713 (West 1991); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.855 (West 1993): Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-21,200 (1995); N.Y. Dom Rel. Law § 122 (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.D.
Cent. Code § 14-18-05 (1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(46)(C) (1996).
166. See Braverman & Corson, supra note 63, at 357 (indicating that psychological
tests and clinical observation of gestational carriers "demonstrated that the women
who seek to be gestational carriers do so because it meets their own internal needs to
be important and vital in other people's lives"); Hanafin, supra note 5, at 379
(discussing what motivates both gestational carriers and surrogate mothers to
participate); Parker, supra note 64, at 118 (listing motivations of traditional
surrogates). Other reasons women gave for participating were the perceived
enjoyment and desire to be pregnant, the desire to give the gift of a child to a couple
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authors use this fact to support their claims about the possible
exploitation of women, 7 these assertions are not supported by the
profile of a typical gestational carrier. The women who participate are
primarily white, married, high school graduates, between twenty-six
and twenty-eight years of age, with household incomes between
$30,000 and $50,000.16s
The medical procedure of IVF, as described above, 69 is the same
for the intended mother in a gestational carrier situation, if she
provides the eggs, until transfer of the embryo. The gestational carrier
is given GnRH-a to stop normal endocrine activity and then estrogen
and progesterone to prepare her uterus for transfer.' Transfer is
completed by one of the methods previously mentioned.'
The success rate for gestational carrier pregnancies is similar to
non-gestational carrier assisted reproduction. Early reports showed a
success rate of 12% from attempts done from 1984 to 1989.172 Later
studies have reported a live birth rate per cycle of 18.5%, with one
and resolving guilt over previous abortions. Parker, supra note 64, at 118. Close to
ninety percent said the money was important, but not the only factor. Id. Since the
woman is not contributing any of her genetic material, gestational carriers are easier
to recruit than traditional surrogates. See Lawson, supra note 65.
167. See Field, Reproductive Technologies, supra note 70, at 1590; Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1935 (1987) [hereinafter Radin,
Market-Inalienability]; cf Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full
Contractual Enforcement, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2305, 2325-30 (1995) [hereinafter, Epstein,
Full Contractual Enforcement]; Ingram, supra note 70, at 683-85 (saying surrogacy
does not exploit women); Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing
Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 21, 25 (1989)
(writing that a "couple would be unlikely to want the baby of a desperately poor
woman; they would be concerned about her health, and therefore the baby's");
Russell-Brown, supra note 70, at 542-45; Debra Satz, Markets in Women's
Reproductive Labor, 21 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 107, 123-24 (1992).
168. Healy, supra note 5, at 102; see also Parkinson et al., supra note 162, at 671
(reporting that the average age of gestational carriers in several hospitals was 30.4
years of age); Nancy E. Reame & Philip J. Parker, Surrogate Pregnancy: Clinical
Features of Forty-Four Cases, 162 Am. J. Obstetrics and Gynecology 1220, 1221
(1990) (describing the typical surrogate mother in one program as one with a high
school education, married, and twenty-five years old). Most programs require the
prospective gestational carrier to be financially stable in order to participate in the
program. See Hanafin, supra note 5, at 379.
169. See supra notes 96-137 and accompanying text.
170. Corson et al., supra note 25, at 671; James M. Goldfarb et al., Fifteen Years
Experience with an In-Vitro Fertilization Surrogate Gestational Pregnancy
Programme, 15 Hum. Reprod. 1075, 1076 (2000); Marrs et al., supra note 161, at 1859;
Utian et al., Preliminary Experience, supra note 25, at 635; see also Belsito v. Clark,
644 N.E.2d 760, 761 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994) (describing the procedure for both women
as taking medications to "align their fertility cycles and prepare their bodies for the
procedure").
171. See Corson et al., supra note 25, at 672; Marrs et al., supra note 161, at 1859.
For success rates of traditional IVF treatments, see supra text accompanying notes 40-
41.
172. See Utian et al., Preliminary Experience, supra note 25, at 637 (reporting seven
pregnancies out of fifty-nine cycles in one study).
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program having an approximately 50% per couple success rate." In
1998, 809 cycles were reported to the Center for Disease Control with
an overall success rate of 29.2% .174
H. Success and Failure of IVF
After transfer, the waiting game begins until a pregnancy test
determines if any of the transferred embryos have implanted. During
the time before the pregnancy test, progesterone is prescribed in order
to maintain the uterine lining. 75  While almost eighty percent of
couples in an assisted reproduction cycle get to the point of transfer,
only about twenty-three percent of the women get pregnant, with a
slightly lower success rate for gestational carriers.' 6
Even after a successful pregnancy test, the couple still must wait.
This is because two very different negative results can take place at
this stage, both of which are equally devastating. First, the pregnancy
could end unsuccessfully. Approximately thirty-three percent of the
pregnancies end in miscarriages in the first three months)" Second,
there could be too many fetuses that implant, which means that
"selective reduction" might be indicated.78
173. See Corson et al., supra note 25, at 672 (reporting a 16.67% success rate per
cycle and 49.3% success rate overall for couples); Marrs et al.. supra note 161, at 1860
(reporting an 18.5% success rate per cycle): see also Parkinson et al., supra note 162,
at 674 (reporting slightly over thirty-seven percent delivery rate per embryo transfer).
174. Center for Disease Control, supra note 37, at 5.
175. See Speroff et al., supra note 26, at 1139.
176. See id. at 1140; Corson et al., supra note 25, at 672 (reporting a 16.67% success
rate per cycle when using gestational carriers); Marrs et al., supra note 161, at 1860
(reporting an 18.5% success rate per cycle with gestational carriers).
177. See Wallis, supra note 18, at 50 (stating that in 1984 one-third of the
pregnancies ended in miscarriages). A miscarriage is very traumatic:
Of the thousands of women hoping to get a baby though the 200-odd IVF
programs across the globe, the vast majority have been disappointed. The
cycle of hopes raised (she's accepted into the program) and dashed (doctor
could not get an egg), raised (got an egg) and dashed (egg was abnormal),
raised (got a normal egg) and dashed (embryo did not implant), raised
(embryo implanted) and dashed (miscarried) harms women in ways
[medicine] ha[s] not acknowledged.
Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies From Artificial
Insemination to Artificial Wombs 180 (1985). "They [infertile couples in IVF] live
their life balancing between hope and despair, see-sawing around the menstrual
period perhaps until menopause." Ann Lalos, Breaking Bad News Concerning
Fertility, 14 Hum. Reprod. 581, 582 (1999); see also Springen et al., supra note 8, at 40
(quoting one woman whose IVF failed, "It's devastating. It's a terrible sense of
failure.").
178. See Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Mltiiple Pregnanc*: Lifeboat Ethics
in the Womb, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 773, 792-806 (1992) (arguing that increased
information must be provided to patients on selective reduction, and present abortion
statutes do not cover the procedure); Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Selective
Pregnancy Reduction Medical Attitudes, Legal Implications, and a Viable Alternative,
16 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 383, 390 (1991).
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While on the one hand having no live fetuses is traumatic, an excess
number is equally or possibly even more devastating. 79 The incidence
of triplets and other "higher order" multiple births rose from 1034 in
1971 to 4973 in 1995, a 480% increase.180 When a woman is pregnant
with three or more fetuses there are many possible complications.
These include spontaneous abortion, premature delivery due to
uterine over-distention, umbilical cord accidents, pregnancy-induced
hypertension, developmental delays, cerebral palsy, and financial and
emotional strain on the parents. 81 "[E]ach additional fetus shortens
the usual 40 week gestation period by three and one half weeks."',,
With three or more fetuses there are three possible decisions: (1)
terminate the pregnancy; (2) continue the pregnancy; or (3) terminate
one or more of the fetuses.8 3 If the fetuses are selectively terminated,
the number of fetuses are reduced, but the pregnancy can continue.18M
179. "Whereas most ordinary abortions occur when a baby is unwanted, fetal
reduction is usually recommended to couples who desperately yearn for children;
after long trying to conceive, they usually have resorted to fertility drugs or stretched
their finances to the limit for a shot at in-vitro fertilization." Barbara Carton,
Agonizing Decision: Multiple Pregnancies Are Often Pared Back in 'Fetal Reduction,'
Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1997, at Al.
180. Claudia Kalb, The Octuplet Question: A Historic Delivery Raises Concerns
about Multiples, Newsweek, Jan. 11, 1999, at 33. The number of multiple pregnancies
has been called "a growing health crisis." Cowley & Springen, supra note 116.
181. Richard L. Berkowitz et al., Selective Reduction of Multifetal Pregnancies in
the First Trimester, 318 New Eng. J. Med. 1043, 1045 (1988); K.A. Fackelmann,
Experimental Method Lowers Multifetal Risk, Sci. News, May 5, 1990, at 279 (stating
that four or more fetuses increases the risk that the child will die soon after birth or
have permanent disabilities); Finkel, supra note 135. An example of the
complications that can happen are the Frustaci septuplets born in 1985. Of the seven
children, four died within weeks of birth. Daar, supra note 178, at 775. The three
survivors remained hospitalized four months after birth and suffered from physical
and developmental impairment, such as cerebral palsy and eye problems. ld. For the
emotional strain on the parents of triplets see Micheline Garel et al., Psychological
Consequences of Having Triplets: A 4-year Follow-up Study, 67 Fertility & Sterility
1162, 1163 (1997) (reporting that mothers of triplets showed a high degree of
emotional stress which was primarily due to fatigue and stress).
182. Cowley & Springen, supra note 116.
183. Mark I. Evans et al., Multiple Gestation: The Role of Multifetal Pregnancy
Reduction and Selective Termination, 19 Clinics in Perinatology 345, 347 (1992).
While the right to abort deals with the rights of a woman versus the rights of the state,
selective reduction has been defined as the rights of one fetus versus the rights of
another fetus. See Gemmette, supra note 178, at 390. "Selective termination," or
selective reduction, is the termination of an "anomalous fetus" in a multifetal
gestation. Yuval Yaron et al., Selective Termination and Elective Reduction in Twin
Pregnancies: 10 Years Experience at a Single Centre, 13 Hum. Reprod. 2301, 2301
(1998). This is contrasted to "multifetal pregnancy reduction," where a normal fetus
is terminated to improve the survival rate of those that remain. Id.
184. George Annas, professor of Health Law at Boston University, says that
"[w]hat is troubling is the prospect of a woman trying for years to become pregnant,
undergoing enormous emotional strain and financial sacrifice to have a family of her
own, and then ending up having to kill perfectly healthy fetuses." Gemmette, supra
note 178, at 387.
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While it is possible to reduce twins, some doctors say that the selective
reduction procedure should not be offered for this purpose."
Selective reduction used to be completed by the aspiration of one or
more fetuses from the womb, but this sometimes led to complications
and spontaneous abortions of the non-selected fetuses." The present
method is to inject a small amount of potassium chloride into the fetus
by using an ultra-sound-guided needle through the abdomen or
vagina."' Potassium chloride is used because it kills the fetus quickly
and will not harm the woman if a small amount enters her
bloodstream." The fetus is not removed from the womb; rather, over
time it will disintegrate and be reabsorbed into the woman's body."s9
While this procedure can be done later, it is normally completed by
the twelfth week of pregnancy.9"
The process of "selecting" which fetus gets "reduced" is normally
not a scientific one. If there seem to be abnormalities in one or more
of the fetuses, those are chosen."' If no abnormalities are present or
can be found, the "decision of which embryo to choose has been
strictly a technical issue of which embryos are easiest to reach.""'-
185. Berkowitz et al., supra note 181, at 1046: see also Carton, supra note 179
(stating that some obstetricians are seeing selective reductions of twins due to
primarily financial or lifestyle concerns). While there are state statutes which say that
an abortion cannot be performed based solely on the sex of a child, e.g.. 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 3204(c) (West 2000). these may not apply to selective reductions. See
Daar, supra note 178, at 796.
186. See Gemmette, supra note 178, at 384-85.
187. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 181. at 1045; Finkel, supra note 135. But see
G. Iberico et al.. Embro Reduction of Multifetal Pregnancies Following Assisted
Reproduction Treatment: a Modification of the Transvaginal Ultrasound-Guided
Technique, 15 Hum. Reprod. 2228, 2229, 2232 (2000) (reporting positive results using
an ultrasound-guided needle to puncture the embryo's heart until asystolia was found
and not injecting any fluids to kill the embryo).
188. Berkowitz et al., supra note 181. at 1045: Evans et al., supra note 183, at 349
(stating that 0.5 ml of potassium chloride injected into the fetal heart "results in
cardiac standstill" within two minutes). The exact method is described as follows:
[Tihe fetal heart is confirmed in both longitudinal and transverse planes, the
needle is sharply thrust into the thorax. If the thrust is too gentle. the
embryo will reflexively move or roll away, and the alignment process has to
be completely redone. Even if one "misses" with an attempt, it is usually
necessary to remove the needle completely.
Id.
189. See Evans et al., supra note 183. at 349; Finkel. supra note 135.
190. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 181 at 1046 (citing as reasons incomplete re-
absorption of the fetus and the psychological difficulty for the couple of making the
decision after this time). "For parents, distress is heightened because their pregnancy.
unlike those of other abortion patients, has inevitably been closely monitored. They
have usually seen their fetuses on ultrasound screens several times." Carton, supra
note 179.
191. See Finkel, supra note 135.
192. Evans et al., supra note 183, at 349; see also Finkel. supra note 135 (explaining




I. Summary of Assisted Reproduction Using a Gestational Carrier
From an infertile couple's first desire for a child and the stark
realization that they cannot conceive naturally, until the time they
place an embryo into the care of a gestational carrier who will carry it
in her womb until birth, the couple must travel a highly emotional,
painful and costly journey. The medical procedure for each hope-
filled attempt involves several weeks of injectible medications to
control the female hormone cycle, frequent doctor visits, blood tests
and invasive internal ultrasounds; then, aspiration of eggs and, if hope
is rewarded, successful fertilization.'93 Fertilized eggs are incubated,
and several days later one or more healthy embryos are identified as
ready for transfer to the gestational carrier."' This terse list of
procedures cannot begin to portray the intense emotional highs and
lows experienced during this process.'95 Disappointment lurks at
every turn, including poor response to the stimulation drugs,
unsuccessful fertilization and unhealthy embryos.1 96 Many couples
must undergo multiple cycles before an embryo is available for
transfer.'97 In addition to this, most insurance policies do not cover
fertility treatments and, thus, the couple must bear the high cost
themselves. 98 All this physical, emotional and financial burden is
assumed for less than a twenty percent chance of achieving a live birth
through the gestational carrier. 19  Additionally, the gestational carrier
must undergo a medical and psychological screening process, and
typically must endure several weeks of unpleasant inter-muscular
injections during the first few weeks after transfer of the embryo(s) to
her womb." ° Thus, there are many personal reasons why the intended
parents would want to restrict the gestational carrier's right to abort.
This Article will utilize trust law as a framework for supporting such
contracts.2 °' Before discussing the application of trust law to
gestational carrier agreements, however, Part II of the Article reviews
the relevant Supreme Court cases regarding the right to abort in the
United States.
193. See supra notes 99-1321 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
195. "The frequent blood test and ultrasound studies, which are at best
inconvenient, may also be significantly anxiety provoking." Mazure et al., supra note
38, at 275.
196. See supra note 177 (describing the emotional roller coaster during IVF
treatments).
197. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
198. For the cost of IVF treatments, see supra notes 38, 164 and accompanying
text. For the lack of insurance coverage, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying
text.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73
200. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
201. See infra Part III.
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II. THE RIGHT TO ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
This part will briefly review the right of a woman to obtain an
abortion. The abortion issue is one of the most divisive social issues in
American culture today.2 2 By a narrow majority, the Supreme Court
has found that a woman has the right under the Constitution to obtain
an abortion.2 3 The Court did not make this extremely difficult
decision lightly.' At the present time, the right of a woman to obtain
an abortion, without any substantial hindrance or undue burden, is
allowed before the fetus reaches the point of viability outside the
womb with neonatal care.-"-
202. "There simply is no middle ground between those who believe that abortion is
murder and those who reject that view and believe that a woman should not be forced
by the state to be an incubator." Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law- Principles
and Policies 663 (1997). "Abortion has been an intractable issue because of the clash
of moral absolutes it presents." Robertson, supra note 25, at 48, see also Philip
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 157 (1982) (stating that Roe
may be the most "controversial constitutional decision" of the 1970s); Earl M. Maltz,
Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 Notre Dame L Rev. 11, 27 (1992) (asserting
that Roe actually created more national debate on abortion); Donald H. Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1569 (1979) (stating that Roe was "one
of the most controversial cases the Supreme Court has decided").
203. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), nodified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (creating an "undue burden" standard for testing any restrictions
on abortion before viability).
204. As Justice Blackmun wrote in Roe:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional
nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even
among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that
the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to
the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes
toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking and conclusions about abortion.
Id at 116.
In the joint opinion of Planned Parenthood r. Casey, Justices O'Connor,
Souter and Kennedy wrote:
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some
always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of
terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that
cannot control our decision.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
205. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870, 878. "Viability" is that point where the fetus is
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Roe,
410 U.S. at 160. In 1973, viability for a fetus outside the womb was approximately
twenty-eight weeks gestation. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860; Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. By 1992,
viability was possible at twenty-three to twenty-four weeks. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860; see
also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down a Nebraska statute which
criminalized the performance of "partial birth abortions").
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A. Roe v. Wade
The case of Roe v. Wade established the right to obtain an
abortion in the United States. 2 6  Jane Roe 2 7 a pregnant, single
woman, "sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal
abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an
injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes. 208
The Texas statutes in question made it a crime to obtain or perform
an abortion.209 A three-judge District Court held that Jane Roe had a
"fundamental right" to choose not to remain pregnant under the
Ninth through the Fourteenth Amendments. 10 The District Court
206. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. Doe v. Bolton is the companion case to Roe and was
decided at the same time. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Bolton, a married woman
challenged the constitutionality of Georgia's laws criminalizing abortion. Under
Georgia law, abortions were prohibited unless a doctor determined that the
pregnancy would endanger tile woman's life or health, the fetus likely would be born
with a birth defect, or if the pregnancy resulted from rape. Id. at 183. Doe argued that
she was forced to either relinquish her right to decide whether to bear a child or seek
an illegal abortion. Id. at 185. The Supreme Court struck down the Georgia law as
unconstitutional. Id. at 201.
207. "Jane Roe" was a pseudonym. Roe, 410 U.S at 120 n.4. Jane Roe's real name
is Norma McCorvey. David Van Biema, An Icon In Search Mode: Norma McCorvey,
The "Jane Roe" Of Roe v. Wade, Experiences A Change Of Heart (Sort Of), Time,
Aug. 21, 1995, at 36. In 1969, Sarah Weddington, one of the attorneys who filed the
complaint in Roe, asked McCorvey to be the plaintiff in the case. Van Biema, supra,
at 36; Steven Waldman & Ginny Carroll, Roe v. Roe, Newsweek, Aug. 21, 1995, at 22.
Ironically, while the case involved the right to abort, Weddington told McCorvey that
she could not get an abortion since, if she did, she would lack legal standing to sue.
Waldman & Carroll, supra, at 22. McCorvey later gave birth to the child, a daughter.
Id. But see Bobbitt, supra note 202, at 165 (stating that McCorvey terminated the
pregnancy). The selection of McCorvey as Jane Roe seems to have been a bad one
for both parties. Weddington said "I'm sorry I went to Dallas" and found McCorvey.
Waldman & Carroll, supra, at 24. McCorvey regretted her involvement in the case,
and in 1995 publicly stated that she was against all abortions. See Marc Peyser et al.,
Jane Roe Moves Further Toward the Right to Life, Newsweek, Nov. 16 1995, at 11.
208. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. James Hubert Hallford and "John and Mary Doe"
(pseudonyms) also attempted to be named plaintiffs in the case. Id. at 120, 121. James
Hallford was a doctor who had previously been arrested on violations of the Texas
abortion statutes being challenged by Jane Roe. Id. at 120. He was permitted to
intervene by the District Court. Id. The Supreme Court dismissed Dr. Hallford's
complaint since "absent harassment and bad faith, a defendant in a pending state
criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in federal court the statutes under which
the State is prosecuting him ..." Id. at 126-27. In a separate complaint, John and
Mary Doe challenged the Texas abortion statutes since, due to Mary Doe's physical
limitations, "if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the
pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe,
clinical conditions." Id. at 121. The District Court consolidated the case with that of
Jane Roe, but after consolidation dismissed Doe's complaint. See id. at 121-22. The
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. See id. at 128-29,
209. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1191-94, 1196 (West 1973); Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 &
n.1.
210. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (writing that the "fundamental right of single women and
married persons to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth
Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment."); Roe, 410 U.S. at 122.
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went on to strike down the Texas statutes as unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague.211 The Supreme Court took the unusual move
of granting certiorari directly from the District Court without an
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals.2 12
Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the majority.2 '- For a good
portion of the opinion, Justice Blackmun chronicled the attitudes and
laws on abortion throughout much of recorded history.214 This portion
of the opinion served to establish that the right of a woman to have an
abortion is part of the right to privacy that is protected by the
Constitution.215  In his discussion of history, Justice Blackmun
attempted to portray this right as central.21 6 The reason for reviewing
211. The District Court wrote:
There is unconstitutional overbreadth in the Texas Abortion Laws because
the Texas Legislature did not limit the scope of the statutes to such interests.
On the contrary, the Texas statutes, in their monolithic interdiction, sweep
far beyond any areas of compelling state interest. Not only are the Texas
Abortion Laws unconstitutionally overbroad, they are also
unconstitutionally vague.
Roe, 314 F. Supp. at 1223; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
212. The right to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a district court of
three judges is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1253. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994): see also Roe,
410 U.S. at 122.
213. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. The decision was 7-2, with Justices White and Rehnquist
dissenting. Id at 115. The first portion of Roe dealt with justiciability, focusing on
whether the case was appropriate for court review. Id. at 123-29. Jane Roe's case was
challenged as moot since at the time the case was heard "she and all other members
of her class [werel no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy." Id. at 124. The Supreme
Court held that the case was not moot since pregnancy "provides a classic justification
for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be 'capable of repetition, yet evading
review."' d. at 125 (citations omitted).
214. In Roe, Blackmun discussed the treatment of abortion in ancient Greek and
Roman law and society, early English common law, early English statutory law, and
early American law. 410 U.S. at 130-41. He also wrote at some length on the
positions of the American Medical Association, American Public Health Association,
and American Bar Association on abortion. Id. at 141-47.
215. "We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we have inquired into, and
in this opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what
that history reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the
centuries." Id at 116-17. But see Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting)
(commenting that the right to abortion was not "'so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
216. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (-If
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." (emphasis in
original)). But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952-53 (1992)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that history does not support the conclusion that
the right to an abortion is fundamental). In 1868, at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, twenty-eight out of thirty-seven states and eight territories
banned or limited abortions. Id. at 952. By 1900 almost 100% of the states prohibited
or restricted abortions. See id. On these facts, Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in
Casey wrote "it can scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of relatively
unrestricted abortion in our history supported the classification of the right to
2001]
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the history was to show that laws prohibiting abortion are fairly recent
in origin:
It is perhaps not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal
abortion laws in effect in a majority of states today are of relatively
recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its
attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to
preserve the pregnant woman's life, are not of ancient or even of
common-law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory changes
effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century.217
The remainder of the opinion analyzed the constitutionality of the
Texas statutes prohibiting abortion, in two steps. First, the opinion
addressed the question of whether a woman has a fundamental right
to an abortion found in the First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 18
Second, the opinion discussed whether the State had a sufficient
reason to restrict the exercise of that right.21 9
There is no right to abortion specifically evident in the
Constitution.220 When found at all, Courts look to the general "right
of privacy," also not enumerated in the Constitution, but which the
Supreme Court has said is present.2 1
abortion as 'fundamental' under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 952-53.
217. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
218. Id. at 152-56.
219. Id. at 156-62.
220. "Ultimately, this first objection to Roe turns on a much wider on-going debate
over how the Court should interpret the Constitution and when, if at all, it is
permissible for the judiciary to protect unenumerated rights." Chemerinsky, supra
note 202, at 666. "[Olne rarely encounters a law professor or judge willing to defend
[Roe]." Bobbitt, supra note 202, at 157; see also Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A
Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 480, 480 (1990)
(stating that Roe is an "unpersuasive opinion" and the right to abort should be based
on the Thirteenth Amendment).
221. "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy." Roe, 410
U.S. at 152. However, the "privacy right" is one of the "fundamental" rights provided
by the Constitution. Decisions involving the issue of fundamental rights are typically
analyzed in four parts: (1) whether a fundamental right is present; (2) whether the
right is being infringed upon; (3) whether the government's action is sufficiently
justified if it does infringe upon the right and (4) whether the means are sufficiently
related to the goal being sought. See Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at 640. If a
fundamental right is found, unless otherwise stated by the Supreme Court, a
regulation impinging on that right is subject to "strict scrutiny." See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (holding that a Washington state statute
permitting "any person" to petition for visitation rights "at any time" was
unconstitutional since it infringed on a parent's fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody and control of her children); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that the right to privacy
is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Under strict scrutiny review, the government must have a "compelling
interest" to justify the infringement and the regulation must be narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest involved. See Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at 643. This is in
contrast to non-fundamental rights that must meet either intermediate scrutiny or the
lower "rational relationship" test. Under intermediate scrutiny, the restrictions must
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The opinion next gave a cursory review of the right of privacy and
summarized the different views of the various Supreme Court justices
regarding the constitutional basis for the right." Justice Blackmun
then found the right of privacy to exist in this instance, stating that the
right, wherever found in the Constitution, was "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."'  This interpretation was in part due to the various
harms that any law totally prohibiting abortion would cause the
woman by forcing her to have a child-the medical, psychological and
financial burdens of childbirth, the upbringing of the child, and the
social stigma attached to being an unwed mother.2"-
While the Supreme Court did find a privacy right to have an
abortion, that right was not absolute. Rather than allowing a woman
"serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). This level
of scrutiny has been applied to gender discrimination. See Chemerinsky, supra note
202, at 529. Under the lowest level of judicial review, the rational basis test, the
restriction must only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that a state law banning
assisted suicide was rationally related to legitimate government interests); Pennell v.
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988), United States R.R. Retire. Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 175 (1980); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959); Chemerinsky,
supra note 202, at 529 n.2.
222 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. After reviewing the various cases Blackmun
wrote that the "decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy." Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937) (citation omitted)).
223. Id. at 153. The notion that the "privacy right" encompasses a right to abortion
has met heavy criticism. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The IVages of Crying Wolf. A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.i. 920, 947-48 (1973) (asserting that Roe is "a
very bad decision .... It is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because
it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.").
But see Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion (1993); Robertson, supra note 25, at 57
(suggesting that from the right of couples to use contraception found earlier by the
Supreme Court as a privacy right, "it is an incremental step to say that the same
fundamental right presumptively exists when the woman is already pregnant");
Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash Of Absolutes 99 (1990) (stating that many
aspects of personal autonomy and independence that are "liberty" interests are
covered in the Constitution but not specifically stated therein); Philip B. Heymann &
Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L
Rev. 765,775-77 (1973) (stating that the privacy right should cover a woman's right to
abortion); Regan, supra note 202, at 1569 (supporting a woman's right to abort under
common law since individuals are not forced to be "Good Samaritans").
For articles which suggest that the Supreme Court should have used the Equal
Protection Clause as support for a woman's right to abortion, see Kristin Luker,
Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 92-125 (1984); Tribe, supra, at 105-08; Erin
Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality. and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 77, 116-18 (1995); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts On Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985); Kenneth L. Karst, Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53-59 (1977); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955 (1984).
224. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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to get an abortion at any time,2" the right could still be restricted in
the name of "important state interests. ' '226
The interest that Texas had in regulating abortion was also
discussed in the opinion. 7 Of the various reasons given, two were
found to be valid reasons for a state to prohibit abortions. 2 The first
was a state's concern that abortion could be a dangerous medical
procedure, coupled with its desire to protect the mother's health. 29
The Supreme Court noted that while abortion mortality was high until
the advent of modern procedures and antiseptic techniques, the
studies at the time showed mortality rates for legal abortions as low or
lower than those for normal childbirth"3 The other reason for a state
to regulate abortions was the State's interest in protecting prenatal
life.2 31
The majority found that the State's interest in protecting the
mother's health from harm due to an abortion was not "compelling"
until after the first trimester. 2  The first trimester was selected as a
dividing line, since the mortality rate of first trimester abortions was
documented to be as low or lower than the mortality rates of normal
childbirth. 3  After the first trimester, a State could regulate the
procedure only "to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to
225. Id. at 153. "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest,' and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake." Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 154.
227. Id. at 148-52.
228. The only other reason discussed was that the laws "were the product of a
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct." Id. at 148. However, the
Court summarily dismissed this reasoning. Id.
229. Id. at 148-49.
230. Id. "Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from an
inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for her
to forgo it, has largely disappeared. Of course, important state interests in the areas
of health and medical standards do remain." Id. at 149.
231. Id. at 150; see Robert F. Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, 17
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 465, 479 (1965) (reviewing Anglo-American law and concluding
that a fetus should be treated as a human being); David W. Louisell, Abortion, the
Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 235-44
(1969) (discussing legal recognition of a fetus as a human being); John T. Noonan, Jr.,
The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 Neb. L. Rev. 668 (1984) (stating that for the
law to allow abortion means there must be a legal fiction created where a fetus is not
a human being).
In another part of the opinion, the Supreme Court found that a fetus was not a
"person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158
(1973). This was critical to the eventual holding of Roe, since if the "suggestion of
personhood [was] established, [Roe's] case... collapses, for the fetus' right to life
would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment." Id. at 156-
57.
232. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
233. Id. at 149, 163.
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the preservation and protection of maternal health."2'-
The State's interest in protecting the life of the child did not reach a
"compelling" point until viability, since at this time the fetus had the
capability of living outside the mother's womb.2s5 After this time, the
State could enact laws that prohibited abortion, except in cases when
it was necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. -
Since the Texas statutes prohibited abortions without reference to
the trimesters of pregnancy, these statutes were invalid and the
District Court's decision to strike them down was upheld.ar
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
The Supreme Court's most recent case discussing the constitutional
standards permitting abortion is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.- The
234. Id. at 163. The opinion gave the following examples of permissible state
regulations: (1) providing requirements as to the qualifications and licenses required
of the person who is to perform the abortion, and (2) providing requirements as to the
type and license of the facility in which the procedure is to be performed (e.g..
hospital, clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status). Id.
235. Id. In 1973, viability outside the womb was normally possible after twenty-
eight weeks of gestation. See id. at 160. Some commentators feel that the Supreme
Court did not give enough importance to the State's interest in protecting the life of
the fetus:
No reason is given why viability should be the measure of the significance of
the state's interest. This metaphysical assessment of worth is scarcely
inferable from the Constitution or from the record in the case. Moreover, it
would appear to rely on the unacknowledged and plainly incorrect premise
that only self-sufficient living entities may serve as objects of a state's
compelling interests.
Bobbitt, supra note 202, at 159; see also Noonan, supra note 231. at 668-69 (stating
that the decision rested on the jurisprudence of viewing a "person" as being a
construct of law, an interpretation which led to the legal system's support of slavery).
But see Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 Harv. L Rev. 105, 127-28 (1989)
(stating that legislatures should determine when something is "human").
236. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. It was this thinking that lead to the "trimester"
approach to abortion. Blackmun summarized the holding, which in legislative fashion
circumscribed the ability of states to regulate abortion. In the first trimester (the first
three months of pregnancy), the decision to abort must be left exclusively to the
woman and her attending physician. Id. In the next trimester (four to six months), the
State could promulgate laws in promoting the health of the mother. Id. In the final
trimester (seven to nine months), the State could pass laws to protect the fetus. Id. at
164-65.
237. Id. at 164, 166-67. Congress' initial reaction to Roe was to introduce a
constitutional amendment designed to rein in Roe's broad holding. See Gerald
Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 545 (13th ed. 1997) (discussing
the attempts at creating a constitutional amendment and the proposed Human Life
Statute of 1981); Peggy S. McClard, The Freedom of Choice Act: Will the Constitution
Allow It?, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 2041, 2046 n.38 (1994).
238. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Daly, supra note
223, at 80 (stating that the "lead opinion is so fractured that.... there is something in
it for everyone to hate"); David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral
Uncertainty, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3 (1993) (stating that the main contribution of
Casey was putting the focus on the social status of women and the moral status of
fetal life); Robert H. Bork, Again, a Struggle for tite Soul of tie Court, N.Y. Times,
2001]
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plurality opinion was written in an unusual fashion-it was jointly
signed by three Justices, O'Connor, Souter and Kennedy. 39 While the
facts of the case did not require a re-analysis of Roe v. Wade, the joint
opinion in Casey goes into great detail about Roe and its holding. The
primary purpose of this re-analysis can be found in the first line of
Casey, "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."240
Casey involved a challenge by several abortion clinics and doctors
against portions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act.241  The
challenged statutes did not prohibit abortions, and were not like those
examined in Roe. The Pennsylvania statutes addressed several
different issues which could hinder the ability of a woman to receive
an abortion. One of the statutes provided for an information and
waiting period before a woman was allowed an abortion.242 Another
required a married woman to inform her husband before obtaining an
abortion. 3 The last abortion restriction dealt with parental or judicial
consent for minors seeking abortions.2'
After a three-day bench trial, the District Court found that all the
challenged statutes were unconstitutional and issued a permanent
injunction against their enforcement.245 The Court of Appeals for the
July 8, 1992, at A19 (stating that "on a constitutional spectrum [the Casey] joint
opinion is more properly termed 'radical"').
239. See Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at 669. Traditionally one Justice will write
an opinion and the other Justices who agree with the analysis and holding will sign on.
David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective,
62 Alb. L. Rev. 833, 845 (1999). The writing of a joint opinion, which occurred only
one other time in the history of the Court, was thought to be used to send "a clear
symbolic message" of the "strong and unbreakable... institutional commitment the
Supreme Court has made to" the right of a woman to choose to receive an abortion.
Id.
240. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. There was a great deal of speculation as to whether
the Court would overrule Roe v. Wade with the Casey opinion. The reason for the
speculation was that in 1989 the Court seemed on the brink of overturning Roe, with
the 5-4 opinion in Webster v. Reproduction Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
After Webster was decided, two of the justices in the majority, Brennan and Marshall,
resigned. These Justices were replaced with Justices Souter and Thomas, either of
whom could cast the deciding vote to overturn Roe. However, one of the dissenting
justices in Webster, Justice O'Connor, changed her vote and decided to uphold Roe in
Casey. See Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at 668-69; Maltz, supra note 202, at 18
(stating that the Casey decision was a "surprise").
241. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-45.
242. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205 (West 2000) (requiring that, before an abortion
was performed, a woman must be given information and wait at least twenty-four
hours); Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
243. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3209 (West 2000) (requiring spousal notification for
abortions by married women); Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
244. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3206 (West 2000) (requiring parental or judicial
consent for any abortions for minors, with certain exceptions); Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
The final statute reviewed dealt with reporting and regulating provisions on abortion
providers. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), (f) (West 2000); Casey, 505
U.S. at 845.
245. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1396-97 (E.D. Pa. 1990);
Casey, 505 U.S. at 845.
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Third Circuit only affirmed the District Court's opinion on the
unconstitutionality of the spousal notification provisions of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act.21 The Third Circuit held that
the remainder of the statutes were within the bounds of permissible
state regulation of abortion.47
The joint opinion in Casey can be broken down into several sections.
First, it reviews Roe v. Wade and its constitutional foundations at
great length.248 It examines the "liberty" interest as found in the
Constitution, reiterating that the right to abortion is a protected
interest. Second, the joint opinion does an extensive review of stare
decisis. 249  Third, the joint opinion affirms what it labels the
"essential holding" in Roe and then provides a new test with which
to review the constitutionality of state laws regulating abortion."
In the final portion of the opinion, the new standards are applied to
the Pennsylvania statutes in question. 2.51
The first section of the analysis in the joint opinion states that the
right to abortion is found in the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 It goes on
to say that the right to abort is protected because the pain of
pregnancy and childbearing is too "intimate and personal" to allow
complete state interference with a woman's pregnancy.--
246. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682. 719 (3d Cir. 1991); Casey, 505
U.S. at 845.
247. See Casey, 947 F.2d at 719.
248. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text
249. See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
250. See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
252. The Fourteenth Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to thejurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "Constitutional protection of the woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.... The controlling word is 'liberty." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
253. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. As the Court stated:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear.... Her suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the
woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our
history and our culture.
Id. For a description of the many inconveniences and discomforts of pregnancy, see
Regan, supra note 202, at 1579-83.
Justice Scalia wrote a strong dissent in Case*'. rejecting the notion of abortion
as a liberty interest protected by the Constitution:
The emptiness of the "reasoned judgment" that produced Roe is displayed in
plain view by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort by some of the
brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the country, after more than
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Next the joint opinion went into an extensive review of stare decisis,
the doctrine by which courts adhere to former judgments made by the
Court. 4 The joint opinion stated that there are three primary reasons
to reject stare decisis and overrule former opinions: (1) if "the rule
has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability";. 5 (2) if the law evolved to the point which "left the old
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine"; 256 or (3) the
facts upon which the old opinion relies "have so changed, or come to
be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification."" Also, if "the rule is subject to a kind of
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation," it should not
be overruled.1 8 The joint opinion then examined each rationale in
detail.9 After its review of stare decisis, the Court did not find
sufficient reason to overrule the "essential holding" in Roe, which
permitted a woman to obtain an abortion in certain circumstances free
from state interference.2 °
10 cases upholding abortion rights in this Court, and after dozens upon
dozens of amicus briefs submitted in these and other cases, the best the
Court can do to explain how it is that the word "liberty" must be thought to
include the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of
adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political
choice.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 983 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. See Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at 670; see also Maltz, supra note 202, at 31
(stating that the Supreme Court erred in relying on stare decisis).
255. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55.
256. Id. at 855.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 854.
259. Each reason to reject stare decisis is discussed in turn in the joint opinion. Roe
was not unworkable and "the required determinations [fell] within judicial
competence." Id. at 855. The evolution of law was found not to have eclipsed Roe. Id.
at 857. "No development of constitutional law since the case was decided has
implicitly or explicitly left Roe behind as a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional
thinking." Id. The factual predicates of Roe were found to be similar. The joint
opinion noted that while safe abortions may be obtained later in pregnancy and a
fetus may be deemed viable earlier, "these facts go only to the scheme of time limits
on the realization of competing interests, and the divergences from the factual
premises of 1973 have no bearing on the validity of Roe's central holding." Id. at 860.
Finally, there was reliance on Roe since peoples' actions with regards to sexual
conduct were made "in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail." Id. at 856. But see Maltz, supra note 202, at 20 (stating that
there was no basis for the Court to make the claim of reliance).
260. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. As the Court stated:
A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both
profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the
Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere
to the essence of Roe's original decision, and we do so today.
Id. But see id. at 954 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist
wrote that stare decisis "is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as meaning 'to abide by,
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After its review of stare decisis, the Court concluded, "'that the
essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed," but went on to change
the strict scrutiny test, which Roe required. 21' In recognizing the
Court's initial purpose for constructing the trimester framework, the
joint opinion stated that the framework was "erected to ensure that
the woman's right to choose not become so subordinate to the State's
interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not
in fact."' 62  The joint opinion, however, then noted that the rigid
trimester approach was not necessary to accomplish that objective. -"
Nor was the trimester approach intended to prevent states from
taking steps, even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, to ensure that a
woman's choice was thoughtful and informed." Notwithstanding the
joint opinion's dismantling of the trimester paradigm, a majority of
the Court reaffirmed the "essential holding" of Roe, particularly the
or adhere to, decided cases.' Whatever the 'central holding' of Roe that is left after
the joint opinion finishes dissecting it is surely not the result of that principle." Id.
(citations omitted). Justice Scalia took issue with the joint opinion's use of popular
opinion to reaffirm Roe. "I cannot agree with, indeed I am appalled by, the Court's
suggestion that the decision whether to stand by an erroneous constitutional decision
must be strongly influenced-against overruling, no less-by the substantial and
continuing public opposition the decision has generated." hi. at 998 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). But see Vanessa Laird, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Role of Stare
Decisis, 57 Mod. L. Rev. 461, 466-67 (1994) (stating the use of stare decisis was not
for increased judicial certainty, but for the protection of the judiciary against assaults
by the other branches of government).
261. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871. The "essential holding" of Roe according to Justices
Souter, O'Connor and Kennedy is:
First... a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from
the State.... Second is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict
abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies
which endanger the woman's life or health. And third is the principle that
the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become
a child. These principles do not contradict one another, and we adhere to
each.
Id. at 846. For application of the strict scrutiny test to state abortion regulations, see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,154-55 (1973).
262. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
263. "A framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its later interpretation
sometimes contradicted the State's permissible exercise of its powers.... We reject
the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding
of Roe." Id. at 872-73.
264. Id. at 872. As the Court stated:
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and
regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic
and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of
continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are procedures and
institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain
degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.
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woman's right to choose an abortion before the point of viability
without undue interference from the state.2 65
While overruling all but the "essential holding" of Roe, the joint
opinion did not allow a woman an unequivocal right to obtain an
abortion. The three justices of the joint opinion determined that an
"undue burden" analysis should be used to best balance the State's
interest in protection of potential life versus a woman's
constitutionally protected privacy right as recognized by Roe.266 The
opinion explained that an undue burden exists if "a State regulation
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus. '2z67
In the last portion of the opinion, the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act was analyzed under the undue burden standard. All but
one of the statutes challenged did not impose an "undue burden" on
the right of a woman to obtain an abortion in Pennsylvania.2 I The
only statute that did not meet the new standard was the spousal
notification requirement.269
The Casey decision provides no clear victory for either side of the
abortion debate. After Casey, "Roe is either resting firmly on
constitutional ground or quivering on the edge of demise."7 0 The
dissent in Casey made clear its intent to overturn Roe given the
265. See id. at 872-73.
266. "Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability
to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 874; Chemerinsky, supra note 202, at
669.
267. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.... What is at
stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be
insulated from all others in doing so.
Id.
268. Four portions of the Pennsylvania Act were found not to impose undue
burdens: (1) the definition of "medical emergency"; (2) the requirements of informed
consent and the 24-hour waiting period prior to non-emergency abortions; (3) the
requirement of parental or judicial consent for minors; and (4) the record-keeping
and reporting requirements. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880-901; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§
3203, 3205-06 (West 2000).
269. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-95.
The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant
number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not merely make
abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many women, it
will impose a substantial obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact
that the significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety
of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as
surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.
Id. at 893-94.
270. Kelly Sue Henry, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey:




opportunity to do so, and if that opportunity is presented to the Court,
the dissent needs only one vote to achieve this goal.'
The Supreme Court has not yet heard a case, nor have there been
any reported cases, involving a gestational carrier's right to abort.
Most lawyers and commentators believe a gestational carrier has the
same unrestricted right as any other woman to abort the fetus she is
carrying at any time she desires.2z In the next section, the authors
propose that a gestational carrier's right to abort should be restricted,
since she owes a trustee's duty to both the fetus she is carrying and the
intended parents. This duty is not an "undue burden," since it is one
which the gestational carrier freely accepts. Therefore the trustee's
duty should act to prohibit a gestational carrier's right to abort.
III. THE GESTATIONAL CARRIER AS TRUSTEE
A. Basic Tenets
There is no precise legal theory analogous to the circumstances in
which intended parents agree with a gestational carrier that she will be
entrusted to act in the best interest of both the intended parents and
the fetus by carrying the fetus to term. While traditional contract
principles should be sufficient to cover these situations as long as the
provisions do not violate public policy, many commentators have
urged courts to find these agreements unenforceable on a number of
grounds, particularly as they relate to the gestator's right to abort. '
271. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944-45 (1992) (Rehnquist, Ci., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun in his concurrence to Casey wrote:
I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote
necessary to extinguish the light.... I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on
this Court forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation process for
my successor well may focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret,
may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds will be made.
Id. at 923, 943 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
272. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,784 (Cal. 1993).
273. For articles which state that the Thirteenth Amendment would prohibit
enforcement of gestational surrogacy contracts, see Koppelman, supra note 220, at
486-92 (comparing gestational surrogacy contracts to the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition of slavery); Mayo, supra note 65, at 613 (indicating that the Thirteenth
Amendment would prohibit enforcement of restrictions on the right to abort
contained in traditional surrogacy contracts); see also Shari O'Brien, Commercial
Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L Rev. 127, 144 (1986)
(indicating that not only does commercial surrogacy induce a poor woman to become
a gestator, but it is also akin to slavery); Note, Runpelstiltskin Revisited: The
Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1936, 1938-39 n.ll-13
(1986) [hereinafter Rumpelstiltskin]. Rumpelstiltskin analyzes gestator agreements in
light of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. See id.
at 1937-39. The author concludes that the comparison between gestator agreements
and slavery "fails because it overlooks a number of gaps in [Tlhirteenth
[Almendment doctrine." Id. at 1938. The Thirteenth Amendment does not appear to
prohibit "several family arrangements that bear a striking similarity to slavery." Id.
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As a result of the opposition to gestational carrier agreements, this
part argues that an analogy that closely parallels these relationships
can be found in trust law. This part posits that the relationship of the
parties, the gestational carrier, intended parents, and the fetus, is
analogous to the trust relationship.274 As will be argued in greater
detail later, the three relationships required for a trust are clearly
present: the intended parents are the settlors who place the trust
property with the trustee; the gestational carrier is the trustee who
receives the trust corpus and agrees to assume responsibility for its
well-being; and the intended parents are the trust beneficiaries who
have the right to expect that no harm will come to the trust
property.275 The fetus is the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship
created between the intended parents and the gestator. As a result,
the parties enter into what can be fairly characterized as a
"confidential relationship"276 that requires the gestational carrier to
For example, children are obligated to obey their parents and must remain in their
custody, and until recently, spouses were required to remain married unless one could
show that the other breached the marriage contract. Id.
For articles which state that the enforcement of gestational surrogacy
contracts is a violation of the gestational carrier's right to privacy, see Kermit
Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the Concept of
Parenthood, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 79, 120 (1998) (arguing that enforcing gestational
surrogacy agreements is a violation of the right of privacy); Andrea E. Stumpf,
Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 Yale L.J.
187, 203 n.61 (1986) (asserting that despite any contractual arrangements suspending
the right to abort, such a contract should not be upheld; instead, the intended parents
must assume the risk that the gestator will not carry the child to term.).
For other articles which posit that the right to abort should not be limited, sec
Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts- Gestational and Traditional: The Argument
for Nonenforcement, 31 Washburn L.J. 1, 8 (1991) [hereinafter Field, Surrogacy
Contracts] (arguing that upholding gestational surrogacy contracts will reduce the
demand for adoption); Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Privacy and the Regulation of the
New Reproductive Technologies: A Decision-Making Approach, 22 Fain. L.Q. 173.
192 (1988) (claiming that gestator agreements degrade women); Radin, Market-
Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1935 (arguing that gestator agreements result in the
commodification of women's reproductive capabilities and exploit women);
Rumpelstiltskin, supra, at 1936-37 (noting that courts must allow gestational
surrogates to have abortions since doing otherwise would hamper a woman's
"personhood" rights).
274. See infra notes 301-03 and accompanying text.
275. See infra notes 278- 300 and accompanying text.
276. Black's Law Dictionary 298 (6th ed. 1990). A "confidential relation[ship]" is a
fiduciary relationship where
the law, in order to prevent undue advantage from the unlimited confidence
or sense of duty which the relation naturally creates, requires the utmost
degree of good faith in all transactions between the parties. It is not
confined to any specific association of parties. It appears when the
circumstances make it certain that the parties do not deal on equal terms,
but on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other...
[a] dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed.... It covers every form of
relation[ship] between parties wherein confidence is reposed by one in
another, and [the] former relies and acts upon representations of the other
and is guilty of no derelictions on his own part.
[Vol. 70
A TRUSTANALYSIS
refrain from engaging in any conduct resulting in harm to the subject
of the trust. Arguably, this includes not aborting the fetus unless the
life or health of the gestational carrier is at stake.
Relying on trust law for the analytical framework, this section
addresses the gestational carrier's fiduciary responsibilities to both the
fetus and the intended parents. While a trust analysis has been made
in connection with the right to abort in general,277 it has not been
argued in the context of the gestational carrier/intended parent
relationship.
B. Basic Trust Doctrines
A trust has been defined as a fiduciary relationship in which one
party holds title to property subject to an equitable obligation to keep
or use that property for the benefit of another.2 78  A trust generally
involves three interests: settlor, beneficiary and trustee. -  One party
can hold any two of these interests."-& There must be a settlor, one
Id.
This article posits that contrary to arguments that place the gestator in a
weaker bargaining position, it is the intended parents who are dependent upon the
gestator to deliver the child to term. See ifra Part III.C.2. In the truest sense, the
intended parents are more vulnerable. They are justified in trusting that the
gestational carrier will do what she has agreed to do and are virtually powerless to
prohibit an abortion, absent a court's willingness to uphold the agreement. See Linda
D. Applegarth, Emotional Implications, in Reproductive Endocrinology. Surgery &
Technology 1953, 1961 (Eli Y. Adashi et al. eds.. 1996) (suggesting that infertility
patients pursue treatment with a tenacity equal to that of cancer patients).
277. See Jeffrey D. Goldberg, Involuntary Ser'itudes: A Property-Based Notion of
Abortion-Choice, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1597, 1612-13 (1991). Goldberg argues that in
almost every case of unwanted pregnancy a woman does not intend to put her body in
trust for a fetus. Id. at 1612. Absent the woman's intent or unjust enrichment, the law
has no mechanism to imply a trust. Id. at 1612-13. In addition, a woman needs to
have a beneficial interest in her body or at least in her labor. Id. at 1613. Without
such an interest, a woman could not use her bodily resources for her own benefit. Id.
"[U]nder [a] trust theory analysis, a woman has legal title to her bodily resources,
[but] she cannot use them to her benefit in any significant way. M.: see also
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170(1) (1959) ("[T]he trustee is under a duty to the
beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.").
278. George T. Bogert, Trusts § 1 (6th ed. 1987) (discussing the general duties of
the trustee): see also Walter G. Hart. What is a Trust?, 15 L.Q. Rev. 294, 301 (1899)
(defining a trust as "an obligation imposed either expressly or by implication of law
whereby the obligor is bound to deal with property over which he has control for the
benefit of certain persons of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may
enforce the obligation").
279. A "settlor" creates and provides the consideration for the trust. Black's Law
Dictionary, supra note 276, at 1373. A "beneficiary" is the party who is designated to
benefit by, or receive something from, an appointment, disposition, or assignment. Id.
at 157. A "trustee" holds the property in trust for the benefit of another and owes a
fiduciary responsibility to the beneficiary. Id. at 1514.
280. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States: A Basic
Study of Its Special Contribution, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 133, 134 (1998) (noting that the
same person can play more than one of the three roles in a trust relationship).
Hansmann and Mattei suggest that the settlor and the beneficiary can be the same
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who intentionally brings the trust into existence." l The trust may be
created by oral communication or by a written instrument. 28 No
formal or technical words are necessary to create a trust.283 It is
imperative, however, that the settlor's intent is clearly expressed, and
that the trust describes with certainty the subject matter, beneficiaries
and purpose of the trust.' To this end, a trust instrument must have
a beneficiary, a person for whom the trust property is held or used by
the trustee.25 There must also be a trustee who is responsible for
holding the trust property subject to the rights of the beneficiary.8 6
The primary focus of the next section is the trustee's duties to the trust
beneficiary.
C. The Trustee's Duties to the Beneficiary
The relationship between trustee and beneficiary is an intimate one.
It requires the beneficiary to place great confidence in the trustee who
has nearly full control over the trust affairs of the beneficiary. 287 As a
result, courts refer to this relationship as a "fiduciary relationship,"2
person. Id. In this case, the trust only involves a "delegation of responsibility for
managing property from the settlor/beneficiary to the trustee." Id.; see also Bogert,
supra note 278, at 3 (indicating that a trust may be valid if there are only two parties
to it if, for example, the settlor also declares herself to be the trustee, thereby making
the settlor and trustee the same person. The trust is valid as long as the beneficiary is
a separate party.).
281. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 280, at 134.
282. Bogert, supra note 278, at 24.
283. Id.
284. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 23, 25 (1959) (discussing the forms in
which the intent to create a trust can be manifested); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note
280, at 136 (indicating that as long as the parties characterize the relationship they
have as a trust or make it clear they intend a trust-like relationship, they are bound by
rules automatically inserted into their agreement under the law of trusts).
285. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 280, at 134.
286. Id. at 137; see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 197-99 (1959)
(discussing remedies of the beneficiary when a trustee does not carry out the trust
intent).
287. See Bogert, supra note 278, at 2.
288. Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 276, at 626. A "fiduciary relationship" is
"a very broad term embracing both technical fiduciary relations and those informal
relations which exist wherever one person trusts in or relies upon another." Id. It has
been defined as follows:
A relation[ship] subsisting between two persons in regard to a ...
contract... or... the general business of one of them, of such a character
that each must repose trust and confidence in the other and must exercise a
corresponding degree of fairness and good faith. Out of such a relation, the
law raises the rule that neither party may exert influence or pressure upon
the other, take selfish advantage of his trust, or deal with the subject-matter
of the trust in such a way as to benefit himself or prejudice the other except
in the exercise of the utmost good faith and with the full knowledge and
consent of that other....
Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959) (defining a trust as a "fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of
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which requires the trustee to act with "strict honesty and candor and
solely in the interest of the beneficiary." ' In fact, it has been argued
that due to the nature of the trustee-beneficiary relationship, the
court of equity imposes a duty of care upon the trustee higher than
that existing in an ordinary business relationship.21'
A trustee is imbued with a number of responsibilities. One such
duty, the duty of loyalty, requires the trustee to act with unselfish,
undivided loyaltyM  and extreme good faith. '  The duty of loyalty
dictates that a trustee refrain from placing herself in a position where
her personal interests or those of third parties conflict with the
interests of the beneficiaries.293 The duty also requires that any act
that impacts the trust must consider only the welfare of the trust
beneficiaries.219 In upholding the duty of loyalty, a court is not
primarily concerned with preventing unjust enrichment or resolving
another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create
it"); 1 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 2.5. at 43 (4th ed.
1987) (stating that a fiduciary relationship exists between the trustee and the
beneficiary); Benjamin G. Carter, Relief For Beneficiaries Suing for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty: Payment of Accounting Costs Before Trial, 76 Wash. U. LQ. 1411,
1414 (1998) (indicating that a trustee has a fiduciary obligation to deal impartially
with all beneficiaries and to faithfully administer the trust for their benefit). But see
Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., The Transmogrification of the American Trust, 31 Real Prop.
Prob. & Tr. J. 251, 252 (1996) (arguing that present trust law has relaxed so that
trustees are often held only to standards applied to agents and sometimes trustees are
judged more leniently than agents).
289. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 170, 206 (1959) (discussing the duty of
loyalty of the trustee); Bogert, supra note 278. at §§ 1. 2 (discussing the fiduciary
relationship between the trustee and beneficiary).
290. Bogert, supra note 278, at § 95 (discussing the extreme difficulty of putting the
beneficiary's interests before the trustee's); see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Chief Justice Cardozo noted that "many forms of conduct
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals
of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.").
291. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1959); see also Mercury Bay
Boating Club, Inc. v. San Diego Yacht Club, 557 N.E.2d 87, 95 (N.Y. 1990) (holding
that a trustee owes an undivided duty of loyalty to all beneficiaries); Strickland v.
Arnold Thomas Seed Serv., Inc., 560 P.2d 597, 601 (Or. 1977) (indicating that all
courts recognize the trustee's fundamental duty of loyalty to a beneficiary); Willers v.
Wettestad, 510 N.W.2d 676, 680 (S.D. 1994) (holding that -[a] trustee's duty to
preserve the trust assets is in accord with the fundamental duty of loyalty and fidelity
owed by every trustee to [his] beneficiary."): Carter, supra note 288, at 1415.
292 See Bogert, supra note 278, at § 95 (discussing the loyalty doctrine and the
results of questionable transactions by the trustee): Carter, supra note 288, at 1415
n.22 (stating that the trustee is never relieved of the duty to act in good faith).
293. See Riegler v. Riegler, 553 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Ark. 1977) (stating that a trustee
must act for the beneficiaries' benefit and not in his own self-interest); Carter, supra
note 288, at 1415-16 (stating that if the trustee fails to act in the interest of the
beneficiary, the beneficiary can petition the court to compel the trustee to comply
with the terms of the trust).
294. See Bogert, supra note 278, at § 95 (discussing the temptations of the trustee to
act in his own best interests).
20011
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the equities of the parties in a given case.295 Rather, the rule is
designed in large part to deter all trustees from acting contrary to the
beneficiaries' rights.296 Most important, however, is that where a
trustee threatens to commit a disloyal act, a court of equity has the
power to stop the act by entering an injunction against the trustee.29
In addition to the duty of loyalty, by accepting the responsibility to
act in the best interest of the beneficiary, a trustee must defend the
trust and the interest of its beneficiaries against attack by any person
who attempts to destroy the trust.298 This same duty also prevents a
trustee from attaching or terminating the trust in violation of the
settlor's intent.299 Instead, a trustee has a duty to take whatever steps
are necessary to protect and preserve the property from loss ordamage. 3°
D. Gestational Carrier as Trustee
1. The Gestator's Duties to the Trust Beneficiaries
The argument that the agreement between the intended parents
and the gestational carrier creates a trust-like relationship is
compelling. The relationship encompasses the required interests. The
intended parents function as settlors who initiate the trust
relationship. They provide the trust corpus, the embryo, which,
standing alone, is the personal property of the intended parents.
Further, the embryo retains its character as personal property until
entrusted with the gestational carrier.301 Once the carrier accepts the
295. See generally In re Bond & Mortg. Guarantee Co., 103 N.E.2d 721, 725 (N.Y.
1952) (stating that the rule is primarily based on prevention and deterrence and is not
primarily remedial).
296. See id.; see also Carter, supra note 288, at 1415 (citing Smith v. First Nat'l
Bank. 624 N.E.2d 899, 907 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that the "trustee's duty of
loyalty to beneficiaries is more intense than in any other fiduciary relationship")).
297. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 197-99 (1959) (discussing the legal and
equitable remedies available to the beneficiary); Bogert, supra note 278, § 98
(discussing the duty of the trustee to defend the trust from attack).
298. See id. § 178 (discussing the trustee's duty to defend the trust from attack); see
also In re Estate of Strange, 97 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Wis. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that
respondents cannot hold themselves out as executors of an estate held in trust in
order to finance a destruction of the trust).
299. See Bogert, supra note 278, § 98 (discussing the liability of the trustee if he
fails to defend the trust); Carter, supra note 288, at 1416-17.
300. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 22, 24 (1959) (discussing the trustee's
duty to carry out the settlor's intent); Bogert, supra note 278, § 99. While trustees
have many other duties placed upon them by law, discussion of those duties is beyond
the scope of this article.
301. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998) (indicating that frozen
embryos were "property"); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989). In
York, the court held that where the defendant took possession of the plaintiffs' pre-
zygote, it created a bailor-bailee relationship between the parties, even where there
was no express intent to create such a relationship. Id. All that is needed to create a
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embryo, she becomes the functional equivalent of a trustee, and she is
responsible for the trust's well being, including protecting the fetus
from attack and delivering it to term, nothing more than the gestator
has expressly agreed to do.
The circumstances surrounding these agreements clearly show
intent to enter into this association. The trust beneficiaries are the
intended parents. The fetus benefits from this relationship. The
intended parents enter the initial agreement with the expectation that
the gestational carrier will do what is necessary to protect and
ultimately deliver the child to term. It is clear that the gestational
carrier accepts the responsibility for serving as trustee, particularly in
light of the rigorous physical and psychological examinations she must
generally endure before she is permitted to serve as a gestational
carrier.3' By submitting to the required procedures, she evidences
her intent to serve as trustee for the beneficiaries. For a finite period,
then, the gestational carrier has temporarily surrendered her largely
unfettered right to abort by virtue of the inclusion of other parties
comprising the trust relationship. She is not the sole actor. If the
gestational carrier aborts the fetus, she breaches several duties of a
trustee: to protect the subject of the trust, to defend the trust corpus
from attack, to make the subject (fetus) productive, and to maintain
the duty of loyalty to all beneficiaries. 3 In fact, the gestational
carrier's act of aborting the fetus breaches the duty not to self-deal,
since she has placed her personal interests above those of the subject
(fetus) and the intended parents.
bailment is lawful possession and the duty to account for the thing as the property of
another. Id. In this regard, one who owns the pre-zygote is the owner of "property"
and has a cause of action in detinue for wrongful detention of the pre-zygotes. Id. at
427; see also John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos,
76 Va. L. Rev. 437, 454-55 (1990). Robertson noted that a question arises as to who
owns or has a property interest in early embryos. Robertson cautions that -[a]pplying
terms such as 'ownership' or 'property' to early embryo risks misunderstanding." I.
at 454. These terms do not indicate that embryos are to be treated in all respects like
other property. Instead, such terms simply designate who has authority to decide
among legally available options for an early embryo. Id. at 455. Robertson further
asserts that having a property or ownership interest in early embryos should not be
analogized to having a property interest in a car or furniture. Rather, the pivotal
question is who has dispositional authority and what limits there are on what may be
done. Id at 455 n.48. But see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)
(holding that frozen embryos are neither person nor property, but rather "occupy an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for
human life").
302. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text (outlining the various
requirements placed on women who want to be gestational carriers and the medical
procedures incumbent upon them).
303. See supra notes 291-300 and accompanying text.
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2. The Gestational Carrier's Duty to the Fetus
As trustee, the gestator's duties to the fetus are similar to those
owed to the parents to the extent that the law imposes upon the
pregnant woman certain fiduciary obligations to the fetus and holds
her responsible for breaching such duties.3"
In this respect, the gestational carrier stands in the position of a
daycare facility that is accountable to the child and ultimately the
parents. The facility assumes fiduciary responsibilities to the parents
who are beneficiaries of the agreement, which places the child's well-
being in the hands of the facility operators. As beneficiaries, the
parents have certain expectations. During the period of entrustment,
they are unable to directly care for their child. As a result, they
deliver their child to the facility with the expectation that he will be
cared for during the time of entrustment and that he will be returned
to the parents unharmed at the end of the designated period. The
parents are vulnerable while the child is in the hands of the facility's
operators in that they are virtually helpless to defend their child from
attack while he is entrusted to someone else. They must rely on the
facility operators' promise not to harm the child or allow anyone else
to harm him. In essence, daycare officials insure a child's safety for a
specific period of time. This is the heart of the argument.
As a beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship between the intended
parents and the gestator, the child has similar expectations. The day
care center, however, has an even greater responsibility to the child
who is vulnerable to attacks and is powerless to protect himself. At a
minimum, the child is entitled to have his basic needs met while at the
facility. Further, he has the right to be returned to his parents without
having been intentionally or negligently harmed.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RESTRICTING ABORTION
This Part considers some prominent arguments that might render
gestator agreements unenforceable under any theory, including trust
theory. It addresses feminists' concerns regarding commodification
and inalienability of personhood rights.0 5  In addition, it also
examines the gestational carrier as a Good Samaritan.0 6 This Part,
however, concludes that these assertions are untenable and have not
been recognized in the Roe-Casey line of decisions, nor in trust law.3 07
These arguments should not serve as the basis for denying women the
right to choose to serve as gestational carriers and to fulfill a legal
promise not to abort a fetus and carry it to term, nor should these
304. See infra Part IV.E.3.
305. See infra Part IV.A.1-3.
306. See infra notes 423-38 and accompanying text.
307. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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assertions be voided to allow women to escape a legal promise which
they subsequently find too burdensome to fulfill-carrying a fetus to
term for the intended parents.
Some feminist legal scholars and academic commentators raise a
number of arguments relative to the efficacy of gestational carrier
agreements. 308 Much of the debate centers around the continued right
of gestational carriers to abort despite agreeing not to do so. To this
end, opponents of agreements not to abort may have a powerful
objection to an argument that draws upon the daycare facility analogy
and trust principles to explain the gestator/intended parent
relationship, and the corresponding responsibilities the gestational
carrier temporarily assumes for both the intended parents and the
fetus. Juxtaposed with the right to abort, the daycare comparison
appears to be overly simplistic. This analogy, it can be argued, ignores
that entrusting a child to a daycare or similar facility involves no
relinquishment of autonomy or personhood rights by the facility's
owners or operators. It is in this light that opponents of gestational
carrier/intended parent agreements argue that these agreements
violate a woman's privacy and personhood rights. This part addresses
a few of the more prominent arguments against gestational
carrier/intended parent relationships, primarily assessing the
contention that these relationships result in the commodification of
personhood rights. After reviewing the arguments we conclude they
are untenable.
A. The Right to Abort as an Inalienable Property Right
1. Market-Inalienability and Commodification
A prominent assertion against a trustee-type analysis is that
gestator agreements result in a woman waiving her constitutional right
to abort.3° Critics allege that the surrender of abortion rights has a
dehumanizing and oppressive effect on women. The right to abort,
therefore, should be considered a personal property right and should
be afforded legal protection from alienability in the marketplace,31-'
even if a woman voluntarily relinquishes that right."' Margaret Radin
308. The feminist movement asserts that "women are subordinated in capitalist
(and other) societies, and their position must be changed" and the objective is
"radical change." Richard S. Harnsberger, Reflections About Law Reviews and
American Legal Scholarship, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 681,696 (1997).
309. See supra note 273.
310. See Thomas A Shannon, Surrogate Motherhood: The Ethics of Using Human
Beings 72 (1988) (arguing that by paying a gestational surrogate for her reproductive
services, the possibility is great that we objectify and alienate a function which is
essentially personal in nature); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1852-
53;
311. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1852-53.
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refers to the notion of inalienability of personal property rights as
"market inalienability,"3"' meaning that some rights, like the right to
abort, cannot and should not be sold or traded in the marketplace.' 3
Radin argues that, by rendering such rights non-salable, society
recognizes that some rights cannot be treated as commodities. 14
Market-inalienability is not limited to the circumstances in which a
gestational carrier is willing to carry a fetus to term, thereby foregoing
the right to abort.1 Rather it encompasses any right that is central to
312. Id.
313. See id. Radin bases her commodification theory, at least in part, on Marxist
theories. Id. at 1871. She argues that the freedom of alienation is the crucial
characteristic of liberal property rights; yet Marx saw a necessary connection between
market alienability and human alienation. Id. Radin reasons that in early writings
Marx analyzed the connection between alienation and commodity
production in terms of estranged labor; later he introduced the notion of
commodity fetishism. In his treatment of estranged labor, Marx portrayed
workers' alienation from their own human self-activity as the result of
producing objects that became market commodities. By objectifying the
labor of the worker, commodities create object-bondage and alienate
workers from the natural world in and with which they should constitute
themselves by creative interaction. Ultimately, laboring to produce
commodities turns the worker from a human being into a commodity,
"indeed the most wretched of commodities."
Id. (citations omitted). But see Wendy McElroy, Breeder Reactionaries: The
"Feminist" War on Reproductive Technologies, Reason, Dec. 1994, at 18, 19-20.
McElroy argues that radical feminists refer to themselves as post-Marxists; but it is
not clear how far they have moved past Marxists theories. Radical feminists have
taken Marxist theory and substituted gender for economic relations. "In place of
capitalism, there is patriarchy...; in place of class exploitation, there is gender
exploitation, Developments apparently benefiting women-such as longer lifespan,
birth-control pills, increased access to property, wealth, and education-actually
maintain the patriarchal status quo." Id. at 20. McElroy further asserts that because
of their belief about exploitation and the oppressiveness of patriarchy, radical
feminists find new reproductive technologies abhorrent. Id. at 20. Radical feminists
conclude that these technologies are a creation of male science, which seeks to
dominate nature. These scholars further contend that the legal bases for
implementation of these new technologies, including individual rights and contract
law, are an extension of an inherently exploitative capitalist system. Id. McElroy
argues that these assertions are both absurd and contradictory. Id. For a definition of
"radical feminists," see infra note 345.
314. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 959
(1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property]. Radin argues that some property is more
central to "personhood" than other property and that the law should protect these
rights. Id. at 959-61. Further, Radin believes it is possible to measure an object's
relationship to personhood by the "kind of pain that would be occasioned by its loss."
Id. at 959; see also Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 273, at 1946-49 n.45 (arguing that the
law should protect personhood rights).
315. See Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 273, at 1947 (asserting that in deciding whether
a given right should be alienable, judges must initially assess the "centrality of
freedom to the identity of current individuals and then compare it with the centrality
of security from past selves to the personal identity of future individuals"); see also
Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1879-80, 1880 n.1 15 (suggesting "that
property may be divide into fungible and personal categories for purposes of moral
evaluation"); Radin, Property, supra note 314, at 959-61, 978-79, 986-88 (describing
the intuitive personhood perspective).
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one's identity or personhood.316 "Centrality" to personhood is
characterized by the notions and attributes that most people believe
are important to their personality and feelings of self-worth."" Such
rights are identified by the kind of pain that results by the loss of that
right.318 To this end, women cannot transfer gestational services,
particularly as they impact abortion rights.
Commodification of personhood rights supposes that gestational
agreements turn humans into commodities, resulting in an inferior
form of human life. 20 Such agreements fail to recognize the
importance of bodily integrity, treating it as a fungible object rather
than an attribute inextricably tied to human beings.3 "' The danger to
personhood in treating personal attributes as fungible objects is that it
detaches something integral from the person." Arguably, by allowing
one to be separated from a non-detachable right, like the right to
abort, proponents of free alienability of property rights do not realize
that one cannot remain the same after the loss of a personhood
right.32
2. Justifications for Rejecting the Sale of Personhood Rights
Market-inalienability, then, is viewed by these neo-Marxists as a
means of correcting the market's failure to recognize some property
interests as unsuitable for sale. Noncommodifiability of personhood
rights is a means of controlling external factors that prevent the
market from achieving an efficient result. 24 Noncommodifiability
allegedly represents a better view of personhood because it recognizes
the interconnectedness of the person and her environment as integral
to personhood.31 By promoting a positive view of freedom, it fosters
316. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1849, 1916;
Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 273, at 1949-50 (arguing that in the context of surrogacy, a
woman should not have to give up the right to abort because it protects her control
over her body and procreative decisions).
317. See Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 273, at 1947.
318. See id. at 1947 n.45.
319. See id. at 1950 (arguing that compelling a woman to continue with a pregnancy
threatens her dignity and self-respect).
320. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1872 (arguing that, as a
result of debasing humans by commodifying them, Marx concluded that people must
change in order to live without the market).
321. See id. at 1849, 1930; Mark Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations: On
Surrogate Reasons and Surrogacy Policies, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 135 (1992) [hereinafter
Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations] (noting that an argument against surrogacy
arrangements is that they increase the likelihood that women will be treated as
fungible entities rather than as people who deserve respect).
322. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1849.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1904.
325. Radin asserts that in looking for a better view of personhood, freedom,
identity and contextuality are three main considerations. She argues that
[t]he freedom aspect of personhood focuses on will, or the power to choose
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a concept of human flourishing superior to that implied by universal
commodification.326
Those who reject the salability of personhood rights realize that in a
market society, whatever people want to buy and others want to sell is
deemed transferable.127 Market-inalienability seeks to create a case
for preventing a person from choosing to make fungible personal
attributes, rights or things.3" Prohibiting the transferability of these
rights seeks legitimacy under a number of theories. One argument is
that it appeals to the sense of moral rightness that is fostered when we
embrace a commitment to the sanctity of life.329 Another method of
justifying nontransferability suggests a domino effect from allowing
the transfer of some sexual interactions. 330 The argument envisions a
slippery slope that will result in the commodification of all sexual
relationships. 33
1
A final means of justifying an inalienability theory, which will be
the primary focus of the remainder of this section, relies on the duty
to protect women from their "choice" in placing personal property
rights in the stream of commerce. It is a prophylactic measure.332 The
premise of this argument is that some property may be freely
for oneself. In order to be autonomous individuals, we must at least be able
to act for ourselves through free will in relation to the environment of things
and other people. The identity aspect of personhood focuses on the integrity
and continuity of the self required for individuation. In order to have a
unique individual identity, we must have selves that are integrated and
continuous over time. The contextuality aspect of personhood focuses on
the necessity of self-constitution in relation to the environment of things and
other people. In order to be differentiated human persons, unique
individuals, we must have relationships with the social and natural world.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1905. Radin refers to the alienability of anything in the marketplace as
universal commodification. Id. She refers to this sort of freedom as negative liberty
because in this context, freedom is the ability to use one's will to manipulate objects
in order to gain the greatest monetary value. Id. Radin reasons, however, that "even
negative liberty can reject the general notion of commodification of persons: the
person cannot be an entity exercising free will if it is a manipulable object of
monetizable value." Id. at 1905.
328. Id. at 1880-81.
329. See id. at 1912. Radin argues that "[slomething might be prohibited in its
market form because it both creates and exposes wealth- and class-bascd
contingencies for obtaining things that are critical to life itself-for example, health
care-and thus undermines a commitment to the sanctity of life." Id.
330. Id. at 1912-13.
331. Id. at 1913-14. Radin suggests that the domino theory assumes that, under
some circumstances, the commodified and non-commodified versions cannot co-exist.
Id. By this, she means that if we commodify some things, we prevent their non-
commodified parallels from existing. Id. Based on this analysis, commodifying sexual
interactions, like gestational carrier agreements, will lead to the commodification of
all sexual relationships. Radin concludes that when commodification and non-
commodification cannot co-exist, the non-commodification version is morally
preferable. Id. at 1913.
332. Id. at 1909-10.
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exchangeable as one sees fit. Personal property, however, is
sometimes transferred under circumstances that raise suspicion as to
the voluntariness of the decision.333 The rationale for preventing such
a decision is that
[g]iven that we cannot know whether anyone really intends to cut
herself off from something personal by commodifying it, [a suspicion
of coercion] might sometimes justify banning sales. The risk of harm
to the seller's personhood in cases in which coerced transactions are
permitted ... and the great difficulties involved in trying to
scrutinize every transaction closely, may sometimes outweigh the
harm that a ban would impose on would-be sellers who are in fact
uncoerced. 33
A prophylactic argument disallows a rebuttable presumption of
non-coercion or even a case-by-case examination of the issue of
voluntariness. The belief is that the risk of harm to personhood in a
coerced transaction, which might be mistakenly seen as voluntariness,
is so great that it is better to risk constraining the exercise of choice by
those who really wish to trade a personhood right.33-
3. Market-Inalienability Applied to a Gestational Surrogate's Right to
Abort
Although based on faulty reasoning, the above and similar
arguments suggest that women who agree to serve as gestational
carriers view the alleged "commodification" of the right to procreate
as the solution to their economic powerlessness or oppression.3 ' If
women are prevented from entering into gestational carrier
agreements, they are placed in a "double-bind."337  If we permit
commodification, we may exacerbate the oppression of women. If,
however, "we do not allow commodification, we force women to
remain in circumstances that they... believe are worse than becoming
333. Id. at 1910.
334. Id. at 1909-10.
335. Id. at 1910. According to Radin's argument, so great is the risk to personhood
in allowing commodification of personal attributes, that there could not even be a rule
creating a rebuttable presumption that these transactions are uncoerced. Id. at 1910.
336. Id. at 1915-16.
337. Id. at 1915-17. A "double bind" generally refers to a situation in which
someone receives conflicting information from a single source which does not permit
any appropriate response to be made. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 347
(10th ed. 1996). Radin argues that the double bind has two main consequences:
First, if we cannot respect personhood either by permitting sales or by
banning sales, justice requires that we consider changing the circumstances
that create the dilemma. We must consider wealth and power redistribution.
Second, we still must choose a regime for the meantime, the transition, in
nonideal circumstances. To resolve the double bind, we have to investigate
particular problems separately; decisions must be made (and remade) for
each thing that some people desire to sell.
Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1917.
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'sexual commodity-suppliers.' 38  We deprive the women who are
most in need of the opportunity to earn more money a chance to lead
a better life.339
Radin also recognizes that gestational carriers may not experience a
double bind at all." Rather, these women may carry and deliver
children for someone else out of a sense of altruism.3" Even under
these circumstances, Radin argues that gestational carriers may be
unwittingly contributing to women's oppression by "reinforcing
oppressive gender roles. '342  Similarly, another commentator asserts
that permitting women "to contract away their right to abortion...
enlist[s] the coercive machinery of the state in the project of
compelling [women] to bear children," which is a privacy violation. -"3
In an effort to prevent gestational carriers from relinquishing the
right to abort, supporters of an inalienable-personhood-rights
argument contend that "compelling a woman to continue with a
pregnancy... threatens her dignity and self-respect," because she
would be forced to live with her decision until the child was born. 4
Based on this line of reasoning, if we invalidate gestational carrier
agreements under all circumstances because of their dehumanizing
effect on women, the fundamental right to abort remains intact, even
if it denies women who knowingly and willingly consent to carry a
child to term for the benefit of the intended parents, the right to make
such agreements.
338. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1917.
339. Id. at 1916-17.
340. Id. at 1930.
341. See id.; see also supra note 166.
342. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1930-31.
343. See Roosevelt, supra note 273, at 120.
344. See Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 273, at 1948-50 (relying on Anthony T.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763, 780-84 (1983)).
The commentator notes that people may make a decision which they later come to
regret. Id. at 1948. The author argues that people must be able to depersonalize what
they determine to be mistakes in order to protect their senses of personal integrity. Id.
at 1948. Additionally, when a person changes her mind, she has "likely changed her
mind about some value or goal, such as the value of choice in the future." Id. When a
woman changes her mind about an agreement she has made, she likely views her
earlier decision to enter the agreement as a "foreign and irrational act." Id.
Accordingly,
[sjhe will view her earlier self as almost a different individual-one who
betrayed her by committing her to act against her best interests. This feeling
of former self-betrayal and irrationality can undermine her ability to make
decisions and future commitments by leaving her in doubt of her current
rationality and of the effects of her present decisions on a future self.
Specific performance of promises requiring personal cooperation intensifies
her feelings of regret and self-betrayal, because it forces her physically to
confront her former irrational commitment. Protecting her right to breach
the promise and pay damages ensures her ability to depersonalize the




4. Market-Inalienability Should Not Limit the Ability of a Couple to
Restrict a Gestational Carrier from an Abortion
Many of the concerns about gestational carrier agreements appear
under the rubric of commodification. A common underpinning in
these assertions seems to be the claim that women are being
marginalized and victimized and must be protected from their own
decisions. Critics claim that, even if there is no direct victimization,
the supposed small number of women who might act out of altruism in
carrying a child for a childless couple share some complicity in
women's oppression by reinforcing gender role stereotypes.
These arguments, which seek to persuade law-makers and judges
that gestational carrier agreements should be voided as repugnant to a
number of social policies, are based on faulty reasoning, however, and
should not be used as a basis for invalidating these agreements. This
section seeks to dismantle some of these pursuits as weak arguments
and, instead, asserts that gestational carrier agreements would be
enforceable under trust law principles.
a. Rejection of a Commod fication Theory In Gestator Agreements
To begin, radical feminists"5  argue that the gestational
carrier/intended parent relationship is improper because it
commodifies women, their labor and their offspring.' These
arguments are fatally flawed for several reasons. First, neither the
gestator nor the couple are forced into this market. 7 Infertile
couples may pursue surrogacy or adoption, but have the right not to
choose either.' Moreover, the vast majority of women who choose
not to become gestational carriers are free to make their own
choice. 9 As one author aptly concludes:
The claim about commodification ... has nothing whatsoever to do
with what a woman may or [may] not do with her own body, or what
a man may or may not do with his own sperm. Instead, it is an effort
by some to impose their own conception of the right and proper
345. "Radical feminists" see women as "those from whom sex is taken," just as
workers "are those from whom labor is taken." Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1988). This group is seen by general society as being
more separatist, more alarming and more sensitive to the power difference between
men and women than other feminist groups. Id. In this way, radical feminists stand in
contrast to "cultural feminists" for whom the "important difference between men and
women is that women raise children and men don't." Id.
346. See Epstein, Full Contractual Enforcement, supra note 167, at 2326 n-31;
Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1855-56, 1928-36.





thing to do with bodies, eggs, and sperm on other individuals who
hew to different conceptions of the good.350
There must be more than the bare condemnation of surrogacy rubric
in order to persuade society to restrain those who willingly pursue
these relationships. 5
Another reason for rejecting the commodification theory is that it
wrongly characterizes women and their child-producing ability as
"fungible. ' '35 2 A fungibility argument envisions that women and their
reproductive capabilities are interchangeable goods. It implies that
one woman can simply replace another in fulfilling her obligation
under the agreement.3  True commodities are, by definition, designed
to be exchanged in the market with relative speed.354  "The key
element of a commodity... is the perfect substitutability of one unit
for another, from which it is easily inferred that there is no special
subjective value that is attached to any particular unit. 355
By contrast, the very nature of gestator agreements belies the
argument that women and their children are fungible. The intended
parents and the potential carrier must agree to enter a relationship
which the parties contemplate will last for the duration of the
pregnancy. There is something special which motivates a woman to
carry a child to term for the intended parents. 56 There is also
something that draws a couple to accept a woman as a gestational
carrier and trust that she will deliver their child to them upon its birth.
Under these circumstances, there can be no "perfect substitute."
Clearly the agreement is not for resale.357 Despite concerns about a
gestator's receiving payment, neither the agreements nor the products
350. Id.
351. Id. Epstein argues that, to prevent gestator agreements, there must be more
than just disapproval of them. Id. at 2326. If this is the case, there must be an
examination of the contracting process and the negative impact these agreements
have on third parties, and neither of these considerations have any merit. Id.
352. Fungibles are defined as "goods ... of which any unit is, by nature or usage of
trade, the equivalent of any other like unit." Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 276,
at 675.
353. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 167, at 1880-81. Radin argues
that a fungible object can be replaced with money or its equivalent. Id. at 1880. For
Radin, possessing fungible objects is the same as possessing money. Id. Accordingly,
such objects "can pass in and out of the person's possession without effect on the
person as long as [their] market equivalent is given in exchange." Id. Radin concludes
that speaking of personal attributes as fungible goods is "intuitively wrong." Id. But
see Epstein, Full Contractual Enforcement, supra note 167, at 2328 (arguing that
gestator agreements are not interchangeable, but are specifically tailored to the
situation they address).
354. See supra note 352.
355. Epstein, Full Contractual Enforcement, supra note 167, at 2327.
356. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the motivations behind
becoming a surrogate mother).
357. See Epstein, Full Contractual Enforcement, supra note 167, at 2327 (arguing




of these agreements are intended to be sold in the market as fungible
goods. In fact, enforcing gestator agreements demonstrates that
women and their children are not fungible commodities, but rather
unique individuals.35
There are, however, other reasons why commodification arguments
are simply untenable. If the potential for objectification and
alienation of personal capacities, such as child bearing, are of such a
nature that they preclude payment for the use of these capacities, a
number of professions would be illegal 59 For example, artists and
caregivers should not be paid for their services since they provide
personal services. In addition, the pivotal issue is not whether a
gestational carrier is paid for her services, but rather whether her
value is viewed as reducible to the fee she has been paid. As one
scholar notes, people who believe that gestational carriers can be
reduced to a fee would probably see the gestator as even less valuable
if she did not receive remuneration for her services.' Logically,
doctors and lawyers can offer services at a given sum without having
people conclude that they are worth only that sum.' Further, one
can pay the stated sum for those services without implicitly suggesting
that the doctor or lawyer is worth only the amount received.-' If this
is so, one can pay a gestational carrier a specified sum without
suggesting that either the child or the gestator is only worth the
amount paid by the intended parents.'
b. Respecting a Woman's Freedom to Choose
When comparing the rights of the intended parents and the fetus
against the rights of the gestational carrier, the weight of authority
balances in support of the right to abort as a fundamental right of
privacy under Roe v. Wade and its progenies.' 6 A number of other
legal theories also suggest that a woman has a right to abort that
358. Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for
Surrogate Motherhood, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2343, 2368-69 (1995) (quoting Marjorie M.
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Gender-Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 364 ("IThe more every child is unique, the
more women and children are neither fungible nor reducible to specific traits, the
stronger the claim for specific performance upon breach of any such agreement.")).
359. See Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations, supra note 321, at 211.
360. Id (arguing that if gestators cannot be paid for their services, neither should




363. Id. at 212.
364. Id
365. Id.
366. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
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cannot be impeded. 67 Those who support the unrestricted right to
abortion in this context either expressly argue or tacitly accept that
the right to abort is so fundamental that it cannot be waived, even if a
woman is willing to do so.?8 This argument, however, seems to ignore
an important point: the United States Supreme Court has recognized
one's right to knowingly and voluntarily waive other fundamental
rights,369 including the First Amendment right of free speech,370 the
367. See supra note 273.
368. See supra note 273.
369. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1973) (right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizures); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966) (right to consult an attorney before questioning by the police); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) (right to waive assistance of counsel in a criminal
proceeding); Arizona v. Jelks, 461 P.2d 473, 475-76 (Ariz. 1969) (right to a jury trial);
see also Katie Marie Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. Fam.
L. 263, 280-82 (1981-82). Brophy asserts that the gestator should agree that she will
not abort the child once it is conceived. She suggests, however, that there are two
exceptions to this proposition. "First, is if in the opinion of the inseminating
physician, such action is necessary for the physical health of the [gestating mother]."
Id. at 280. Second, is if the physician determines the child to be physiologically
abnormal. See id.; Healy, supra note 5, at 119 n.124 (indicating that generally a waiver
of constitutional rights requires that a party who waives the right does so knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily, questioning whether a contractual agreement meets the
standard, and finally suggesting that it depends on the terms and circumstances of the
agreement); Ingram, supra note 70, at 693 (noting that while Roe v. Wade protects a
woman's right to have an abortion, the right may be voluntarily waived, like any other
constitutional right); Mandler, supra note 66, at 1313-14; Kenneth W. Simons,
Rescinding a Waiver of a Constitutional Right, 68 Geo. L.J. 919, 942-49 (1980)
(supporting the enforcement of the waiver of the right to abort). In his article,
Mandler argues that, once a gestator waives her right to abort and then aborts without
the intended parent's consent, monetary damages are insufficient. Mandler, supra
note 66, at 1313. The parents stake their hopes for a family on the gestator's promise
to conceive, to bear and to allow them to assert parental rights over the child. Id. No
legitimate interest is served by allowing gestators to change the terms of the
agreement after the child is conceived. See id.
370. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511 (1980) (holding that an
agreement between plaintiff and the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") was
enforceable and all future profits would be the corpus of a constructive trust
benefiting the CIA). Frank W. Snepp III, a former employee of the CIA, published a
book without first submitting the book to the CIA for pre-publication review. Id. at
507. At the beginning of his tenure with the agency, Snepp signed a contract agreeing
not to publish any information about the CIA either during his term of employment
or after, without first submitting it to the CIA for review. Id. at 507-08. The
government sued for damages and declaratory relief, and an injunction, preventing
Snepp from publishing any information in the future without first submitting it to the
CIA. Id. at 508. Snepp's primary argument was that the contract and subsequent
injunction constituted an unenforceable prior restraint on free speech. Id. at 509 n.3.
The Court quickly disposed of the argument in a footnote indicating: "When Snepp
accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agreement that
expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publication for prior review. He does
not claim that he executed this agreement under duress. Indeed, he voluntarily
reaffirmed his obligation when he left the Agency." Id. As a result, Snepp had to live
with the consequences resulting from a contract he willingly signed, including the
award of damages for his breach. Mayo, supra note 65, at 618-19. Mayo indicates
that "since the chilling effect of damages on Snepp's right of free speech was an
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waiver of which has consequences far beyond the relinquishment of
the initial right.371 While Roe v. Wade protects a woman's right to
have an abortion, logically the right may be waived if exercised
without coercion or duress. Nothing in Supreme Court jurisprudence
indicates that the right to abort is to be afforded any more protection
from waiver than any other fundamental right.
In reviewing arguments that reject gestational carrier/intended
parent relationships, there is really no evidence that gestational
carriers waive their rights due to coercion or oppression. Indeed, the
circumstances surrounding these agreements indicate a willingness on
the part of the gestational carrier to forego some rights for a limited
time for the benefit of the intended parents and the fetus.' The
gestator has consented to the waiver of some intimate personal rights,
including the right to abort. In essence, she has agreed to serve as a
trustee, a position which includes exercising loyalty to the parents by
carrying the fetus to term. This does not, however, require the
gestator to put her life or physical health in jeopardy.
Much of the anti-waiver-inalienability rhetoric emanates from
radical feminists who suggest that women cannot consent to enter
gestator carrier agreements and thus deny women the right to choose
to participate in this or other new reproductive technologies.-
Ironically, only recently the hue and cry from these same sources
insisted that women must be free to choose what they want to do with
their own bodies.374 Suddenly, however, the landscape has changed.
incident of his prior exercise of his freedom of contract, there was no first amendment
basis for setting aside the award of damages." Id. at 618. In addition, the Court
affirmed the damages award under circumstances where there would have been no
legitimate grounds for a lawful prior restraint against publication even to protect
national security. Id. Mayo concludes both freedom of speech and privacy-based
abortion rights involve core values protected by the first amendment. Id. at 619. Yet
"Snepp was a weaker case for... uphold[ing] the constitutionality of an award of
damages than is the surrogacy case, because Snepp's contract was with the...
government, not.., another private citizen." Id.
371. Mayo, supra note 65, at 618 ("[Wjhat is clear from Snepp is that since the
Court finds that there was no duress or coercion in the formation of the agreement,
Snepp's right of free speech was, both presently and in the future, restricted by the
contents of that voluntary agreement.").
372. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
373. See, e.g., McElroy, supra note 313, at 22. McElroy asks:
What do radical feminists tell women who choose to "medicalize" the birth
process by using such devices as electronic fetal monitors? Or the many
women who seek out new technologies in order to have a child? Or the
women who choose to be surrogate mothers? Would these radical feminists
deny these women the right to exercise medical choice over their own
bodies? In a word: yes.
Id.; see also Karen H. Rothenberg, Gestational Surrogacy and the Health Care
Provider: Put Part of the "IVF Genie" Back into the Bottle, 18 L Med. Health Care
345, 348 (1990) (stating that the gestational carrier can never give informed consent).
374. McElroy, supra note 313, at 22 (asserting that radical feminists -once
championed 'choice' in unfettered terms").
2001]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Women are now being told choice alone is insufficient; while they
appear to be making informed choices, they are not really making
choices at all. As Janice Raymond writes, "[f]eminists must go
beyond choice and consent as a standard for women's freedom.
Before consent there must be self-determination so that consent does
not simply amount to acquiescing to the available options." '
Reliance on these sorts of pronouncements is an attempt to create a
conflict between consent and self-determination.376 Some feminist
writers concede that some women may appear to choose to carry a
child for someone else, yet they rationalize that these women are not
"choosing" and are incapable of doing so until they are free from
oppressive technological advances and the free market.377
The advantage of shifting the focus of the debate is that women's
choices can be dismissed as lacking self-determination because such
decisions are influenced by the oppression of patriarchy.378 The new
battle cry seeks to protect women from "bad" choices.37 9 In the
meantime, it denies women the ability to make certain choices at all.38
Moreover, those who would deny women the chance to be gestational
carriers ignore two inescapable facts. First, every choice is influenced
by culture.381  Second, choice, by its very nature, denotes limited
options. As Wendy McElroy aptly notes:
[Having limited options] is true of women today and would be true
of women in some future feminist utopia. To claim that such
influences somehow negate a woman's free will-and the right to
control her own body-is to deny that anyone, male or female, ever
truly chooses anything. It strips women of the only defense they
really have against destructive influences: the ability to act freely in
their own self-interests. 382
In this context, the rhetoric leads in disturbing directions. Rather
than acknowledging that women have the prerogative to participate in
gestational carrier arrangements, and further to suspend or waive a
fundamental right such as the right to abort, some radical feminist
writers are willing to risk that women may be viewed as weak-willed,
375. See id. (quoting Janice G. Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive
Technologies and the Battle Over Women's Freedom (1993)).
376. Id.
377. Id. (asserting that radical feminists claim that only when women are free from
oppression will they have the possibility of making free choices).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. McElroy argues that radical feminists can dismiss women who choose new
reproductive technology as lacking self-determination. They can eliminate any
possibility of future embarrassing choices by simply banning them. By doing so, they
gloss over the tension inherent in their competing claims: "1) Women must control






as sheep being lead to slaughter. The outcome of their arguments
would be to thrust women back into the darkness of a time when
women were declared unable to make important decisions, -1
relegating them to a child-like status. "Since they define women as an
oppressed 'class' that is denied choice, they must attack the very
concept of individual choice because it threatens class solidarity.""
Those who would limit a woman's options make what is in essence
an "average reciprocity of advantage"" argument: they want to force
women to forgo the right to make imperfect choices such as deciding
to become gestators, wherein they and others might benefit, to
preserve the integrity of women as a class. Although average
reciprocity of advantage is a property regulating concept, it can also
be applied to the arguments of those who would try to control a
woman's right to choose to become gestational carriers foregoing the
right to abort, primarily because they view the right to abort as an
inalienable property right. Their argument is that, while this restraint
on the choice not to abort and carry a child to term for the intended
parents might appear to be a burden to women because it interferes
with their right of autonomy, these women may benefit in the long
run. Under a theory of average reciprocity of advantage, women who
refuse to be governed by modern reproductive techniques, including
gestational surrogacy, benefit women individually and as a class by
preserving their collective dignity and protecting them from the
oppressive hegemonic structure. Those in favor of restricting the
choice of women to become gestational carriers would find average
383. Id McElroy notes, "[t]he irony is staggering. For centuries, men have
declared that women don't know their own minds, that they can't be trusted with
important decisions. Now, radical feminists mouth the same old patriarchal line." Id.
at 23.
384. Id.; see also Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations, supra note 321, at 212-13.
Strasser notes that there are clearly times when people should not be permitted to
make decisions. For example, minors often do not have the experience and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be harmful to them. Id. However, women
should not be treated like children who are incapable of making their own decisions,
lacking the maturity and experience to be held responsible for their own decisions. Id.
385. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice
Holmes refers to an "average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as ajustification of various laws." Id.; see also Edward H. Rabin et al., Fundamentals of
Modem Property Law 604, n.1 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that many land use regulations
that appear to burden a land owner may, in fact, benefit her). An example the
authors give is as follows:
[S]uppose an ordinance requires every house to be set back from the
sidewalk a minimum of twenty feet. Although landowner A may resent this
ordinance since it reduces the area on which he or she can build, that
landowner gains a benefit since he or she enjoys the open space created
when landowners B, C, and D must also abide by the ordinance. On





reciprocity of advantage an appealing concept, primarily because it
brings consistency to otherwise inconsistent rhetoric.
However, the use of average reciprocity of advantage cannot be
fairly applied to this situation. This is because a gestational carrier's
agreement is not with an entire gender. It is, instead, with the
intended parents. As a result there is no average reciprocity of
advantage in denying women a choice to become gestational carriers.
Therefore, those who would deny women the chance of becoming
gestational carriers cannot tell women who decide to become
gestators that they cannot temporarily forgo their right to abort when
they have promised and suspended the right for the intended parents
simply because it benefits women as a class.
There is another element critical to this new "self-determination"
mantra of certain radical feminists, which posits that women must
know of the material ramifications before making a decision. The
argument is that in the gestational carrier contract, a woman cannot
possibly give informed consent because she does not know how she
will later feel toward the child she is bearing.8 6 She may, in short,
change her mind about the decision she has made. They argue that
the appeal of bearing a child for someone else and the promised
compensation may fade as the task becomes more burdensome."'
Those that support the unfettered right to abort assert that a woman
must be able to change her mind and abort a fetus."s They believe
that to hold otherwise poses a threat to her integrity and self-respect
386. See id. at 23-24. McElroy asserts that "the legal system at times seems to agree
with the feminists." Id. McElroy further notes that the judge in the Baby M case
indicated that surrogate mothers never make a completely voluntary, informed
decision because any decisions prior to the child's birth are compelled, by contractual
and monetary concerns, making any decision "less than totally voluntary." Id. at 23
(quoting In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)). McElroy argues that this sort of
ruling not only invalidates gestator contracts, but also would invalidate any
contractual agreements between human beings. Id. In addition, she notes that it
could be said of almost any contract that people will not know how they will feel until
the contract has been completed. Id. at 23-24. Additionally, an overwhelming
majority of programs only accept women as gestational carriers if they have given
birth and parented at least one child. Hanafin, supra note 5, at 379. Programs making
this requirement do so since the prospective gestational carrier will have more
knowledge of the medical risks and physical demands which will be placed on her, and
will be better able to predict her emotions. Id.; Unif. Parentage Act, supra note 5, at §
803(b)(5) (requiring that, for a valid agreement, a court must find "the prospective
gestational mother has had at least one pregnancy and delivery and her bearing
another child will not pose an unreasonable health risk to the unborn child or to the
physical or mental health of the prospective gestational mother," because "such a
finding will help insure that she fully understands the nature and experience of
pregnancy. Her consent to be the gestational mother is thus with full knowledge of
what she has agreed to do, including to relinquish the child born to her to the
intended parents").
387. Ingram, supra, note 70, at 684 (arguing that in cases involving gestator
agreements "the appeal of the offered rewards may fade as the task becomes more
onerous and seemingly never-ending. However, the task must be completed.").
388. Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 273, at 1950.
[Vol. 70
A TRUST ANALYSIS
because forcing her to carry the fetus to term "imposes a constant,
sometimes painful, and always invasive physical reminder of what
seems a self-betrayal. '"319
Changing one's mind, however, is not limited to circumstances
involving gestational carriers.39 People often commit themselves to
long-term ventures they later regret. Nonetheless, they must fulfill
their obligations. 9' We do not, generally, "consider it exploitive to
expect people to perform difficult and dangerous assignments that
they have willingly and knowingly undertaken.13 - That a woman
might change her mind about, or regret a decision she has made
should not interfere with a woman's right to participate in gestational
carrier agreements.393  It would be paternalism at its worst.3
"Women are not second-class citizens and do not need to be protected
from themselves. They are fully capable of making their own
decisions and accepting responsibility for them."3 95
What opponents of gestator arrangements do not acknowledge is
that the failure to enforce such agreements will harm personhood.3 6
The law respects one's right to freely contract. To refuse to enforce
gestator agreements made in good faith and with the parties' full
knowledge of their repercussions-particularly the intended parents
who have detrimentally relied upon the gestator's promise-would be
to deny the autonomy and decision-making power of the gestator.3
B. The Violinist
1. Thomson's Argument
Many commentators and scholars who address a woman's right to
abort invariably include in their discussion Judith Jarvis Thomson's
389. Id. (arguing that a woman should be able to change her mind even if she has
agreed to carry a fetus to term). "Judges should therefore hold that abortion rights
are inalienable." Id To hold otherwise violates a women's right of privacy. Id.
390. Ingram, supra, note 70, at 684.
391. Id. Ingram indicates that when people commit to activities they do not want
to complete, they must still complete them because they have no other alternatives.
For example they may not want to complete "'polar or space expeditions, military
combat, or an ocean voyage; performing a long and delicate operation; or caring for
children in the parents' absence." Id. Nevertheless, they must still fulfill the




395. Id. at 685. Ingram argues that women should be able to choose to become
gestators. In fact, gestators have the potential to create "new opportunities for
women that might not otherwise be economically possible." Id. The role of gestator is
"left to those who choose it," so it cannot be degrading for a woman who willingly
bears a child for someone else. Id. at 685.




now famous article, "A Defense of Abortion,""39 which posits that a
fetus does not necessarily have the right to life.399 Thomson likens a
woman's carrying a pregnancy to term to a Good Samaritan."° She
reasons that from a moral standpoint, "a woman who carries a
pregnancy to term is like a person who generously offers, at some
considerable cost to herself, to provide what another needs but does
not have the right to, while a woman who terminates a pregnancy is
like a person who declines to offer such assistance." '' For Thomson,
abortion is not immoral; rather, requiring a woman to continue with
the burdens of pregnancy goes beyond what a woman is morally
required to do.4"
Thomson's argument turns critically on an analogy between a
woman's being pregnant as compared with a woman's being
kidnapped and plugged into a famous violinist who needs to use her
kidney for nine months in order to survive. 3 The analogy proceeds
as follows:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed
with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He
has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of
Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and
found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have
therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory
system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to
extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of
the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry that the Society of
Music Lovers did this to you-we would have never have permitted
it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist [is] now
plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never
mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered
from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.''4°4
The question is whether it is morally permissible to unplug the
violinist while denying a pregnant woman the right to abort.40 5 Those
who accept the positions of the violinist and the fetus as comparable
argue that, if we conclude that one has a right to unplug the violinist,
then a woman has a right to abort the fetus in both rape and non-rape
cases.
406
398. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47 (1971).
399. Id. at 54-60.
400. Id. at 62-64.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 48-49.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. See David Boonin-Vail, Death Comes for the Violinist: On Two Objections to
Thomson's Defense of Abortion, 23 Soc. Theory & Prac. 324, 330-38 (1997)
[hereinafter Boonin-Vail, Death Comes for the Violinist] (indicating that there is no
morally relevant distinction between killing a fetus and letting it die-if a woman has
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2. Challenges to the Violinist Analogy
There are some ostensibly powerful objections to Thomson's use of
the violinist analogy as a parallel to the right to abort. As we shall see
later, however, these objections are insufficient to address the
gestational carrier's obligation not to abort and to carry the fetus to
term.' An initial line of argument is that while one may be morally
able to unplug the violinist, it does not follow that a woman can abort
a fetus. Those who support this position posit that there is a morally
relevant difference between killing a person and letting him die, in
that abortion kills the fetus while unplugging the violinist merely
allows him to die.' something he would have done had he not been
impermissibly plugged to the woman's kidney. A similar argument is
that there is a morally relevant difference between intending death, as
with abortion, and merely foreseeing it if we unplug the violinist who
has been attached to the woman involuntarily and without her
consent.409
Others challenge Thomson's violinist analogy with a
"Responsibility Objection, 410  which encompasses two distinct
arguments. One responsibility argument, referred to as the "Tacit
Consent Version" posits that the fetus has a right to use the pregnant
woman's body in non-rape cases because the pregnant woman is at
least partially responsible for the fetus's existence."1 ' The reasoning is
that by engaging in intercourse "knowing that this may result in the
creation of a person inside her body, she implicitly gives the resulting
person a right to remain. 412 The reasoning is that presuming that the
a right to unplug the violinist, she has a right to abort the fetus.).
407. See infra text accompanying note 422.
408. See Baruch Brody, Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A Philosophical
View 30 (1975) (arguing that "Thomson has not established the truth of her claims
about abortion primarily because she has not sufficiently attended to the distinction
between our duty to save [a] life and our duty not to take it"); John Finnis, The Rights
and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thoinson, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 117, 141
(1973) (indicating that the distinction between killing and letting one die may be the
primary reason why abortion cannot be analyzed under a Good Samaritan theory and
why Thomson's arguments are merely a novelty); see also Michael Tooley, Abortion
and Infanticide 43-44 (1983). Tooley characterizes Finnis's argument as hinging on
the difference between direct and indirect killing. Id. A killing is direct if the death is
either one's desired end or a means to one's end. Id. If, however, the killing is only a
foreseen consequence of one's action, and neither desired in itself nor a means to
something which is desired, then the killing is said to be indirect. Id. While indirect
killing of the innocent is sometimes justified, direct killing never is. Id. Therefore,
abortion differs from the unplugging of the violinist in that abortion is a direct killing
while unplugging the violinist is indirect. Id.
409. See Tooley, supra note 408, at 42-45; Finnis, supra note 408, at 117-45.
410. See David Boonin-Vail, A Defense of "A Defense of Abortion": On the
Responsibility Objection to Thomson's Argument, 107 Ethics 286, 287-88 (1997)
[hereinafter Boonin-Vail, A Defense of "A Defense of Abortion"].
411. Id. at 290.
412. Id. (quoting Bonnie Steinbook, Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status
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woman voluntarily engages in the act of intercourse, she should be
understood as having tacitly consented to something that results in a
fetus developing inside her body. 13 She is also deemed to have tacitly
consented to the fetus's having the right to remain alive.414 It is at
least arguable that the notion of tacit consent seems reasonable, if
tacit consent assumes that one acts voluntarily, there is a causal link
between the act and the result, and the result is foreseeable.415 If a
woman becomes pregnant from voluntary intercourse, her act is
voluntary; if intercourse is the proximate cause of the pregnancy that
temporarily impedes her right to control her body, it is the cause of
her circumstances which were foreseeable to her, assuming that she
understood that intercourse could lead to pregnancy.46 This claim of
"tacit consent" is compelling if the elements are not only necessary,
but also sufficient. 417
Those who reject tacit consent as a means of holding a woman
responsible for carrying a pregnancy to term reason that if the
elements comprising tacit consent do not constitute a waiver of rights
in a non-pregnancy context, then they are insufficient in the context of
abortion rights.418 Instead, their argument is that even if deliberately
creating a situation amounts to consenting to the burdens it imposes,
it does not follow that being partly responsible for the state of affairs
counts as consent.
4 19
A second responsibility objection, the "Negligence Version," rejects
tacit consent as necessary for the voluntary nature of the woman's
intercourse in order to deny the woman her right to refuse to help the
fetus. 410 Rather, the woman is akin to a person who is partially
responsible for the accident that leaves an innocent bystander in need
of her assistance. 421 A simple response to the "negligence version" is
that while the innocent bystander has options other than relying on
the one causing the accident-and whose assistance may be
impossible-the fetus has no options other than relying on the
pregnant woman for survival. 41 Neither the tacit consent nor the
of Embyros and Fetuses (1992)).





418. See id. at 300.
419. Id at 301.
420. Id. at 300.
421. See Tooley, supra note 408, at 45; Boonin-Vail, A Defense of "A Defense of
Abortion, supra note 410, at 300.
422. See Tooley, supra note 408, at 45. But see Boonin-Vail, supra note 410, at 300-
01. Boonin-Vail argues that Tooley's argument and other similar arguments rely on a
negligence analogy to support a pregnant woman's duty to support the fetus and carry
it to term. Id. He asserts that most would agree that people have a right not to be
injured by another's negligence and that the one causing the injury should be held
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negligence version of the responsibility objection satisfactorily justify
a gestator's responsibility not to abort the fetus, primarily because
both objections seem to treat the woman's pregnancy as emanating
from a voluntary act leading to an "accident" for which the woman is
at least partially responsible. As will be discussed below, however, in
the gestational carrier context, the gestator is not merely passively yet
partially responsible for being pregnant. She has not engaged in
intercourse knowing that pregnancy might be a possible outcome as a
result of her voluntary act, an outcome she does not necessarily desire.
The gestator's actions are more deliberate and more direct. She
expressly submits herself to medical procedures; she knows that these
procedures are designed to result in her pregnancy; she, in effect,
agrees to serve as trustee for the intended parents with the
concomitant duties of care and loyalty to carry the fetus to term if a
pregnancy results.
C. The Good Samaritan As Stranger: The Right Not to Render Aid
At the heart of Thomson's attack on the notion that a woman must
provide life to the fetus is that people do not normally view an
individual's right to life as imposing obligations upon others to
provide whatever is necessary for his survival.4 ' While Thomson
addresses her arguments to the right to abort in general, these
arguments clearly extend to the question of whether a gestational
carrier, who assumes the position of trustee, may abort when she has
expressly agreed to carry a fetus to term for the intended parents.
As a means of demonstrating that people are not normally viewed
as having to provide whatever is needed for another's survival,
Thomson relies on the parable of the Good Samaritan"'4 as an
underpinning for her analysis of a woman's right to abort.'2- She notes
liable. Id. But this is not analogous to the case of an intended pregnancy. Id. The
question continues to be whether or not a fetus has a right not to be aborted. Ud The
issues are not the same.
423. See Thomson, supra note 398, at 61-64.
424. The parable of the Good Samaritan is recounted in the Book of Luke as
follows:
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves,
who stripped him of his clothing, wounded him, and departed, leaving him
half dead. Now by chance a certain priest came down that road. And when
he saw him, he passed by on the other side. Likewise a Levite, when he
arrived at the place, came and looked, and passed by on the other side. But
a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was. And when he saw
him, he had compassion on him, and went to him and bandaged his wounds,
pouring on oil and wine; and he set him on his own animal, brought him to
an inn, and took care of him. On the next day, when he departed, he took
out two denarii, gave them to the innkeeper, and said to him, "take care of
him; and whatever more you spend, when I come again, I will repay you."
Luke 10:30-35 (New King James).
425. See Thomson, supra note 398, at 62.
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that the Good Samaritan went out of his way, at some expense to
himself, to help a man in need, while a priest and a Levite did
nothing.426 Assuming that the priest and Levite could have helped by
doing something less than the Good Samaritan, the fact that they
chose to do nothing shows that they were not even minimally
decent.427
But they did not have to be. Thomson argues that as a general rule,
people are not compelled to be good or even minimally decent
citizens. In support of this point, she relies on the story of Kitty
Genovese who was murdered while thirty-eight people watched or
listened but did nothing to help her.42  She reasons that a Good
Samaritan would have given direct assistance; a minimally decent
Samaritan would have at least called the police.42 9 Instead, the thirty-
eight people chose to do nothing.430 Clearly, she argues, it was not
morally required of any bystander to rush to the aid of the victim at
the risk of her own life.431 From this example she concludes "[t]hat it
is not morally required of anyone that he give long stretches of his
life-nine years or nine months-to sustain the life of a person who
has no special right.., to demand it [sic]. 43 2 If Thomson is correct,
then there is no moral obligation to the fetus whether the fetus is
present due to rape or voluntary acts. It may be callous or indecent to
refuse to help, but it is neither immoral nor illegal.
Judith Jarvis Thomson is correct, but only for a limited and narrow
set of facts. People are not required to be minimally decent.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 62-63. For an explanation of why no help was offered or calls made by
bystanders, see J.M. Darley & B. Latane, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies:
Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. Personality Soc. Psychol. 377, 377 (1968) (stating the
more people who share the ability to help another in need, the less likely help will be
given by any one person); see also David G. Myers, Exploring Psychology 528-29 (4th
ed. 1999) (examining the "bystander effect," a phenomenon where people are more
likely to offer help when people perceive themselves to be the only source of
assistance).
429. See Thomson, supra note 398, at 62-3.
430. Id. at 63.
431. Id. Thomson's characterization of the thirty-eight people who watched or
listened but did nothing to help Kitty Genovese is overly simplistic. Thomson asserts
that their actions can be seen as being neither those of a Good Samaritan or of those
who are even minimally decent Samaritans, and there is no law under which they
could be charged for standing by while Ms. Genovese died. Id. However, the other
argument is that the law would not have protected them had they wrongfully
intervened. They would have intervened at their own physical and legal peril. See
Shelby A.D. Moore, Doing Another's Bidding Under a Theory of Defense of Others:
Shall we Protect the Unborn with Murder? 86 Ky. L.J. 257, 276 nn.100-105 (1997)
(quoting Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), affd 451 A.2d 664
(Md. 1982) (reasoning that "[tihe onlookers hesitated to become involved in the
fracas at their legal peril. Even if their hearts had been stout enough to enter the fray
in defense of a stranger being violently assaulted, the fear of legal consequences
chilled their better instincts.")).
432. Thomson, supra note 398, at 63.
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Certainly, they are not compelled to be Good Samaritans, for with few
exceptions, American jurisprudence does not compel one to aid
another, particularly a stranger.433 While one may be held responsible
for misfeasance for committing an act leading to liability, there is no
such liability for nonfeasance for failure to act when there is no duty
to do so.4' In fact, strong public policy considerations have supported
433. See generally John Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some
Observations About the Current State of Comnmon Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or
Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 867, 867-71 (arguing that bystanders should be held
to act reasonably under the circumstances when determining if a duty to rescue
exists); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 Cornell L Rev. 901,
928-43 (1982) (asserting that the no-duty-to-rescue rule is justified due to the process
constraints of tort law); Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution
and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirnative Obligations, 72 Va. L Rev. 879, 879-
81 (1986) (asserting that as the law develops a duty to rescue will be imposed); Jay
Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 Wm. & Mary L Rev.
423, 428-45 (1985) (arguing that there should be a duty to render aid and explaining
how it would apply); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue. 90 Yale L.J.
247, 249-51 (1980) (asserting that courts have refused to impose a general duty to
rescue primarily because it would be unmanageable); Jennifer L Groninger.
Comment, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a Victim Lying in the
Street? What Is Left of the American Rule, and Will it Survive Unabated?, 26 Pepp. L
Rev. 353, 353-56 (1999) (indicating that although most civil law countries impose a
duty to rescue, America imposes no such responsibility upon its citizens); Robert
Justin Lipkin, Note, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic
Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue. 31 UCLA L. Rev. 252, 254 (1983)
(noting that while one may be liable for negligent conduct. "he is not required to be a
Good Samaritan"); Marcia M. Ziegler, Comment, Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist:
The American Seinfeld Syndrome, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 525, 528 (2000) (noting that in
both the civil and criminal law, a bystander's failure to assist at either an accident or a
crime scene is completely nonactionable). But see Peter F. Lake. Bad Boys, Bad Men,
and Bad Case Law: Re-examining the Historical Foundations of No-Duty-To-Rescue
Rules, 43 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 385, 385-87 (1999) (stating that the assertion that there
is no duty to rescue is an over generalization, and that the more accurate statement is
that there is no general non-statutory law duty to rescue a stranger).
American courts recognize several basic exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue
rule. See John L. Diamond et al., Understanding Torts 117-20 (1996) (including
creating the peril, special relationship, undertaking to act and reliance, and contract
between parties); see also Restatement (Second) Tort § 314 cmt. a, § 314A-324A
(1965) (including special relationships, landowner's duty, supervisor of dangerous or
helpless persons, and undertaking dangerous acts or rendering services). The
Restatement indicates that a
[sipecial relation[ship] may exist between the actor and the other... which
impose upon the actor the duty to take affirmative precautions for the aid or
protection of the other. The actor may have control of a third person, or of
land or chattels, and be under a duty to exercise such control.... The
actor's prior conduct, whether tortious or innocent, may have created a
situation of peril to the other, as a result of which the actor is under a duty to
act to prevent harm.... The actor may have committed himself to the
performance of an undertaking, gratuitously or under contract, and so may
have assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of the other, or
even of a third person ....
Id. at § 314, cmt. a.
434. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability, 56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217,219-20 (1908). Professor Bohlen explains:
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American courts' consistent "refus[al] to require a stranger to render
assistance, 4 35 even when the nonfeasance seems egregious, and where
the stranger or acquaintance could have helped another with very
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more
fundamental than that between misfeasance and nonfeasance, between
active misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a
failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm
not created by any wrongful act of the defendant.... In the case of active
misfeasance the victim is positively worse off as a result of the wrongful act.
In cases of passive inaction plaintiff is in reality no worse off at all. His
situation is unchanged, he is merely deprived of a protection which, had it
been afforded him, would have benefited him.
Id.; see also Restatement (Second) Torts § 314 cmt. a (1965); Diamond et al., supra
note 433, at 113-20 (explaining "the well-established distinction between misfeasance,
for which a duty is typically found, and nonfeasance, for which a duty is not"); W,
Page Keeton et al., Prossor & Keeton on Torts 373-85 (5th ed. 1984). The
Restatement indicates that:
The origin of the rule lay in the early common law distinction between
action and inaction, or "misfeasance" and "non-feasance." In the early law
one who injured another by a positive affirmative act was held liable without
any great regard even for his fault. But the courts were far too much
occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be greatly
concerned with the one who merely did nothing, even though another might
suffer serious harm because of his omission to act. Hence liability for non-
feasance was slow to receive any recognition in the law. It appeared first in,
and is still largely confined to, situations in which there was some special
relation between parties, on the basis of which the defendant was found to
have a duty to take action for the aid or protection of the plaintiff.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 314 cmt. a.
435. Diamond et al., supra note 433, at 115 (noting that the no-duty rule embodies
"the value placed on individualism in American society"); Keeton et al., supra note
434, at 373 (indicating that the defendant whose misfeasance endangers the plaintiff
has "created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by 'non-feasance' he has at least
made [the plaintiff's] situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by
interfering in his affairs")
Another justification for the existence of the no-duty rule is that because
rescue is morally right, rescue will be devalued if it is required. Diamond et al., supra
note 433, at 115. Others oppose an obligation to rescue because there is absolutely no
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's peril. See
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 151-52 (1973).
A practical reason upholding the no-duty rule is that the legal system would
not be able to manage a rule imposing liability for the failure to rescue. See
Henderson, supra note 433, at 935-36; Ziegler, supra note 433, at 536-37. For
powerful arguments rejecting the no-duty rule, see Diamond et al., supra note 433, at
116 (indicating, in part, that other policy reasons for imposing the duty to rescue
include the belief that the law should not only shape but also reflect society's moral
values: it encourages the timid to get involved because it would be the right thing to
do; it simplifies a judicial system that has become burdened by the complicated
exceptions to the duty-to-aid cases; and the value of the savings accrued in a cost-
benefit formula from encouraging rescues which small societal and personal sacrifice
that avert great potential losses); see also James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22
Harv. L. Rev. 97, 98-100 (1908) (indicating that the law should impose liability on
people who fail to aid others when they could do so with little or no inconvenience to
themselves); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory in Tort, 38 J.
Legal Ed. 3, 36 (1988) (arguing, in part, that the rule results from a legal system
devoid of care and responsiveness to the safety of others).
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little effort or risk to himself. -  Indeed, it seems both outrageous and
immoral that an Olympic swimmer is free to disregard a drowning
child or that one can ignore a child who is being sexually assaulted and
murdered in a public restroom.43 7 To encourage humanitarianism,
every jurisdiction has enacted "Good Samaritan" laws aimed at
limiting liability for those who come to the aid of others, particularly
in an emergency.4:' Nonetheless, in most instances, a would-be Good
Samaritan can still choose to ignore one in need of her assistance.
1. Foregoing the Right Not to Assist Another
Only under certain circumstances does one have a responsibility to
help strangers. For example, one must aid another with whom he has
a special relationship, where one has created the peril, and where one
has contracted to help another.39 The landscape changes, however,
when one voluntarily chooses to forego the anonymity of the priest
and Levite, who ignored the man in need, and to assume the burdens
of being a Good Samaritan. As Prosser eloquently states -[the result
of all of this is that the Good Samaritan who tries to help may find
himself mulcted in damages, while the priest and the Levite who pass
by on the other side go on their cheerful way rejoicing."'
Clearly, then, once a person who has no initial duty to do so
gratuitously takes charge of another who is helpless to adequately
assist or protect himself, she creates in herself a duty and must accept
responsibility for the obligation she has undertaken." She becomes
liable for the person now in her charge if she does not exercise care to
secure his safety, 42 or if she discontinues assistance or protection,
436. See Keeton et al., supra note 434, at 375-76.
437. Diamond et al., supra note 433, at 115; Ziegler, supra note 433, at 525-26.
Sherrice Iverson was sexually assaulted and murdered in a bathroom stall by Jeremy
Strohmeyer as her father played slot machines in a Las Vegas casino. Ziegler, supra
note 433, at 525-26. Even more reprehensible, Strohmeyer's best friend, David Cash,
stood on the toilet seat in the next stall and watched the brutality but did nothing to
stop it. Id. While his inaction was deplorable, Cash did nothing for which he could be
civilly or criminally liable. Id.
438. Diamond et al., supra note 433, at 119; Justin T. King, Comment, Criminal
Law: "Am I My Brother's Keeper?" Sherrice's Law: A Balance of American Notions
of Duty and Liberty, 52 Okla. L. Rev. 613, 617-18 (1999) (noting that every State and
the District of Columbia have Good Samaritan laws which exempt rescuers from
liability for their rescue attempts); Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and
Application of "Good Samaritan" Statutes, 68 A.L.R14th 294, 300 (1989). But see
Frank B. Mapel, III & Charles J. Weigel, II, Good Samaritan Laws- Who Needs
Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protection in the United States, 21 S.
Tex. L.J. 327, 329-30 (1981) (arguing that Good Samaritan Laws do not really provide
an incentive for rescue); Groninger, supra note 433, at 365-66 (noting that studies
reveal that Good Samaritan legislation has had little, if any, beneficial impact).
439. Diamond et al., supra note 433, at 114.
440. Keeton et al., supra note 434, at 378.




leaving her charge in a worse position than when she came to his
aid. 443
Similarly, even if we view the gestational carrier and the fetus as
strangers wherein the gestator selflessly sacrifices her autonomy for
the fetus, the argument that the gestator maintains responsibility for
the fetus remains the same. She must still carry the fetus to term. For
if one can become liable to a stranger for coming to his aid but
subsequently failing to secure his safety or by discontinuing aid and
leaving him in a worse position, then there is an even stronger
argument to be made in the case of a gestational carrier who willingly
agrees to serve as trustee for the fetus. The gestator takes
responsibility for a fetus who, arguably, as a stranger with absolutely
no genetic connection with the gestator, had no initial right to and did
not demand the gestator's assistance-although its very existence
depends on the gestational carrier-but to whom the gestator
nonetheless commits to exercise the duties of care and loyalty. Based
on the duties that envelop her as trustee, she must carry the fetus to
term.
2. Beyond Good Samaritanism and Strangers: Enforcing the
Gestational Carrier's Fiduciary Responsibilities to the Fetus
Thomson's premise of pregnant woman as Good Samaritan is based
upon what she believes is the tenuous relationship between two
alleged strangers: the pregnant woman and the fetus. The pregnant
woman makes promises and sacrifices that she may discontinue by
aborting the fetus if those promises interfere with her autonomy
beyond what she finds acceptable. But Thomson's argument is faulty
in large part because it treats the fetus as a stranger who just happens
to be inconveniently placed proximate to the mother or because she
has taken responsibility for the fetus by default."4 The gestational
carrier and the fetus are not strangers, however. The fetus is not
being carried merely by happenstance or mistake." 5  Rather, the
443. See id.
444. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982); see
also Rosalind Hursthouse, Beginning Lives 191-93 (1987) (questioning Thomson's
argument that a pregnant woman is a Good Samaritan simply because she carries a
fetus to term); David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1992
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 10-14 (1993). Strauss rejects the argument that the pregnant woman
is a Good Samaritan. Strauss, supra, at 10-14. He notes that neither Casey nor any
other decision relies on this argument. Id. at 11. He notes that the argument is
problematic in that it depends on two libertarian premises: "[Fjirst that obligations
must be in some way commensurate with voluntary undertakings; and second, that
there is a sharp distinction between bodily invasions and other impositions on
individuals. These libertarian premises are not obviously true, are difficult to justify,
and conflict with strongly held institutions." Id.
445. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (stating that there is a lengthy




intended couple who is unable to conceive endures considerable
monetary, physical and emotional strain' to produce an embryo to be
entrusted to the gestational carrier." In fact, some argue that
infertile couples pursue the desire to have a child as if their very lives
depend on it.' Gestational carriers are well aware of their role in
helping the intended couple achieve this goal. 9 Whether for
economics, altruism or other reasons, gestational carriers willingly and
knowingly submit to the procedures necessary to assist intended
parents in their quest for a child.4 50
If a woman chooses to become a gestational carrier, she knows that
apart from her own monetary considerations, 5' if any, the primary
purpose of the relationship is to produce a child for the intended
parents. To this end, she must choose to endure procedures that she
may find invasive to her personal autonomy. These procedures are
not forced upon her. She must agree to submit to a full medical and
psychological evaluation.452 To facilitate her ability to carry the fetus,
the gestational carrier must receive injections to prevent normal
endocrine activity, 53 followed by estrogen and progesterone to
prepare the fetus for transfer.4" Thereafter, the fetus is transferred to
the gestator's uterus by one of the methods previously described., 5
Even after the transfer has been completed, however, there are no
guarantees that the gestator will produce a live birth. Less than 18.5%
446. For monetary considerations, see text accompanying notes 38 (estimating the
cost of one IVF cycle to be between $8000 and $10,000), 43 (the costs are normally
not covered by insurance) and 164 (payments to gestational surrogates range from
$10,000 to $50,000 for a successful pregnancy). On the physical requirements of IVF,
see notes 96-1268 and accompanying text. On the emotional strain on a couple, see
Stewart, supra note 151 ("The dream of bearing a baby is costly, in dollars, in time,
and most of all, in wildly veering emotions, in hope and fear and disappointment.");
supra note 38; see also Rothenberg, supra note 373, at 350 ("[T]he couple... after
investing so much time, emotional energy, and money in achieving a [gestational
carrier] pregnancy, may feel they have no other recourse than to go to court to
attempt to protect their genetic material from any negative behaviors of the
[gestational carrier].").
447. See supra Part I.G (describing the procedures necessary to use a gestational
carrier).
448. See Applegarth, supra note 276 (suggesting that infertility patients pursue
treatment with a tenacity equal to that of cancer patients).
449. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71, 200.
450. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71, 200,
451. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65 (noting that gestational carriers
typically receive payments between $10,000 and $50,000 for a successful pregnancy,
but payments can be as little as ten percent of the agreed amount if a live birth is not
achieved).
452- See supra text accompanying notes 161-62; see also Ethics Committee of the
American Fertility Society, supra note 25, at 60S (stating that the screening of the
gestational carrier is required since there is a risk of the gestational carrier being less
concerned for the child than a pregnant woman who will rear the child).
453. See supra text accompanying note 170.
454. See supra text accompanying note 170.
455. See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
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of gestational carriers actually become pregnant. 456 Of this number,
about one-third of these pregnancies end in miscarriage during the
first trimester.4 7 Because the likelihood of a full-term pregnancy is
not great, the intended parents must rely on the gestational carrier not
to commit any intentional acts to cause the death of the fetus,
including abortion.
It is clear that both the intended parents and the gestational carrier
must endure substantial physical invasion, as well as emotional tumult,
for the intended parents to have even a possibility of conceiving or
delivering a child with their complete genetic makeup.458 It is also
undisputable that neither the intended parents nor the gestational
carrier are forced into the relationship that binds them together. 59
And because the gestator willingly agrees to carry the fetus, she has
invited it in and she becomes the host.4 ° Prior to submitting to the
medical procedures necessary to receive and carry the fetus, the
gestational carrier has absolutely no moral or legal obligation to
provide security and, ultimately, life to the fetus.461 In this sense, she
is no different from any other woman in society who can freely refuse
to be burdened by the needs of another unless she is legally obligated
to assume the burden. But once she identifies herself as one willing to
undertake the arduous task of bearing a child for another, including
the intendent risks, her status changes. Her right to exist as an
anonymous member of society, who in this context is not accountable,
temporarily ceases and gives way to a duty to the fetus.462 The
456. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
457. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
458. See Utian et al., Preliminary Experience, supra note 25, at 634 (detailing that
couples were accepted into gestational carrier programs only if the female had ovaries
and either no uterus or a severely abnormal uterus, over five recurrent abortions, or
some other medical problem with conceiving (e.g., DES exposure, severe heart
disease, diabetes mellitus)).
459. See Epstein, Full Contractual Enforcement, supra note 167, at 2326.
460. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 438 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson,
Procreative Liberty] (indicating that in the context of abortion in general, a woman is
under no obligation to invite the fetus in, however, once she does, she assumes
obligations to the fetus that limit her freedom over her own body). If this is true in
cases of pregnancy in general, then an even stronger argument can be made where the
gestational carrier agrees to carry the fetus and subsequently invites it "in."
461. Id.
462. See James Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal
Punishment for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1104, 1127 (1991)
(asserting that while a person is not required to take any action to help another, once
she does take this role, other obligations may arise. A woman who does not wish to
help a fetus does not have any obligation to do so, but once she accepts the role of
"mother" she owes certain duties to the child.); see also In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 614
(D.C. 1987) (holding that as a matter of law the woman's right to abort is separate
from her obligations to the fetus once she decides to carry the fetus to term); Keeton
et al., supra note 434, at 376-77 (noting that the law has limited any tendency to
depart from the rule that there must be some special relationship between the parties
before a duty is created between the parties).
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gestational carrier can be seen as having created a "special
relationship" with the fetus whose care and safety clearly have been
entrusted to her. 3 In essence, she is the trustee, and the fetus, as a
beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship between the intended parents
and the gestator, depends upon her to act in good faith by fulfilling
her duties of loyalty and care.4
Even if one is unwilling to concede that the fetus and the
gestational carrier share a special relationship, another basis for
imposing a duty emerges. An equally forceful argument is that the
gestational carrier becomes liable like anyone else who has no initial
obligation to help another yet decides to intervene.4 - Extending
responsibility under these circumstances is logical. If, for example,
one can be held liable for failing to obtain medical aid for another
based primarily on his promise to do so,4 ' it is not a stretch to find
that a woman has a duty to the fetus not only for her promise, but also
for her undertaking direct responsibility for its safety and security.
She cannot leave the fetus in a worse position than it would be in had
she not assumed the duty. 67 The following hypothetical based on one
created by Rosalind Hursthouse helps to demonstrate this position:
"Suppose I am living in a house in France in 1944. As I happen to
know, its earlier occupiers had run it as a link in a chain smuggling
Jews out of Germany and-as I happen to know-the simple signal
they use to show that the hiding places were free was to leave a
window open. If all the windows were shut it meant 'Danger, keep
away'.... I allowed myself to open the occasional window when it
was very hot. Suppose one night a Jewish refugee climbs in....
interpreting the open window" to mean he was free to enter. "His
survival depends on my sheltering him, as I knew the survival of
anyone who interpreted the open window... would." Nevertheless,
I tell the Jewish refugee he cannot stay, knowing that expelling him
from my home will result in his death. '
Clearly someone's survival depends on what is done.4" Under these
circumstances, can I legitimately argue that I am not responsible for
463. See Diamond et al., supra note 433, at 118; Keeton et al., supra note 434, at
376-77.
464. See supra notes 273-301 and accompanying text.
465. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 323 (1965): Diamond et al., supra note 433,
at 118 n.20 (discussing duty to act once police have taken a person into custody);
Keeton et al., supra note 434, at 378-82. Keeton argues that one does not have a
general duty to help another in peril. Id. at 378. But if one does attempt to help,
taking charge and control of the situation, one is regarded as entering into a
relationship with its attended responsibilities. Id. at 378. For example, a doctor who
accepts a charity patient will be liable for failure to use reasonable care for the
protection of the plaintiff's interests. Id.
466. Diamond et al., supra note 433, at 118.
467. Id.




the refugee's being in my house and dependant upon me for his
survival?47 ° The Jewish refugee had no right to enter my house short
of my giving him permission to enter.471 But once I have invited him
in, I cannot reasonably argue that my right to bodily integrity, which is
not absolute, and my right to be free from physical intrusion permit
me to expel him from my home, knowing that I have created a
situation where he justifiably has become dependant upon me because
I agreed to be responsible for his care and safety.47 Indeed, it is likely
that the refugee has lost the opportunity to have someone else secure
his safety. Under these circumstances, I cannot now refuse to give
assistance whether I have encountered a stranger or one with whom I
have previously established a relationship. In either case, the person
has a right to depend on me. I can neither act unreasonably nor leave
him in a worse position than before his reliance.473
The same argument can be made in the context of the gestational
carrier and the fetus. Like the Jewish refugee, neither the intended
parents nor the fetus could insist that anyone provide for its care and
safety. It is only after one takes some positive steps signifying that
another can depend upon him that anyone can assert a right of
reliance.474 The fetus has an even stronger argument than does the
refugee. Whether one believes the fetus is a human being or
property,475 prior to being transferred to the gestator's uterus, the
embryo has no functional existence. This means that, standing alone,
the embryo has no ability to progress beyond its current status, but the
possibility still exists that someone might carry it to term so that it can
be transferred to the intended parents. Once the gestational carrier
accepts care and responsibility for the fetus, she forecloses this
opportunity for any other woman. The fetus is worse off in two
critical ways. First, it must now depend upon the gestational carrier
for its very survival. Second, once the gestator is permitted to abort,
she eliminates any possibility for the fetus to be carried to term, born
alive and delivered to the intended parents.
One can argue that this is true in all cases of abortion, whether or
not there is a gestational carrier since, in either case, the fetus must
depend upon the woman for survival. However, the disequilibrium
between these two situations occurs because the gestator has
knowingly and voluntarily suspended her abortion rights-agreeing to




473. See Diamond et al., supra note 433, at 119 (noting that one can be held liable
for negligence or intentional acts for preventing a rescue, and also can be held liable
where an unfinished rescue effort has dissuaded others from helping).
474. See Denison, supra note 462, at 1127 (arguing that once a woman elects to
carry a fetus to term, she has a duty to the fetus).
475. See supra note 301.
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both the fetus and the intended parents. There is a confidential,
fiduciary relationship of trust which results because the fetus and the
intended parents justifiably rest their trust in the gestator for the
benefit of the fetus.476 While they could not have demanded that
anyone be the fetus's source of refuge, they have the right to depend
upon it once the gestator agrees to accept responsibility for the fetus.
Otherwise, the intended parents lose the opportunity to realize the
birth of a child by relying on the gestator's promise not to abort. For
this loss, there can be no monetary compensation.
Returning to the violinist hypothetical," we employ a scenario
more intimate than the one involving the Jewish refugee, which
similarly supports these propositions. Rather than being kidnapped,
the woman voluntarily agrees to relinquish her kidney to the violinist.
Relieved, the violinist justifiably discontinues his search for another
donor. Unfortunately, immediately after the transplant, the woman
changes her mind and demands the return of her kidney, knoving that
without it the violinist will die. Surely, one cannot reasonably argue
that the woman has the right to the return of her organ, even if it
results in the death of the violinist who has justifiably relied to his
detriment on the woman's willingness to give him her kidney.
3. Implied Recognition of a Trust Relationship between the Mother
and the Fetus
Unfortunately, those who champion the gestator's right to abort
even when she has knowingly and voluntarily agreed to temporarily
waive this right seem to forget that the fetus also has rights which
must be protected. Even under Roe v. Wade,47 a woman does not
have an absolute right to abort 79 Rather, the Supreme Court in Roe
clearly recognized that the State has an important and legitimate
interest in potential life which exists throughout a woman's
pregnancy.' Further, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,4st
the Supreme Court erased the "viability" line pronounced in Roe that
designated when the State's interest in potential human life became
compelling.' In a minority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated,
"we do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human
476. See supra note 276.
477. See Thomson, supra note 398, at 48-52.
478. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
479. See supra text accompanying notes 22425-26 and 264-65.
480. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63 (indicating that the State has an "important and
legitimate interest" in potential life that exists throughout a woman's pregnancy, and
that such interests increase substantially as a woman approaches the time to give
birth). Roe also held that the State's interests become "compelling at the point of
viability." Id.
481. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
482. See Christine Hunt, Criminalizing Prenatal Substance Abuse: A Preventative
Means of Ensuring the Birth of a Drug-free Child, 33 Idaho L. Rev. 451,466 (1997).
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life should come into existence only at the point of viability .... '[T]he
State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling
before viability. '' 48 3 Planned Parenthood v. Casey4" also recognized
that a woman's freedom to terminate her pregnancy is not so
unlimited "that from the outset, the State cannot show its concern for
the life of the unborn."48
In this context, when the gestational carrier assumes responsibility
for the fetus, she has limited her right to complete bodily integrity.48 6
Indeed, the very nature of her decision to become a gestational carrier
brings her rights into conflict with the rights of the fetus.4' s Just like a
trustee, she assumes a duty to avoid acts or omissions that will injure
the corpus of the trust, the fetus, and ultimately the child.4m Her
responsibilities are not different from those required to protect the
child's welfare from the time the child is born until the mother
transfers the duty to someone else.489 The fetus acquires the right to
have the gestator exercise a duty of care and conduct herself in a
manner that does not cause injury,49° as well as the right to be brought
into the world as healthy as reasonably possible.49' Recent medical
developments support the legal concept that "a fetus has the right to
begin life with a sound mind and body. ' 49
483. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)); see
also Hunt, supra note 482, at 466-67 ("The Supreme Court in Webster did not hold
that the State's interest is 'compelling' throughout a woman's pregnancy, but rather, it
held that the State's interest becomes 'compelling' not at the rigid line of viability, as
determined by Roe, but some time before viability.").
484. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
485. Id. at 869; see also Hunt, supra note 482, at 466-67 (indicating that Roe and its
progeny support a limited state right to regulate abortion).
486. See Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 460, at 438. See also Hunt,
supra note 482, at 468-69. Hunt notes that some scholars have argued that once a
pregnant woman chooses to forego an abortion, she acquires both a legal and moral
duty to give her fetus the best care possible. Id. at 468. In addition, Hunt notes that
one judge held that there was "no reason to treat a child in utero any differently from
a child ex-utero where the mother has decided not to abort or where the time allowed
for abortion has passed." Id. at 469.
487. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 460, at 437-38.
488. Id. at 438. Robertson notes that
[t]he mother has... a legal and moral duty to bring the child into the world
as healthy as is reasonably possible. She has a duty to avoid actions or
omissions that will damage the fetus and child, just as she has a duty to
protect the child's welfare once it is born until she transfers this duty to
another. In terms of fetal rights, a fetus has no right to be conceived-or,
once conceived, to be carried to viability. But once the mother decides not
to terminate the pregnancy, the viable fetus acquires rights to have the
mother conduct her life in ways that will not injure it.
Id. at 438.
489. Id. at 437-38.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. James A. Filkins, A Pregnant Mother's Right to Refuse Treatment Beneficial to
Her Fetus: Refusing Blood Transfusions, 2 DePaul J. Health Care L. 361, 361 (1998);
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This right of the fetus to be born free from harm is not speculative.
The choice of fetal interests over maternal rights is deeply rooted in
the criminal law tradition 493 as well as recent tort Iaw.4 " American
criminal law jurisprudence reveals that a person who performs acts
before fetal birth that result in the death of the fetus after birth
commits homicide.495 While a prenatal act causing a fetus in itero to
be stillborn is not homicide, it has been traditionally punished as
either feticide or even abortion.4 The fetus's mother is also subject
to liability under the same theories.
For well over a decade, great focus has been placed on the pregnant
woman's responsibility for the prenatal welfare of her fetus."' One
issue which has resulted in considerable controversy and heated
see Robin M. Trindel, Fetal Interests vs. Maternal Rights: Is the State Going Too Far?,
24 Akron L. Rev. 743, 743 (1991).
493. See, e.g., Wayne R. Lafave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 607-09 (2nd
ed. 1986).
494. See, e.g., Keeton et al., supra note 434, at 367-70; Regina M. Coady, Ertending
Child Abuse Protection to the Viable Fetus: Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 71 St.
John's L. Rev. 667, 672 (1997) (noting that the decision in Bonbrest v. Kotz marked a
major advancement in the development of fetal rights because fetuses gained the right
to recover for tortious injuries inflicted upon them in utero); Trindel, supra note 492,
at 745-46 nn.14-19. See generally Michelle D. Mills, Comment, Fetal Abuse
Prosecutions: The Triumph of Reaction over Reason, 47 DePaul L Rev. 989, 992-93
(1989) (discussing development of fetal tort law and noting that many state laws allow
pregnant women to recover for injuries resulting in the death of a fetus).
495. See Lafave & Scott, supra note 493, at 609; Trindel, supra note 492, at 744.
496. Lafave & Scott, supra note 493, at 609; Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra
note 460, at 438 & n.99.
497. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 460, at 438.
498. For articles which discuss fetal rights. see Rebekah R. Arch, The Maternal-
Fetal Rights Dilemma: Honoring a Womnan's Choice of Medical Care During
Pregnancy, 12 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 637 (1996): Katherine Beckett, Fetal
Rights and "Crack Mons": Pregnant Women in the War on Drugs, 22 Contemp. Drug
Probs. 587 (1995); Arthur S. DiDio, The Right to Refuse Treatment During Pregnancy:
Where Maternal and Fetal Rights Conflict, 45 Med. Trial Tech. 225 (1999); Julia
Epstein, The Pregnant Imagination, Fetal Rights, and Women's Bodies: A Historical
Inquiry, 7 Yale J. L. & Human. 139 (1995): Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions &
Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 Harv. Women's L.J. 9 (1987); Nova
D. Janssen, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs During
Pregnancy, 48 Drake L. Rev. 741 (2000); Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal
Rights: Conflicts ivith Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal
Protection, 95 Yale L.J. 599 (1986); Robyn M. Kaufman, Legal Recognition of
Independent Fetal Rights: The Trend Towards Criminalizing Prenatal Maternal
Conduct, 17 Child. Legal Rts. J. 20 (1997); Beth Driscoll Ososki. The Need for Logic
and Consistency in Fetal Rights, 68 N.D. L. Rev. 171 (1992); Dorothy E. Roberts.
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color Equality, and tile Right
of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1991); Barbara Shelley, Maternal Substance
Abuse: The Next Step in the Protection of Fetal Rights?. 92 Dick. L. Rev. 691 (1988);
Elizabeth S. Brown, Note, Constitutional Considerations Underlie Missouri's
Expansion of Fetal Rights Within Its Wrongfid Death Statute, 61 Mo. L Rev. 473
(1996); Michael Lee, Note, The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Introduces a Dangerous
New Weapon in the Battle over "Fetal Rights," 30 Ga. L Rev. 1183 (1996); Note,
Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Crininalization of "'Fetal
Abuse," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 994 (1988).
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debate centers on whether pregnant women can be prosecuted under
state criminal statutes for ingesting illegal substances during
pregnancy resulting in injury to the child after its birth.499 Beginning
with Reyes v. Superior Court,5 ° the great weight of authority
consistently held that women cannot be prosecuted for harm to the
unborn under these circumstances.50 1 Reyes, the first appellate case to
499. See Janssen, supra note 498, at 741; Lisa M. Noller, Taking Care of Two:
Criminalizing the Ingestion of Controlled Substances During Pregnancy, 2 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Roundtable 367 (1995); Kellam T. Parks, Protecting the Fetus: The
Criminalization of Prenatal Dng Use, 5 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 245 (1998);
James G. Hodge, Jr., Annotation, Prosecution of Mother for Prenatal Substance
Abuse Based on Endangerment of or Delivery of Controlled Substance to Child, 70
A.L.R.5th 461, 461 (1999) (arguing that in cases recognizing a pregnant woman's duty
to the fetus, these courts implicitly recognize that the pregnant woman has committed
a wrong against the child and must be held responsible). Those jurisdictions that do
not impose such responsibility do not do so primarily due to lack of legislative
authority. See Hunt, supra note 482, at 454 (indicating that by statute courts have the
authority to involuntarily civilly commit a pregnant woman where it has been
demonstrated that she poses a danger to her unborn child or herself). However, since
criminal statutes did not include the word "fetus," women did not have fair notice and
warning that harm to the fetus in utero could result in criminal prosecution under law.
Denison, supra note 462, at 1104 (arguing that great controversy and heated debate
centers around the abuse of illegal drugs by pregnant women and the impact on their
children after birth); Hunt, supra note 482, at 454-55.
500. 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
501. While most jurisdictions have been reluctant to hold mothers criminally
responsible for prenatal substance abuse, it has not been because they find these sorts
of prosecutions inherently wrong. See Hodge, supra note 499, at 470-72. Rather,
these women have been able to avoid prosecution because these courts believe they
lack specific legislative authority to charge mothers with child abuse or child
endangerment for delivering drugs to a fetus. Id. at 470-72; see also U.S. v. Foreman,
1990 WL 79309, at *2 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990) (holding that an unborn fetus is not
intended as a potential victim of criminal neglect under a military statute covering
child abuse and neglect); Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (indicating that child abuse statute did not include fetuses); Reyes v. Superior
Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding the ingestion of heroin during
pregnancy was not subject to criminal prosecution since the word "child" in the
applicable statute did not include fetuses); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the statute did not include the criminal
prosecution of mothers whose prenatal substance abuse harms their infants);
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1993) (noting that a fetus is not
included in the definition of a "person," and if the legislature had wanted to include it
they would have expressly done so); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 52-53 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that while the existing state statute clearly proscribed the
possession and use of cocaine, nothing evidenced an intent to prosecute women for
delivery of cocaine to a fetus while in utero and concluding the court was not at liberty
to create a new crime); Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 598 (Nev. 1994) (holding that a
mother cannot be prosecuted for the delivery of a controlled substance to her child
through the umbilical cord due to the lack of clear statutory language); People v.
Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846 (Geneva City Ct. 1992) (holding the delivery of
cocaine to a fetus in utero is not within the scope of the statute since a fetus is not
included in the statutory definition of "child"); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711
(Ohio 1992) (holding that a mother cannot be prosecuted for substance abuse during
pregnancy under the child endangerment statute because the "parent-child"
relationship is not established until birth); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex.
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consider this issue, clearly sets the tone for similar decisions in other
jurisdictions by holding that the state's criminal child abuse statutes
did not intend to include the unborn in its definition of "child."'
Despite the overwhelming majority of cases refusing to allow any
prosecutions or criminal sanctions against pregnant women solely
because of their prenatal substance abuse, one state has been willing
to hold to the contrary." 3 In a bold move for fetal rights, Whither v.
State held that, in South Carolina, a pregnant woman who causes pre-
birth injuries to her fetus can be held criminally responsible for the
child's post-natal injuries.
The decision in Whitner was not a stretch, however. South Carolina
law had for many years recognized that in the context of civil law,
viable fetuses are persons with certain rights and privileges.' In Hall
v. Murphy, 06 the South Carolina courts previously held that there was
no medical or other basis for holding that a viable fetus was not a
person for purposes of its wrongful death statute.5Y7 Following Hall,
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Fowler v. Woodard -
reaffirmed that a viable fetus need not be born alive to bring an action
for wrongful death of the fetus."° Fowler made clear that the decision
in Hall was based upon its view of a viable fetus as a person with legal
rights.5 10
The South Carolina Supreme Court subsequently held in State v.
Horn511 that a viable fetus is a person even under state criminal
statutes.1 The Court concluded that it would be "grossly inconsistent
for us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purposes of
imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a similar classification
in the criminal context. '513 The Court reasoned that its holding in
App. 1994) (holding that a mother could not be prosecuted for giving birth to a drug-
addicted child since it was not possible under the statute to prosecute the results of
the mother's conduct, but rather only the conduct itself).
502. See Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14.
503. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (upholding the prosecution of
a mother who abused drugs during her pregnancy and was charged with child abuse
and endangerment); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
(holding that drug tests on urine samples of maternity patients suspected of using
cocaine was in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
504. Id
505. See Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.E.2d 257,262-63 (S.C. 1960) (finding that a fetus is a




508. 138 S.E.2d 42,44 (S.C. 1964).
509. Id. at 44.
510. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1997).





Whitner was consistent with existing medical information, 14
precedent 55 and the statute's public policy. 116
In light of these cases, Reyes was incorrectly decided. The
interpretation of the statute was erroneous because it overlooked the
fact that the abused child really is not the fetus. 517 Rather, it is the
child who is born alive and suffers from injuries occurring before its
birth. 18 Indeed, Reyes was inconsistent with California homicide law
which, at the time of the decision, imposed liability for prenatal
actions that cause death post-natally.5 19 Those decisions following
Reyes also appear to have ignored that the child born alive after the
mother has exposed it to illegal drugs is in need of protection. 20
Even if Reyes and its progeny got it wrong, Whitner and subsequent
similar decisions have gotten it right.521 As one commentator notes,
"[t]he timing of the Whitner decision was critical; as the first state high
court to criminalize maternal drug use, it sent a prominent message
that abuse of the unborn child will not be tolerated."' 22 While the
ground-breaking decision resurrected the balancing of a woman's
514. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780; see also Coady, supra note 494, at 669 (arguing
that the South Carolina Supreme Court based its decision primarily upon existing
medical information regarding fetal development); Joseph Wharton, Domestic
Relations: Drugs in Pregnancy Amount to Abuse, 82 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 43
(asserting that the decision in Whitner was based on medical knowledge rather than
the relationship between mother and child).
515. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780-81.
516. Id.; see also Whitner v. State, 70 A.L.R.5th 723, 732 (1998) (noting that a
Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, was similar to the facts in Whitner
but reached a different result, primarily due to different public policies). In Pellegrini,
the court held that a viable fetus could only be accorded the rights of a person for the
sake of its mother or its parents. Id. at 733. This means that the viable fetus does not
have rights of its own that deserve vindication. Id. To the contrary, the policy
underlying South Carolina's body of law was the protection of the viable fetus, a
policy radically different from that underlying the law of Massachusetts. Id. See
generally Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1993) (holding that a
mother of a newborn could be criminally prosecuted based on a statutory theory of
possession of cocaine, where drugs were found in the child's urine as a result of
prenatal drug abuse by the mother).
517. See Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 460, at 439.
518. Id.
519. See Cal. [Penal] Code § 187 (West 1999); see also Keeler v. Superior Court,
470 P.2d 617, 622 (Cal. 1970), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Carlson, 112
Cal. Rptr. 321, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) ("When the child is born.., it becomes a
human being, [sic] within the meaning of the law; [sic] and if it shall then die.. . it
would be murder."(citation omitted)); People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92, 95 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1947).
520. See Hunt, supra note 482, at 468 (noting that the child who is born alive but
who has been damaged by the mother's prenatal drug abuse will require costly
neonatal care, and those children who are born mentally impaired will require special
education). For these reasons and others, the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the fetus. Id.
521. See Coady, supra note 494, at 676 (noting the number of recent decisions
which have held pregnant women accountable for prenatal injuries to their fetuses).
522. Id. at 678 n.50.
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rights with those of her fetus, it did so consistent with advances in
medical technology."a Such technological advances lend increasing
support for the fetus's legal fights. 4 As society recognizes the need
to extend fetal rights, however, there is, of necessity, a compromise of
a pregnant woman's freedom.'
By strong implication, Whitner recognizes that a pregnant woman
holds the fetus in trust and has responsibilities to it, including the duty
of care. This is so even if she has not willingly agreed to serve as
trustee for the child to whom she will ultimately give birth. It is
important to emphasize that in prenatal substance abuse cases, the
duty of care is not willingly assumed by the pregnant woman. Instead,
the court recognizes that in such cases, the woman's right to bodily
integrity has to give way to the fights of the fetus.
In the case of a gestational carrier, the argument supporting a
gestator's duty to the fetus is less difficult. She is the trustee who has
a fiduciary responsibility to the fetus. She has not been forced to
assume the duty of care. She willingly accepted the responsibility for
the fetus knowing that she agreed to make sacrifices. Short of
extraordinary circumstances, there is no unexpected burden to her
bodily integrity. As a result, even if she grows weary of the task she
has undertaken, she must be held to the promise she made for the
benefit of the intended parents and ultimately the fetus: to protect the
fetus and to conduct her life in a manner that does not injure it,52b and
to deliver a child as healthy as is reasonably possible.--
CONCLUSION
With the help of modern medicine, some infertile couples are able
to achieve the dream of bearing a child of their own through in vitro
fertilization. This medical miracle affords couples the ability to have a
100% genetically related child, even where the female is incapable of
gestating a child. This is achieved through a gestational carrier. The
intended parents provide the embryo which is then turned over to
another woman for the period of gestation. However, the amount of
time, money and emotion that it takes to reach this goal is daunting.
Most legal and medical professionals believe, under the current
state of the law, that a gestational carrier can freely abort the
entrusted embryo at any time, and for any reason, without recourse
for the intended parents. This is wrong. The gestational carrier
should be treated as a fiduciary, the trustee of the embryo she is
carrying. Her responsibilities as a fiduciary are to protect the subject
523. Id at 676.
524. Id. at 677.
525. Id. at 677 n.49.




of the trust, to defend the trust corpus from attack, to make the
subject of the trust productive, to satisfy her duty of loyalty to all
beneficiaries and to not engage in self-dealing. Any one of these
duties alone would preclude the gestational carrier from getting and
abortion unless her own life or physical health were at stake.
While there have been numerous objections to the limitation of the
right to abort, these should not apply to limiting abortions in the
context of a gestational carrier. The commodification arguments must
fail since they are nothing more than neo-Marxist rhetoric that would
preclude women's freedom of choice. The arguments proposed by
Judith Jarvis Thomson, that of the violinist and Good Samaritan, also
fail in the gestational carrier context since the gestational carrier is
responsible for the welfare of the fetus and is not just passively
carrying a stranger to whom she has no responsibility. The gestational
carrier is a trustee who knowingly and willingly enters into a trust-type
relationship in which she assumes responsibility for the welfare of the
fetus.
There is no easy answer when considering the right of a gestational
carrier to abort the fetus she is carrying. On the one hand, are the
intended parents who desperately want a child of their own and have
paid a high monetary, physical and emotional cost to provide embryos
to the gestational carrier. On the other, is the gestational carrier who
could be required to endure the pains of gestation and childbirth.
However, since the burden was freely and knowingly taken, and the
gestational carrier owes a fiduciary duty to the intended parents and
the fetus, the scales should tip in the balance of restricting the
gestational carrier's right to abort.
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